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Abstract
Although many general narrative works exist covering the events of the Albigensian 
Crusade, very little has been written specifically regarding the military aspects of the war 
in the Languedoc. The main written source used in this study has been the Chanson de la 
croisade Albigeoise, a contemporary vernacular work which has been found to contain 
much that this relevant to this subject.
The recruitment and composition of crusader armies and armies in southern 
France is examined and comparisons made between the two. In order to establish a 
background for the crusading army an examination of the recruitment of royal armies in 
Northern France has been carried out. A study of documentary evidence reveals several 
mechanisms whereby armies in Northern France in this period were recruited. Such 
evidence is particularly important in terms of examining the use stipendiary troops and 
mercenaries. This may be helpful in ascertaining the composition of the crusading army. 
It is clear from examining the written sources that the type of warfare carried out during 
the crusade involved many types of troops in the crusading army, not just knights who 
dominate the written sources. Men with specialist skills as well as infantry, mounted 
sergeants and troops who could be utilised for general labour all had an important role to 
play. It is also clear that many crusaders fought for monetary reward as well in order to 
fulfil feudal duties and crusading vows.
An examination of the social, political and economic background in the 
Languedoc has been carried out in order to establish the differences which existed in the 
recruitment of armies in northern and southern France. It has been found that different 
social structures affected land holding and political power. In its turn this affected the 
recruitment of men who served for monetary reward rather than giving service in return 
for land. It is probable that mercenary troops were used more fi'equently in southern 
France in comparison with the North. This was probably as a result of the different social 
structures which existed. The depiction of warfare in Occitan poetry has also been 
covered as it has been found that differences exist in the definition of knighthood in 
southern France particularly in relation to military service.
Fortifications in northern and southern France have been examined and 
compared and an in depth survey of how such fortifications were utilised and besieged 
during the Albigensian Crusade has been carried out. It has been found that siege warfare
was an extremely important feature of the warfare of the Albigensian Crusade as with 
much other warfare of this period. It has also been found that some differences existed 
between fortifications in northern France and the Languedoc in the thirteenth century.
This due to political, social and economic conditions as well as the topography of the area.
Other issues addressed include the possibility of the transfer of siege technology 
and fortification techniques between northern and southern France during the Albigensian 
Crusade and afl:er. In some areas of southern France castle architecture underwent some 
changes due to the coming of the crusade, particularly after the royal take over of south 
western France. Although it is possible that technical innovation came about due to the 
nature of the warfare being undertaken, a technical superiority on either side has not been 
found.
Warfare in the field is also examined. Areas covered include an examination of 
the study of field warfare, particularly battles. In general, it appears that warfare in the 
field following much the same pattern of raids, skirmishes, and ravaging as it did in other 
conflicts of the period with the decision to give battle an exception rather than the rule. 
The battle of Muret is examined as an example of the field warfare which took place 
during the conflict, though it emerges that examining such isolated incidents can rarely 
give a true picture of warfare as a whole during the conflict.
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Chapter 1
1.0 Introduction
When choosing the subject of this dissertation there were a number of factors which led 
to the decision to take as its theme military aspects of the Albigensian Crusade. There 
have been several general works in both English and French written on the crusade. ^  
These have dealt mainly in a narrative way with the events of the crusade and their 
background. There appears, however, to have been very little written analysing its 
military aspects. This seemed, therefore, an appropriate area for research, not only for 
the specific conclusions which might be reached about warfare in the Albigensian 
Crusade, but also for the more general conclusions which might result from such a study, 
relating to warfare in the early thirteenth century as a whole. Issues covered in this 
study will include comparisons between the crusaders and southern armies in 
recruitment of men, fighting techniques and the weapons used and whether major 
differences in such can be perceived in the two regions on the eve of the crusade and 
during it.
Another question which this study hopes to cover is the possibility that military 
technology and methods of fortification may have been imported into the area of 
southern France with the coming of the crusaders. It is hoped to relate the present study 
to theories such as that proposed by Bartlett.^ Bartlett sees three main types of military 
technology as being typical of northern France, Germany and England during this 
period, these being the castle, the use of the crossbow and the use of heavy cavalry. The 
dissemination of such military techniques, architecture and weapons is seen as being 
carried out by three dififerent methods; those of conquest, conscious imitation and as a 
consequence of planned political development. Castles, heavy cavalry and the use of the 
crossbow are certainly evident in southern France well before the start of the crusade in 
1208. The Albigensian Crusade and the subsequent royal takeover of southern France, 
however, involved both conquest and then political assimilation, two of Bartlett’s
 ^ Principal among these are J. Sun^)tion, The Albigensian Crusade (London, 1978), P. Belperron 
La croisade contre les Albigeois et l ’union du Languedoc à la France ( Paris, 1942) and M. Roquebert, 
L ’Épopée cathare,, 4 vois. (Toulouse, 1970 -1994).
 ^See R. Bartlett, The Making o f  Europe (London, 1993), pp. 64-78.
criteria for the dissemination of military technology. One of the aims of the present 
study, therefore will be to ascertain whether the coming of the crusaders can be linked to 
the introduction of new methods of siege warfare and weapons and a growing 
sophistication in military architecture. Bartlett’s model would seem to suggest that the 
south of France was a region where both ‘Mediterranean’ influences and the influence of 
the North met. This being the case, it will be part of the present study’s aim not only to 
investigate whether influences can be perceived in the field of military technology and 
organisation, but also where these influences came fi'om.
The existence of a source such as the Chanson de la croisade Albigeoise was 
also a major factor in the decision to carry out research into this particular area.  ^ The 
Chanson is a contemporary, vernacular work which gives a great deal of detail about 
many of the military episodes which took place and which, on close examination, yields 
valuable insights into warfare as it was fought during the crusade. With the Chanson 
having been taken as its major primary source the present study will mainly concentrate 
on the years 1208 -1221. It has also been necessary, however, to extend the period 
covered in order to be able to ascertain whether the royal takeover of southern France 
led to any noticeable changes within the sphere of military architecture and technology. 
Other narrative sources used have been Peter of les Vaux-de-Cemay’s Historia 
Albigensis  ^and William of Puylaurens’ Chronicle.^
French royal financial records exist from this period, which can be utilised in the 
study of certain aspects of military service for northern France.^ It is hoped that study of 
the methods of Philip Augustus and others for recruiting and maintaining armies might be 
shown relevant to the composition of crusading armies. Also, methods of recruitment 
and composition of armies used in northern and southern France in this period might be
 ^ The edition I have used throughout this study has been La chanson de la croisade Albigeoise, 
ed. & trans. E. Martin-Chabot, 3 vols. (Paris, 1931) translated into French with the original Provençal 
facing, referred to hereafter as Chanson, cited as verse followed by line number in the Martin-Chabot 
text. An English translation. The Song o f  the Cathar Wars, trans. J. Shirley (Aldershot, 1996) has also 
been used.
Petri Vallium Samii Monarchii, Hystoria Albigensis, ed. P. Guébin and E. Lyon, 2 vols. (Paris, 1926). 
Referred to hereafter as Historia, cited with chapter number. Also see the recent English translation of 
this work. The History o f  the Albigensian Crusade, trans. W. A. & M. D. Sibly (Woodbridge, 1998)
 ^ Guillaume de Puylaurens, Chronique, ed. & trans. J Duvemcy (Paris, 1976), referred to hereafter as 
Chronicle, cited with chapter number.
 ^ These have been collected and edited in Le registres de Philippe Auguste, ed. J. W, Baldwin and 
E. Bautier (Paris, 1992); see also J. W. Baldwin, The Government o f  Philip Augustus : Foundations o f  
French Royal Power in the Middle Ages (Berkeley, 1986).
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compared. Few financial records of the type which survive in northern France are 
available from the area effected by the crusade but there are, however, many documents 
that exist relating to land holding which may shed some light on certain aspects of 
military service in the Languedoc.^ Some of the secondary literature regarding the 
Chanson and other sources will be covered particularly in relation to what they can 
reveal about the role and meaning of knighthood in southern France, the nature of 
military service and the different types of soldiers used in the area.* Such studies will 
therefore be relevant to any conclusions reached regarding warfare during the 
Albigensian Crusade.
It will also be necessary to include some observations on the nature of southern 
French society, particularly in relation to land holding and military organisation. This has 
been the subject of a number of studies, with many authors keen to emphasise 
differences between northern and southern France.^ The nature of political authority in 
the South will have to be taken into consideration in order to understand the kind of 
defence and counter-attack the people of the Languedoc were able to mount in response 
to the crusaders. The relationship which existed between the Languedoc, the 
Mediterranean and the rest of France is also an important factor in discussing the nature 
of political, social and economic structures in the South^ ® Major trade routes crossed 
this area helping it to develop wealth which led to the growth of prosperous urban 
centres. Population growth and prosperity helped the people of such cities as Toulouse
 ^See C. de Vic & J. Vaissète, Histoire générale du Languedoc, 16 vols. (Osnabruck, 1973), vol. 8., 
specifically for documents relating to this period.
* See L. Paterson, ‘Knights and the Concept of Knighthood in Twelfth-Century Occitan Epic’, 
Knighthood in Medieval Literature, ed. W. Jackson (Woodbridge, 1981) pp. 115-130 and M. Swiften, 
‘The Chevalier in Twelfth-Century French and Occitan Vernacular Literature’, The Study o f  Chivalry, 
Resources and Approaches, eds. H. Chickering and T. H. Seiler ( Kalamazoo, 1988) pp. 403-447.
 ^See A. R. Lewis, ‘The Formation of Territorial States in Southern France and Catalonia 1050-1270’, 
Medieval Society in Southern France and Catalonia (London, 1984) pp. 505-516, A.R. Lewis, ‘Patterns 
of Economic Development in Southern France 1050 - 1217’, Medieval Society in Southern France and 
Catalonia, pp. 57-85 and A. R. Lewis, The Development o f  Southern French and Catalan Society, 718 - 
1050 (Austin, 1995) Lewis points to several features of southern French society to illustrate the contrast 
between southern and northern French customs including the prevalence of allodial land holding, more 
highly developed monetary economy, the survival o f Roman and Visigothic law and the weak or 
negative role of feudal obligation. See also L. Paterson, The World o f  the Troubadours (Cambridge, 
1993)
See P. Belperron, La croisade contre Les Albigeois, pp. 8-9. Belperron is keen to emphasise how the 
history of the Languedoc was greatly determined by its position, isolated as it was from the North and 
being part of the Mediterranean rather than northern European world.
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win self government and political influence in the region. Such factors also affected the 
way these cities recruited and commanded armies as well as the way they defended 
themselves against the invading crusaders.
The wealth of the Languedoc’s cities allowed them to build and maintain strong 
urban fortifications. The legacy of imperial Rome and its successor Visigothic kingdoms 
also explains the existence of large scale urban fortifications in the Languedoc. It is 
important therefore to emphasise the continuity between the Roman and medieval 
periods in relation to fortifications in the south of France. The role these fortifications 
played will need to be investigated, as well as the specific problems they presented to 
both their attackers and defenders during the Albigensian Crusade. The Languedoc, 
however, was one of sharp contrasts in its landscape and wealth. These factors are 
important when considering the types of fortifications which were in evidence in this area 
in the early thirteenth century. The large and wealthy fortified cities, well defended 
towns of medium and smaller size and the mountain castles of the region represented 
different challenges for the crusaders. The number and nature of small independently 
built fortifications in the area and the way these fortifications were garrisoned will be 
considered. It has often been emphasised that the Cathar heresy was deeply rooted in 
many of the hill towns and outlying districts of the region where the excellent natural 
defences afforded by the terrain made the heretics very difficult to root out.^  ^ ^ 
purely military level, it was necessary to be able to take these fortifications in order that 
they should not be used as military bases from which to launch raids against the 
crusaders.
Archaeological evidence and secondary literature regarding castle building will be 
important in discussing the building and use of fortifications in both the north and south 
of France during this period. Such areas as the development of castle building during the 
mid to late twelfth century, the influences that may have come from the Near East, the 
fimctions of the castle for defence, and also as a residence will be covered. This will be 
related to a comparison between castles in the north and south of France built during this 
period and possible changes in methods of fortification in southern France bought about
 ^^  See J. Given, State and Society in Medieval Europe - Owynedd and Languedoc Under Outside Rule 
(Ithaca, 1990), pp. 22-24.
See M. Barber, ‘Catharism and the Occitan Nobility, the Lordships of Caberet, Minerve and Termes’, 
Ideals and Practice o f  Medieval Knighthood III, Papers from the Fourth Strawberry Hill Conference, 
1988. eds. C. Harper-Bill & R. Harvey (Woodbridge, 1990), pp. 1-19
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by the coming of the crusade. Particular problems arise in the study of the development 
of fortifications, especially in the southern France, mainly owing to the fact that many 
have been destroyed, improved or replaced since the early thirteenth century. This is 
particularly true for many of the mountain fortresses, which were abandoned and 
subsequently fell into disrepair, some in the mid to late thirteenth century, others after 
the Treaty of the Pyrenees of 1659 redefined the border between France and Spain. As 
many fortifications underwent considerable restoration and improvement under Capetian 
rule, the study of such improvements may go some way to enabling conclusions to be 
reached regarding influences in military architecture from the North. However, the 
original twelfth and early thirteenth century fortifications at many sites have mostly been 
obscured by later additions, making it difficult to ascertain their original appearance.
Developments in fortification probably led to a growing sophistication in siege 
methods. The area of siege warfare must play a major role in this study, as it was an 
important part of warfare in the early thirteenth century and because it featured 
particularly heavily during the Albigensian Crusade. The subject of siege warfare during 
the middle ages has been, until quite recently, neglected by most military historians.
The importance of the siege to the study of warfare as a whole has now been 
acknowledged. It is an area which yields valuable insights into the conduct of warfare in 
the middle ages, the use of siege as a means of military conquest being the rule rather 
that in exception in many cases. A number of general studies on siege warfare have 
been published which have mainly concentrated on Britain, northern Europe, the
See H. Kamen, Spain 1469-1714 -A  Society in Conflict (London, 1983), p. 119.
For examples of such works see F. Lot, L ’art militaire et les armes au moyen age en Europe et dans 
la proche Orient (Paris, 1946), C. Oman, A History o f  the A rt o f  War in the Middle Ages, 2 vols. (2nd 
edn., London, 1924) and H. Delbruck, A History o f  the Art o f  War within the Framework o f  Political 
History, 4 vols (London, 1975-85). J. F. Verbruggen, The Art o f  Warfare in Western Europe during the 
Middle Ages from the Eighth Century to 1340, Translated by Col. Sumner Willard, United States 
Military Academy & Mrs R. W. Southern (2nd edition, Woodbridge, 1997) has in many respects 
superseded these earlier works and contains a valuable section on the historiography of this subject in 
his introduction, dealing with many of the mistaken assumptions and methods of previous authors. 
Oman and Delbruck both acknowledge the importance of siege warfare, see Delbruck, A History o f  the 
Art o f  War, pp. 324 & 326, Oman devotes sections in vols. 1 and 2 of his woik to the subject o f siege 
methods and fortification, see Oman, A History o f  the A rt o f  War, vol. 1, pp. 131-48 and vol. 2, pp. 43- 
54. All the above authors, however, concentrate mostly on field armies in their studies.
See B. S. Bachrach, ‘Medieval Siege Warfare - A Reconnaissance’, Journal o f  Military History, 58, 
(1994), pp. 119-133. Bachrach acknowledges the central role that siege warfere played in the middle 
ages and reviews some of the existing literature on the subject. He concludes that the study of medieval 
warfare should move away from the assumption that it was dominated by the mounted knight and 
pitched battles and should emphasise aspects such as the militarization of the population as a whole and 
consider the importance of siege warfare.
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Mediterranean area and the Near East.^  ^ The capture of fortifications was always one of 
the prime objectives of any invading army, while their defence was vitally important for 
the establishment of any kind of permanent power base in a region. Lordship could only 
be established with the possession of fortified strong points fi'om which it was possible to 
police an area as well as exploit it economically and dominate it politically. The taking 
of fortifications during the Albigensian Crusade was therefore of paramount importance. 
Successful military leaders of this period such as Richard I of England, for example, 
needed to be able to employ siege tactics and carry out related activities effectively.^ "^  
The dominance of fortified strong points meant most military action involved a war of 
attrition where infantry, artillery and engineers all had an important role to play. This 
study will cover the role these types of soldiers had to play in the crusading army and the 
army of their southern opponents as well as how they were employed in northern France 
and the near east in the armies of the kings of France.
The effectiveness of siege warfare depended upon a number of factors including 
the topography of the area, the climate and season, the effective recruitment of men, the 
efficiency of methods of supply, the strength of the fortification and the techniques used 
to besiege it. All of these factors should be taken into consideration when trying to 
reach any general conclusions about the nature of siege warfare during the Albigensian 
Crusade. Different methods of attack and defence would have been used depending upon 
the circumstances.
Although this study intends to concentrate mainly on siege warfare, the subject of 
the army in the field needs to be considered. Siege warfare should not be seen in isolation 
as it was very much related to warfare as a whole. On several occasions during the 
Albigensian Crusade, Simon de Montfort took the decision to force a battle. The most 
celebrated occasion on which this happened was at Muret in 1213. As a number of 
military historians writing in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries have 
written on this battle, it will be appropriate to deal with it and other field operations 
during the crusade in the light of this scholarship.^* By covering this area it is hoped that
See J. Bradbury, The Medieval Siege ( Woodbridge, 1992), R  Rogers, Latin Siege Warfare in the 
Twelfth-Century (Oxford, 1992) and P. Warner, Sieges o f  the Middle Ages (London, 1968)
See J. Gillingham, ‘Richard I and the Science of War in the Middle Ages’, War and Government in 
the Middle Ages - Essays in Honour o f  J. D. Prestwich, eds. J. Gillingham & J. C. Holt (Woodbridge, 
1984), pp. 78-91.
 ^* See in particular Lot, L ’Art Militaire, vol. 1, pp. 21 1 -2 1 6  and Oman, A History o f  the Art o f  War,
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conclusions may be drawn regarding the nature of warfare in the field during the crusade 
and its relation to war in the field in northern France during this period. It will be 
necessary beforehand, however, to evaluate the major written sources on the Albigensian 
Crusade available to the historian, and in particular their usefulness to the study of 
military aspects of the crusade.
1.1 Written sources for the Albigensian Crusade
An evaluation of the three major written sources for the Albigensian Crusade is needed 
for the purposes of this study for a number of reasons. First of all there is the question of 
how relevant each of the sources is for the purposes of studying the military aspects of 
the crusade. Matters such as how well informed the authors were, the accuracy of their 
accounts and what their sources were all have a bearing on this. Much of what was 
written by these authors was derived from oral testimony. It is therefore necessary to 
question how well informed the authors’ sources were. Oral testimonies by their nature 
involve the view point of one individual; this limits their usefulness in trying to gain an 
overall picture of an event which may have involved many people and ranged over a 
wide area such as a battle or the siege of a large fortification. What follows is an 
evaluation of each written source according to these criteria.
1.1.1 La chanson de la croisade Albigeoise
The work which has become known by this title is an epic poem in the Provençal 
language which takes as its subject the Albigensian Crusade from the time of its 
inception to the campaign of Prince Louis in 1218. The work consists of two parts, 
generally considered to be written by two different poets. This can be mainly ascertained 
fi'om the decidedly different style, language and political sympathies revealed in the two 
parts of the poem.^  ^The first author, William of Tudela wrote the first 2772 lines
vol. 1, pp. 454 -467.
For the style and language of the poem see Martin-Chabot’s introduction to the Chanson, vol. 1
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(131 verses).The remainder of the work consists of 6810 lines, (83 verses) and was 
written by an anonymous poet. The identity of the author of the first part of the Chanson 
is easily ascertained as he names himself as William of Tudela in the early lines of the 
poem.20. William, who names himself as ‘master’, indicating he was a cleric, seems to 
have been fairly familiar with a good range of vernacular literature and biblical texts 
judging from the allusions made in the Chanson. He also appears to have been a 
jongleur who earned a living composing and reciting such works.^i He alludes to other 
celebrated epic poems such as Raoul de Cambrafi'^  and the Chanson de Roland.^ ^ He 
also refers to the Chanson d ’Antioche, another epic poem in the Provençal language, as 
being his major inspiration and model.^  ^ It can therefore be seen that the Chanson was a 
work firmly rooted in a secular, vernacular tradition. The first part of the poem was 
probably started in or around 1210 and was finished in 1213.2  ^ The last events 
mentioned in William’s part of the Chanson took place in or around July 1213 .2^  It is 
likely that the poem was composed as and when news of events reached the poet until he 
was interrupted for unknown reasons.22
It is unclear when William took up residence in southern France. He does record 
that he stayed at Montauban and was present at the wedding of Raymond VI of 
Toulouse to Eleanor of Aragon which took place in 1199.2* probable that he left 
Montauban in the summer of 1211 when the crusading army was threatening the town.
pp. V - vi. Also see Martin-Chabot, vol. 1, pp. v - xxxv and vol. 2, pp. vii -xxii for a general critique of 
the work. Other relevant studies include Y. Dossat, ‘La croisade vue par les chroniqueurs’, Paix de 
Dieu et guerre sainte en Languedoc auXIlle siècle, Cahiers de Fanjeaux 4, ed. E. Privât (Toulouse, 
1969), pp. 221-59; and for a discussion of the depiction of warfere in the Chanson see L. Paterson, ‘La 
chanson de la croisade Albigeoise: mythes chevaleresques et réalités militaires’. Le croisade: réalitiés et 
fictions: actes du colloque d ’Amiens 18 - 22 Mars 1987, (Gôppingen, 1989), pp. 193-204.
20 Chanson, v. 1, 1-9 informs us of the author’s name, place of origin and education.
2  ^He praises various figures in the poem for their generosity which suggests that he sees this as the 
principal virtue in a good patron, for example the Viscount of Béziers {Chanson, v. 15,4.) and Lady 
Giraude of Lavaur {Chanson, v. 68,23. )
22 Chanson, v. 22, 8.
23 For example Chanson, v. 72,10.
2  ^Chanson, v. 2 ,2 . On the Chanson d ’Antioche and the depiction of the crusade in Provençal epic 
poetiy see R  Lejeune, ‘L’espirit de croisade dans l ’épopée occitaine’. Paix de Dieu et guerre sainte en 
LanguedocXlir siècle. Cahiers de Fanjeaux 4, ed. E. Privât, (Toulouse, 1969), pp. 143-73.
25 For date and composition of the work see Martin -Chabot, Chanson, vol. 1, p. x and Dossat 
‘La Croisade vue par les chroniqueurs’, p. 245.
2  ^ Chanson, v. 131.
22 See Martin-Chabot, Chanson, vol. 1, pp. xi-xii. Dossat, ‘La croisade vue par les chroniqueurs’, 
p.245, however, suggests that the work was composed rapidly in the spring of 1213 and was certainly 
finished by February 1214 when Count Baldwin died, which may have been the reason for William 
stopping the composition of the work at this point.
2* Chanson, v. 15, 18.
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He then sought refuge at Bruniquel with the brother of Raymond VI, Count Baldwin, 
who had recently defected to the side of the crusaders. William was treated well by 
Baldwin and became a canon in the monastery of the town of St Antonin after it had 
been taken by Baldwin and the crusaders. These scant details are all we know of the life 
of the poet of the first half of the Chanson. It possible that he was with Baldwin at 
Lolmie and was taken prisoner and fell into the hands of the Toulousians.^^ As a 
member of the clergy William, it can be assumed, had sympathy with the religious aims 
of the crusade but although he condemns the doctrines of the heretics^ ® he feels a certain 
sympathy for them and the people of the South in general for their sufferings.^i William 
is keen to vouch for the orthodoxy of many of the leading noblemen of the area including 
the viscount of Béziers. 22 He shows a certain neutrality in condemning in equal terms 
the excesses of the crusading army at Béziers^  ^ and the peasants of Montgey who killed 
wounded crusaders after an attack by the count of Foix.^  ^ William appears to make 
some effort to appear impartial, though this may be a result of his patron Count Baldwin 
joining the crusaders in 1211, leading to a desire to flatter Baldwin’s new allies whilst at 
the same time praising the local aristocracy.
William was therefore writing at the same time or very soon after the events he 
depicts, the narrative in some places probably being composed on a day to day basis. It is 
possible that he witnessed some of the events about which he wrote. It is also likely that, 
along with other poems of the genre, this epic work was designed for public 
performance. The audience hearing the poem may well have consisted of members of 
the aristocracy that had taken part in many of the episodes described in the poem or 
those that had at least good second hand knowledge of them. This would suggest that 
the poet, whilst intending to flatter, excite and entertain his audience would also make 
some effort to depict the events he described truthfully. Living in the area and being on 
good terms with Count Baldwin, William may have had access to information gained 
from figures personally involved in the events he describes. On more than one occasion 
he quotes individuals who could vouch for the veracity of his narrative, for example.
2  ^ Dossat, ‘Le croisade vue par les chroniqueurs’, p. 245.
3® For example Chanson, v. 3 ,15. and v 4, 4.
3^  For example in his mourning of the fate of the Lady Giraude, her brother and his knights at 
Lavaur (Chanson, v. 68 ,14 -24)
32 Chanson, v. 15, 6.
33 Chanson v. 22 & v. 23,1-7.
34 Chanson v. 69,16-24.
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Pons de Mela the envoy of the king of Navarre, who gave William details of events at the 
papal curia of 1208 35 and the bailli of Count Baldwin who gave an eye witness account 
of the siege ofMoissac.36
The chronology of the work in many places, however, lacks precision and the 
author often fails to give an indication of the month or day on which events took place, 
being content in many cases to name a season or even day of the week. In other cases 
the naming of a certain day as a religious festival, in common with other authors of the 
time, can date events quite precisely. The poet makes some errors in the sequence of 
events,32 and also exaggerates, for example, when recording the duration of the siege of 
Termes.5* Elsewhere, William’s chronology and the details of his narrative appear to be 
very precise. Where it is possible to check against other written sources, his work 
appears to agree substantially with other contemporary chroniclers which allows the 
reader to give credence to most of the details contained within the work. In some 
instances the Chanson is our only source for the events it describes.^^
One of the major assets of William's work to the historian of military matters is 
that William, being a cleric, had the advantage of a literary and religious education, but 
unlike other contemporary writers on the crusade, wrote in the vernacular and also lived 
amongst the people about whom he was writing. William was therefore very much part 
of the culture and ethos of men such as Count Raymond and his brother Baldwin. The 
vernacular language can sometimes more accurately convey concepts and objects which 
in the Latin language can only, in certain circumstances, be approximations.^^ Being 
written by a southerner and in the vernacular the Chanson could therefore be said to 
reflect the ethos of the southern aristocracy in an accurate manner. In this context it can
35 Chanson 5 ,\6 .
3^  Chanson 119, 5.
32 For example he places the Council of St Gilles after the capture of Termes (Chanson, v. 58, 1-2), on 
other errors see Martin-Chabot, Chanson, vol. 1, p. xiv
3* Chanson v. 56, 31-32, here William says that the besiegers spent Ascension, Pentecost and most of 
the winter at Termes, he estimates the length o f the siege as being 9 months. (CAowjow, v. 57,3). The 
siege only lasted 4 months at the most. See Martin-Chabot, Chanson, vol. 1, p. 135, n.5 The siege was 
decided upon after the taking of Minerve and therefore could not have started before the end of July 
1210, see Historia, Chapter 189, which places the taking of Termes as being on the night of 22/23 
November 1210.
3^  For example the intervention of King Peter of Aragon at Carcassonne in 1209 (Chanson v. 26 - 29) 
and events in Quercy and the Agenais in the same year (Chanson v. 13-14)
4^  See Verbruggen, The Art o f  Warfare, pp. 10-14. Here the importance of the vernacular in the study 
of military history is emphasised, the author observing for example that Latin authors often use 
misleading terms for tactical units in a medieval army. This could also be said for vocabulary referring 
to other military terms.
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be compared with a northern French work such as the L ’histoire de Guillaume le 
Maréchal in its depiction of thirteenth-century warfare.^i
The anonymous continuator of the Chanson appears to have been a strong 
partisan of Toulouse and its Count. To judge from the language and style used the 
author was well educated and probably belonged to either the bourgeoisie or the 
c l e r g y .  42 The anonymous poet may have been in the count of Toulouse's retinue on 
certain occasions, for example at the time of the Lateran Council of November 1215.43 
Failing this he would appear to have been otherwise able to gain very detailed first hand 
information about the events which took place at that time, in Rome and elsewhere. The 
second part of the Chanson concentrates mainly on a few salient events which it depicts 
in great detail, including the sieges of Toulouse and Beaucaire. Other events are 
mentioned only in passing.
The anonymous author’s principal sources of information appear to have been 
gained first hand from the chief figures involved in the events described and other eye 
witnesses. The account given in the Chanson of the siege of Toulouse in 1217/18, for 
example, is extensive and elaborate in its detail .Its depiction of the reactions of the 
Toulousains to the destruction of the crusaders’ siege engine and to the death of Simon 
de Montfort speaks very much of the poet or a close source being an eye witness to 
these events. The fanatical hatred the author has for Simon de Montfort leads to the 
use of literary devices which may exaggerate and obscure the realities of his character 
and relations between the leader of crusade, his retinue and leaders of the other 
crusading contingents. Simon de Montfort is portrayed as a tyrant who is often at odds 
with various members of his entourage. His rage and arrogance are portrayed as being a 
major factor in the making of foolish military decisions.45
The Chanson, therefore, has a number of drawbacks when used as an historical 
source. This is an epic poem, designed to entertain and flatter an aristocratic audience, a 
poem which belongs to a genre and which follows many of the conventions of that genre.
42 L ’histoire de Guillaume le Maréchal, ed. P. Meyer, 3 vols. (Paris, 1891-1901); also see J.
Gillingham, ‘War and Chivalry in the History of William the Marshal’, Thirteenth-Century England II, 
Proceedings o f the Newcastle upon Tyne Conference. 1987, eds. P. Coss & S. Lloyd (Woodbridge,
1988), pp. 1-13.
42 See Dossat, ‘La Croisade vue par les chroniqueurs’, p. 250.
43 Chanson, 143-151.
44 Chanson, v. 172 - 208.
45 See Chanson v. 189,40 - 61 and v.l90, 24 - 49. Here Alain de Roucey, one of Simon de Montfort’s 
iimer circle accuses him of pride and arrogance in his continuing efforts to take the city of Toulouse.
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It is important to bear in mind, however, that the Chanson reflects many of its intended 
audience’s preoccupations, particularly warfare. If the Chanson does not always depict 
events accurately, it depicts the southern aristocracy as they would have liked to have 
seen themselves and reflects their attitudes. The Chanson can be used as a valuable tool 
in the study of warfare during the Albigensian Crusade, both for the detail it gives about 
historical events and way it depicts the major players in these events. It is difficult to 
know, however, how accurately the poem depicts the crusaders, both poets being more 
familiar with southern French society and its conventions and deriving much of their 
information from southern sources. By using the Chanson in combination with a 
northern source such as the Historia Albigensis it is hoped a balanced picture will 
emerge.
1.1.2 The Historia Albigensis of Peter of les Vaux-de-Cemay
Peter of les Vaux-de-Cemay was a monk of the house of Vaux -de-Cemay in the île de 
France, which had close connections with the family of de Montfort."^ He travelled to the 
South with his uncle Guy, who was subsequently appointed bishop of Carcassonne. Peter 
appears to have spent only a limited amount of time in southern France, beginning to 
observe and record events in 1212 and returning to Paris in March 1213. He returned to 
Nevers in 1214 from where he went on to Montpellier and joined the army of Simon de 
Montfort and then followed it to the Agenais and the Rouergue. In that year he also 
accompanied Prince Louis on his expedition to the South. He was present on the 
crusading armies march to relieve Beaucaire and assisted in the siege operations there. 
His observations on the siege of Toulouse appear to come from an eye witness. Peter 
returned to the île de France in 1218.42 can be seen, therefore, that although only in 
the South for a relatively short period of time Peter did travel extensively with the 
crusader army. Peter’s work makes extensive use of oral testimonies. His uncle was a 
man who had spent time in the southern part of France, before the crusade, preaching 
against the Cathar heresy and from whom Peter could have derived background
4^  The History o f  the Albigensian Crusade, trans. W. A. & M. D. Sibly, p. xix.
42 See Dossat ‘La Croisade vue par les chroniqueurs’, p. 224 and Guébin & Lyon, Historia, vol. 3, 
pp. i-iv for details of Peter’s movements.
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information about the politics and geography of the region as well as the chief figures 
involved in the crusade on both sides 4* It is certain that Peter was present at many of 
the events he narrates especially those involving ecclesiastical and political affairs/^
The information he gives on military events can be extremely useful particularly 
regarding the conduct of siege warfare by the crusaders. On many occasions he is our 
only source for such details as the positioning of siege engines and troops.5° His 
descriptions of these events are lucid and detailed despite his tendency to attribute events 
to the miraculous. For example he reports the supposed miracle of a missile fi'om a 
siege engine narrowly missing Simon de Montfort as he conversed with his men who 
were conducting mining operations at Termes. Another miracle is reported in the same 
passage, this involves the count narrowly escaping a crossbow bolt.^i
Limitations in the usefulness to the military historian of sources written by 
churchmen do exist and this should be borne in mind when reading the Historia. 
Monastic authors may be ignorant of military matters and an unbiased account of a 
military encounter is generally not the primary objective of their writings. In many cases 
military matters are only of peripheral interest to the author. Clerical sources are also 
often biased against the knightly class, the authors exaggerating their violence and 
depredations they caused. They are also keen to see the hand of God in the outcome of 
military encounters, imposing their own explanations on events and leaving out details 
which do not fit in with their interpretations. 52 Although Peter is open to criticism of this 
kind, on certain occasions this is balanced by the fact that he was an eye witness to many 
of the events he describes or was close to many of the leading figures involved in the 
crusade.53 Peter also had access to archival information. He utilised not only papal and 
church records dealing with the acts of Innocent III and his legates but also the charters 
and correspondence of figures such as Simon de Montfort. 54 Some of his insights also
4* See Guébin & Lyon, Historia, vol. 3, p. ill.
4^  For example at the Parliament of Pamiers, Historia, 362-364 and the Council o f Lavaur, Historia, 
370-398.
5® For example at the siege of Minerve, Historia, 151-159.
5^  Historia, 190
52 See Verbruggen, The Art o f  Warfare, p. 10.
53 One incident he records involves the saddle of his horse being struck by a cross-bow bolt at the siege 
of Moissac (Historia, 347) indicating that he was indeed very close to some of the events he describes.
54 See Dossat, ‘La croisade vue par les chroniqueurs’, p. 225
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suggest that he had at least some insight into the nature of the warfare being waged. For 
example he points out the importance of the capture of s t r o n g h o l d s .
The major flaw in Peter's work from the view of the historian is his total fanaticism for 
the cause of the crusade and his hero worship of its leader. It is probable that Peter was 
only in his early twenties when the Historia was written and his youth may suggest a 
certain amount of naivety in his writing rather than the cynicism of a propagandist that 
has been suggested by some au th o r s .H e  had no sympathy for any of the southerners 
and seems to have had little understanding of the aristocratic society of southern France, 
reflecting the values of the ecclesiastical aristocracy of the north to which he belonged. 
This does not mean that he was not a truthful chronicler of events in general. He does 
not neglect to record incidence of indisicipline in the crusading army as well as duplicity 
and negligence.52 in the introduction to his work Peter writes "I write what is true, 
nothing is here which I have not seen with my own eyes or have had confirmed to me by 
reliable witnesses".5* There is no reason to doubt this assertion, although his 
interpretation of these events is often open to question. A third written source on the 
Albigensian crusade, the Chronicle of William of Puylaurens also needs to be taken into 
consideration.
1.1.3 The Chronicle of William of Puylaurens
There has been some debate over the identity of William of P u y l a u r e n s .  59 The author of 
the Chronicle appears to have been a native of Toulouse as the work indicates 
childhood memories of events which happened in the city during the early years of the 
crusade, for example, the departure of the White Confraternity from the city to fight at
55 Historia, 321.
5^  The History o f  the Albigensian Crusade, p. xxxvii
52 For example his depiction of the intense rivalry between the duke of Burgundy and count of Nevers 
{Historia, 108) and criticism of the bishops of Beauvais and Chartres for leaving the crusading army at 
the siege of Termes after their men had served their statutory forty days. (Historia, 184 & 186)
5* Historia, 2
59 He has variously been identified as a chaplain in the household of the count of Toulouse and a 
member of the bishop of Toulouse’s staff, as he appears to have been in the confidence of Bishop 
Foulque.
See J. Duvemoy, Chronicle, pp. 1-5, Duvemoy comes down firmly on the side of the latter argument, 
see also Dossat ‘La Croisade vue par les chroniqueurs’, pp. 234-8.
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the siege of Lavaur in March 1210 and the despair felt within Toulouse after the 
southerners’ defeat at Muret.^ It is likely that the author was in the city of Toulouse 
during the siege of 1217/18.^  ^William was hostile to the heresy^  ^and his work is likely 
to have been written some years after the beginning of the crusade, perhaps not being 
finished until as late as 1273. He therefore had time to reflect in hindsight on the events 
he was writing about.^  ^William’s work is shorter and less detailed than the Chanson and 
the Historia, both of which he uses as a basis for some of his work, it nevertheless 
provides a useful supplement to them. He is also more unbiased in his views than either 
Peter of les Vaux de Cemay or the anonymous continuator of the Chanson.
In general, therefore, it should be possible to gain a detailed and reasonably 
accurate picture of military events during the Albigensian Crusade fi*om the written 
sources available, taking into consideration the limitations of each. These will provide the 
foundations on which to build up a picture of how warfare was carried out and organised 
by the crusaders and their southern adversaries. In order, however, to provide a 
framework and context in which to work it will now be necessary to review the situation 
in both northern and southern France on the eve of the crusade with regard to the 
recruitment of armies, the types of men which fought in them and the rewards they could 
expect to receive.
Chronicle, 16 & 21 
SeeDuvemoy, Chronicle, p.2.
For examples of this see William’s prologue, Chronicle, pp. 23-27 
See Duvemoy, Chronicle, pp. 8-9
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Chapter 2
2.0 Introduction
In order to be able to establish a background for the crusading army which invaded the 
Languedoc in 1208 it will be necessary to consider the methods used to raise armies in 
northern France during the early thirteenth century. In this way it is hoped to show the 
typical composition of northern French armies of the period, compared with their 
southern counterparts. As most of the documentary sources which survive concern royal 
armies, this is the area concentrated on. The recruitment of French armies for the 
crusades in the Near East in this period, however, must also be considered in order to 
place the army of the Albigensian Crusade in its broad context.
2.1 Royal Armies in Northern France in the Late Twelfth and Early 
Thirteenth Centuries
This is a period from which several important documents have survived relating to the 
recruitment and payment of royal armies in France.  ^ Such documents can help us 
build up a picture of methods used by the king to recruit and maintain an army both for 
defensive and offensive purposes. What must be taken into account however are the 
reasons why such documents were originally compiled The main sources available to us 
concerning the army of the king of France in the late twelfth and early thirteenth 
centuries fall into two categories. These are first, narrative sources^, consisting of both 
French and English chronicles and poems and second, documentary sources of which the
 ^No similar or comparable documents exist for the Languedoc. Financial records do, however, exist for 
Catalonia from the mid to late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries. These records appear to suggest 
that, unlike the north of France where centralisation increasingly became the dominant trend in 
financial administration, the rulers of Catalonia relied mainly on credit as a means of finance, revealing 
the existence of a decentralised form of fiscal management. See T.N. Bisson, ‘Les comptes des 
domaines au temps du Phillippe Auguste; essai comparative’. Medieval France and her Pyrenean 
Neighbours: Studies in Early Institutional History (London, 1989), pp. 265-283; see also idem, ‘The 
Problem of Feudal Monarchy; Aragon, Catalonia and France’, pp. 237-255 in the same volume.
2 The principal narrative sources for the reign of Philip Augustus are the chronicles of Rigord and 
William the Breton. See Rigord, Gesta Philippi Augusti and Guillaume le Breton, Gesta, Oeuvres de 
Rigord et Guillaume le Breton, 2.vols, ed. H.F. Delaborde (Paris, 1882).
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vast majority are royal records. Poems and chronicles can give us an impression of the 
types of soldiers and the frequency with which they were used in French royal armies. 
Official documentary sources, however, can provide us with more information on how 
these armies were recruited, paid and organised.
The first royal financial records extant for the kingdom of France are for the year 
1202/3. These are particularly useful as a source for military expenditure as they devote 
separate accounts to war expenses incurred during Philip Augustus’ campaigns in 
Normandy^. Detailed accounts were rendered for soldiers’ wages, the greater part of 
which appear to be for knights and crossbowmen, although companies of foot soldiers 
are also mentioned, these being paid lower wages. A few miners and engineers are also 
referred to."^  Working from these accounts it is possible to estimate the number of royal 
troops deployed in Normandy in 1202/3 as being 257 knights, 245 mounted sergeants,
71 mounted crossbowmen, 100 crossbowmen on foot and 1608 foot sergeants.^
Although this does not appear to be a very impressive number at first sight, this force 
was more or less a permanent army maintained by the king without resorting to the 
feudal levy.® What is more important to the present study however is that by observing 
the numbers of troops that made up the various elements of Philip’s army in Normandy it 
may be possible to ascertain the proportions of such troops that would make up an army 
successfully engaged in the taking and manning of fortifications in an hostile environment 
in the early thirteenth century.
A stipendiary force such as this would have served as the nucleus of the royal 
army. We can, however, only gain a rough estimate of the number of men in this army at 
the time as the wages of the soldiers only took up a part of all expenditure on warfare, 
A good deal of the money accounted for would also have gone on the repair and 
building of fortifications.^ From the accounts rendered in 1202/03 it is also possible to 
calculate the normal daily wage for the various types of troops in the paid army in 
Normandy. Table 1 shows that although knights’ wages accounted for over one third of
 ^ SiQQBdX&mvi, The Government o f  Philip Augustus, p. 166 ff.
 ^ According to these accounts a miner received a shilling and a half a day and an engineer 15 denier 
See C. Petit -Dutallis, Feudal Monarchy in France and England from the Tenth to the Thirteenth- 
Century (London, 1936) p. 256.
 ^Baldwin, The Government o f  Philip Augustus, p. 168.
® See E. Audouin, Essai sur l ’armée royale, (Paris, 1913), p. 20. Audouin suggests that the compte 
general of 1202/3 reveals that Philip had available to him what amounted to a standing army.
 ^See below pp. 60-62.
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the total paid out, foot soldiers would have made up by far the greatest number of 
troops in the army, as their lower wage still made up a greater percentage of 
expenditure.^
The total of 27, 370 livres parisi from which these wages are calculated does 
not include a further 3,290 livres paid to the mercenary leader Lambert Cadoc and his 
men.  ^Neither does it include payments made to individual knights which are designated 
as donum ( a gift) in the royal records. The royal financial records of the time were 
compiled in order to keep an accurate record for the king of his expenditure. Therefore 
when using such records as a tool for ascertaining the size and strength of royal armies 
we have far more documentary evidence about paid troops than those drawn from the 
feudal levy. From 1204 onward, however, the royal registers contain more precise 
information for knight service supplied from feudal sources. Before that date we must 
rely on chronicles and other narrative sources. Figures, however, are very rarely given. It 
appears that on many campaigns the feudal host consisted mainly of household knights 
and those from the royal domain rather than knights supplied by the king’s magnates.^® 
Register A contains very little information about the military obligations of the 
great vassals, the sole exception being the feudal inventories for Normandy. The main 
reason for the existence of these records is that they were based on a survey made in 
1172 by Henry II. What is apparent from this inventory is that there was a large 
discrepancy between the number of knights that were enfeoffed and the number of 
knights that actually owed service. Another important discrepancy appears in the 
figures for knight service owed in Normandy. This was 847, according to the survey of 
knight service carried out in 1207, compared with a number of 158 for those knights 
from Normandy who are known to have fought at Bouvines.^  ^Register A does however 
give a good impression of the dominai rights the king claimed over the royal possessions.
 ^See Baldwin, The Government o f  Philip Augustus, p. 169 and Audouin, Essai sur l ’armée royale, 
p. 119.
 ^For use of mercenaries made by Philip Augustus see below p. 27-30.
Baldwin, The Govem m entof Philip Augustus, p. 279.
An earlier example of such a survey, the Cartae Baronum, also survives from the reign of Henry II 
and was made in 1166 in England; see English Historical Documents, ed. D C. Douglas (London, 
1953) vol. II, pp. 903-915.
This is presumably due to the fact that the purpose of the inventory was to record the number of 
enfeoffed knights in order that monetary equivalents for knight service could be calculated. See 
Baldwin, The Government o f  Philip Augustus, p. 286.
Baldwin, The Government o f  Philip Augustus, p. 286.
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rights the king was increasingly keen to enforce, particularly over church possessions 
and towns in the royal domain^^
Judging from documentary evidence such as the Scripta de feodis, a document 
showing knight service owed the the king, Philip Augustus could count on several 
thousand knights for feudal serviced ^  Recruiting an army through means of the feudal 
levy was, however, strongly limited in the time men were willing to serve, usually no 
more than 40 days. Another consideration to be made when discussing the use of feudal 
service in the recruitment of armies is the different types of service a knight could be 
called upon to render in different circumstances. It appears that service in the royal host 
involved only customary and limited numbers. Vassals however could also be called 
upon to provide unlimited service when the kingdom was seriously threatened, for 
example by a foreign invader. A distinction should therefore be drawn between 
exercitum, that is service owed, and bellum, service demanded when a lord's lands were 
under threat from an invading force. One of the few examples known of the latter type 
of service is the call to arms issued by Philip Augustus in response to the two pronged 
attack launched by Emperor Otto and King John in 1214, which culminated in the 
battle of Bouvines. A muster list of troops for the battle of Bouvines exists in
Register C. The feudal host at Bouvines probably totalled around 1,300 knights, another 
800 fighting under Prince Louis against King John. The church in France was also 
subject to feudal military service. All regalian bishops owed knight service to the king for 
the royal host. Owing to the ecclesiastical bias of many of the narrative sources from this 
period we know more about the church’s contribution to the feudal host than other 
feudal lords.
Other important documents relating to military expenses and recruitment in 
France are the Prise des Sergeants and Prisa Servientum. Both of these documents
See E. Hallam, Capetian France 987-1328 (London, 1980) pp. 158 -159.
See P. Contamine, War in the Middle Ages (Oxford, 1984) p.80.
Baldwin, The Government o f  Philip Augustus, p. 204.
Fornumbers at the battle of Bouvines see Baldwin, Govem/nen/ o f  Philip Augustus, p.285 and 
also Lot, L A rt Militaire, pp. 223-28. See also Audouin, Essai sur l ’armée royale, p. 120. Auidouin’s 
figures for Bouvines roughly agree with these other estimates. He gives a figure of 1,200 knights 
available to Philip, 3/5 of the total in the force commanded by h im , Prince Louis commanding the other 
2/5 against King John. He also estimates a force of 3,000 mounted sergeants but asserts that without 
doubt the most important part of Philip’s force were cavalry.
Baldwin, The Government o f  Philip Augustus, p. 279.
The former was compiled in 1174 the latter in 1204, See Lot, L 'art militaire, p. 219. Lot points out 
this was at the height of the conflict in Normandy and so may not be representative of regular service in
27
refer to the number of foot sergeants and transport wagons owed as service by each 
town, commune and abbey in the royal domain.^ ® This document shows that some of 
those towns and abbeys that owed service paid in money rather than men, 21 A period of 
service of three months was expected of each man. The wage earned by a foot soldier in 
the royal army was 8 deniers a day. If the money collected in lieu of service is divided by 
the amount of a three month wage, the number of foot sergeants available to the king 
can be calculated as 11, 683. Mounted sergeants were also becoming increasingly 
important in the make up of the royal army at this time.22
From the above evidence it is apparent that Philip Augustus made extensive use 
of paid service in his army. Such men however should be distinguished from those 
mercenaries which are known in contemporary sources by various names such as 
routier, ribauld or cottereau One distinction between these men and stipendiary troops 
appears to be that most regular troops, serving for pay, owed an obligation to the king 
or their lord for service for a certain length of time. Those that were known as routiers 
owed no service and merely fought for gain. Stipendiary troops were recruited 
individually and paid a daily allowance whilst routiers appear mainly to have been 
recruited in bands, money then being paid to the leader of this band and distributed 
amongst his men. Mercenaries, as depicted in some contemporary sources, were in many 
cases known to be of foreign extraction, some being of Brabançon, Aragonese, 
Navarrese and Flemish origin. Many mercenary bands however consisted of men from 
many different origins and social backgrounds. Such men were normally of humble
the royal army. See also Baldwin, The Government o f  Philip Augustus, pp. 171-172. Baldwin suggests 
the levy o f sergeants could be in fact be adjusted according to royal needs at the time.
®^ See Baldwin, The Government o f  Philip Augustus, p. 172 ff., also Contamine, War in the Middle 
Ages pp. 83-85
21 See E. Audouin, Essai sur l ’armée royale, p. 49. Audouin notes that the comparison between the 
Prisa Servientum and the Compte General of 1202 reveals a striking concordance between a tax of 3 
livres per sergeant and the pay given to a sergeant of foot. A sergeant paid a the rate of 8 denier a day 
would receive 3 livres over his 3 month period of service. It is also observed that the king would 
probably have preferred to have the money rather than the men as this would be a more flexible way of 
recruiting an army.
P. Contamine, ' L'armée de Philippe Auguste’, La France de Philippe Auguste - Le temps de 
mutations ed. E. Bautier (Paris, 1980), pp. 577-594. Contamine observes that mounted sergeants should 
not however be confused with the ecuyers (squires) who accompanied and assisted knights but rather 
should be seen as being recruited from the general mass of the population, their social origins being very 
difficult to define. Also see Audouin, Essai sur l ’armée royale, pp. 64 - 65, here it is noted that in the 
compte general there is a rough ratio of 4:1 of mounted sergeants to knights. He sees their status as 
being perhaps that of vassals of minor nobles for whom it was possible to be elevated to the rank of  
knight.
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origin and were regarded by many contemporaries, particularly churchmen, as social 
outcasts. This is no doubt due to the fact that they were seen as operating outside the 
normal bounds of society as the Church perceived it. They are often considered in 
sources, especially those written by churchmen, to be responsible for many atrocities 
including indiscriminate killing, ill treatment and enslavement of prisoners and 
destruction and theft of church property.^^ The use of mercenaries in the French royal 
army can be traced back at least as far as the twelfth century and appears to have 
expanded during some periods of the reign of Philip Augustus, although lack of 
documentary evidence from before this may tend to distort our view of the situation 
prior to the reign of Philip Augustus. 4^
As mentioned above, payments for mercenaries led by Lambert Cadoc are 
recorded in the accounts of military expenditure for Normandy.^^ Cadoc was given 
various important positions of responsibility by Philip Augustus over the course of his 
reign including being appointed the castellan of Gaillon and bailli of Pont Audemer 26 
He also played a major role in the taking of Château Gaillard in 1204. Cadoc was made 
a banneret and may have commanded a force of foot soldiers at Bouvines. 22 It is 
estimated that in 1202 his band of mercenaries formed one ninth of the effective force of 
the royal army in France.2* The placing of mercenary leaders in such positions of 
responsibility was widely practised by the Angevin kings of England. Such men could 
be highly professional and disciplined in battle and proved to be a necessary tool in 
enforcing the will of the monarch.2®
The expansion of the use of mercenary troops by such monarchs as Henry II of 
England has been attributed to a number of factors.^® These include the delays involved 
in summoning a feudal army fi’om his widely scattered domains and the short length of
23 See M. Strickland, War and Chivalry (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 291-329 and G. Duby, The Legend o f  
Bouvines: War, Religion and Culture in the Middle Ages (Cambridge, 199Q), pp. 78-84.
24 For the use of mercenaries in this period see H. Géraud, Les routiers au XII® siècle'. Bibliothèque de 
l'Ecole des Chartes (1841 -2), pp. 125-147.
23 See Audouin, Essai sur Varmée royale, p. 109.
2® See Contamine, 'L'armée de Philippe Auguste’, p. 585.
22 See Audouin, Essai sur l'armée royale, p. 109.
28 Ibid., p. 120.
2® Strickland, War and Chivalry, p. 300. For the use of mercenaries by Richard 1 see K. Norgate, 
Richard the Lionheart (London, 1924), pp. 51-3 & 304 -15. For the trust placed in mercenaries during 
the reign of King John see W. L. Warren, King John (London, 1961), pp. 90-91.
3® See J. Boussard, *Les mercenaires au XII* siècle; Henri II Plantagenêt et le origines de l’armée de 
metier’, Bibliothèque de l ’Ecole des Chartres, 106 (1945), pp. 189-224.
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service expected of such levies. Other probable factors in the growing use of mercenary 
soldiers were the improvement in fortifications of this period and the success mercenary 
soldiers had in taking and holding these fortifications quickly and efficiently as well as 
the fact that they could be relied upon to carry on serving a lord providing they were 
paid.3i It must be acknowledged however that the use of paid troops extends at least as 
far back as the late eleventh century in E n g l a n d . 3 2
The use of mercenary soldiers in the royal armies of France is somewhat 
obscured in the narrative sources because of two major factors. One is that the 
documents that have survived from the reign of Philip Augustus are in no way a 
comprehensive account of royal military e x p e n d i t u r e .  33 Although we find only 300 
mercenary foot sergeants fighting in Normandy mentioned in the accounts for 1202-03 
there is no reason to believe these are the only mercenary soldiers the king used, very 
many others could have been employed at other times and in other a r e a s . 3 4  Another 
factor is the reluctance of French chroniclers such as Rigord and William the Breton to 
record that the French monarch, a model of Christian kingship according to these 
churchmen, was involved in a practice specifically banned by the Church. It has been 
pointed out that Rigord even goes so far as say that the king never took mercenaries 
into his service. 33 At Bouvines it is the English and the Flemish armies that are described 
as being made up of mercenary soldiers. This is taken as an indication of their impious 
and evil intentions. English chroniclers however do mention several instances where 
Philip Augustus is known to have employed mercenary soldiers.3® It is therefore a
3^  See Lot, L 'art militaire, p. 220, Lot concludes that one of the main reasons for the kings of France 
beginning to use mercenary soldiers in ever increasing numbers was the heavy use of them made by the 
kings of England, such an argument, however, appears to be rather dubious..
32 See J. Prestwich, ‘War and Finance in the Anglo-Norman State ' Anglo Norman Warfare, ed.
M. Strickland (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 59-83 and M. Chibnall, ‘Mercenaries and the Familia Regis 
under Henry F, pp. 84 - 92 in the same volume.
33 See Baldwin, The Government o f  Philip Augustus p. 170. Baldwin points out that in the year 1202-3 
Philip was also involved in wars in Touraine and Anjou, the expenditure for which probably came out of 
the royal chamber rather than the royal treasury
34 See Hallam, Capetian France, p. 163. Hallam states that mercenary soldiers were vital part of French 
royal army from the reign of Philip Augustus onwards, listing mercenary bands used by the king as 
coming from Navarre, Germany, Hainault, Flanders and Brabant.
33 See Duby, The Legend o f  Bouvines, p. 83. William the Breton does mention them in the service of 
Philip but more often in the employ of his enemies such as Richard I o f England.
3® See Contamine, L ’armée de Philippe Auguste', p. 587.
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mistake to believe that Philip Augustus used mercenary soldiers less than any other 
contemporary monarchs.^?
Besides the evidence which exists for the recruitment of royal armies, information 
regarding the recruitment and financing of royal crusading armies in this period may also 
shed some light on the crusading army of the Albigensian Crusade. As can be seen 
below, the king levied a tithe to raise funds for his expedition to holy land in 1189. It 
may be possible, however, that he only received the yield from this tithe from his own 
demesne. The great lords who accompanied him would have been expected to finance 
their own contingents. One important figure which exists regarding the amount spent by 
the king on this expedition is the sum which he paid to Genoese sailors to transport and 
supply his army for eight months, a total of 5, 850 marks. He is said to have contracted 
for the transport of 650 knights and 1300 squires. It is not known how many infantry 
were taken but it is likely they were present in the army in substantial numbers. Lot 
estimates a figure three times that of the knights and squires, this seems a reasonable 
estimate based on surviving evidence from the reign of Philip Augustus.^* It is evident 
that the crusading army of Louis IX was envisaged on a grander scale. His army has been 
estimated at a number of 15, 000 altogether. Financial records appear to indicate that in 
this instance the king gave financial assistance to leaders of other French crusading 
contingents and that the king’s total financial outlay was in the region of 1.5 million 
livres. In order to be able to afford such expenditure it is evident that the king was able 
not only to increase revenues from traditional sources but also to institute new ones.^ ®
Surveying this evidence therefore it is possible to build up a picture of a royal 
army made up of various elements recruited as circumstances demanded using a variety 
of different methods. The evidence suggests that the French king was coming to rely 
increasingly on the use of paid troops for offensive purposes although for the needs of
32 Ibid. p. 590. See also Audouin, Essai sur l ’armée royale, p. 120, Audouin notes that at the 
beginning of his reign Philip Augustus had dismissed most of the foreign mercenaries in his service. He 
observes that most of the names of soldiers recorded in the Compte General of 1202 are French and 
there is nothing to suppose that his mercenaries were of foreign extraction. This however may not be 
the case as those mentioned by name in the Compte General are knights and captains of the sergeants 
of foot. There is no reason to suggest that, for example, Cadoc did not employ foreign mercenaries in 
his band whom he paid out of the aimual wage he received.
38 For the crusading expedition of Philip Augustus see S. Painter, ‘The Third Crusade: Richard the 
Lionhearted and Philip Augustus’, A History o f  Crusades, 6 vols. ,ed. K. Setton (London, 1969-89), vol. 
II, pp. 45-86.
3® See W. C. Jordan, Louis IX  and the Challenge o f  the Crusade: A Study in Rulership,
(Princeton, N.J., 1979) pp. 65-82.
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defence he could still rely on considerable number of feudal troops supplied by his great 
vassals and from the royal domain. Such conclusions should therefore be borne in mind 
when considering the composition and recruitment of the crusading army. Our 
knowledge of the royal armies that Philip Augustus was able to command may in many 
ways fill gaps in our knowledge of this crusading army as may our knowledge of French 
crusading armies which served in other conflicts. What must be borne in mind is the 
relationship between the French monarch, the Papacy and Albigensian Crusade. The 
king’s limited involvement in the crusade in the Languedoc in its early years means that 
information regarding the French royal army must be used with caution in relation to 
recruiting methods used during the crusade.
2.2 The Capetians and the Albigensian Crusade
Although the Albigensian Crusade had been proclaimed in 1208 by Pope Innocent III, 
who had appealed to the French king in person, the Papacy and the Capetian monarchy 
both had ambiguous attitudes to the expedition as circumstances dictated. Changing 
allegiances and local politics in the South, the shifting fortunes of the French king vis a 
vis his foreign enemies and the often stormy relationship between the Papacy and French 
monarchy all played their part in this. Even as early as 1204 Philip Augustus was called 
upon by the pope to take action against Raymond of Toulouse, over whom he was 
nominally feudal lord. Pope Innocent III provided as an inducement the promise that 
he would sanction the action and allow all Raymond’s confiscated lands to go to the 
king.4® By 1208, when the crusade proper was proclaimed, the Pope demanded that the 
king take part personally. Philip Augustus, however, was reluctant to involve himself in 
a war he knew his resources could not stretch to at the time. His ongoing conflict with 
King John over Normandy precluded any commitment to other military action. The 
King did however claim the rights he was due as overlord of any confiscated land taken 
and allowed up to 500 French knights (i.e. from the royal demense) to take up the cross 
In 1211 and 1218 the king allowed a one twentieth tax on church possessions to 
be levied to finance the crusade in the Languedoc. The overall organisation and control
4® For the French monarchy's involvement in the wars in the South see Hallam, Capetian France, 
pp. 164 ff.
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of the expedition was, however, left to the Pope and his representatives. At this stage, 
therefore, it was the Pope rather than the king who led the drive to dispossess Count 
Raymond of his lands for tolerating heresy within them. It was also from the Church 
rather than the king that Simon de Montfort sought recognition of his rights after he had 
claimed the lands the count of Toulouse for himself. i^
In 1215 Prince Louis had led a short expedition to the South in order to fulfil a 
crusading vow. It was, however, only after the death of Simon de Montfort in 1218 that 
the French king became more willing to be involved in the wars in the South. One of 
the major reasons for this may have been that the pope had offered the leadership of 
crusade to the count of Champagne, maybe knowing that this would provoke the king 
into action if the Papacy was shown to be favouring one of his powerfijl vassals. Philip 
saw this as a threat and placed Prince Louis in charge of the expedition in 1219, though 
Louis again achieved very little. In 1221 Innocent Ill’s successor, Honorius III tried 
once again to involve the Capetian monarchy in the crusade by tempting Philip with a 
large tax on ecclesiastical wealth and a full plenary indulgence. The king once again 
refused to be drawn into the matter in any substantial way. When Philip's son came to 
the throne in 1223, as Louis VIII, the Capetians became more willing to listen to the 
requests of the pope. It was not until 1225, however, that Louis made any firm 
commitment and this only after he had persuaded the pope to pledge enormous financial 
backing to the venture. In 1226 a 10% tax on the church was raised to help finance the 
royal expedition and in the same year Amaury de Montfort ceded his rights to his lands 
in the South to the French king and a royal army began a successful campaign in the 
r e g i o n .  42 Louis VIII died very soon after taking Avignon and it was only during the 
latter part of his son's reign that royal power in the South finally began to be 
consolidated. The matter of the rightfiil ownership of the count of Toulouse’s lands was 
finally resolved in 1271 when, Raymond VII’s daughter died without issue and the 
French crown inherited her lands.
Looking at this sequence of events, therefore, one can see the limited 
involvement of the Capetian monarchy with the crusade before the mid 1220's. Care 
should therefore be taken in using royal documents as evidence for the composition and
4^  The same is true of his claim to the Trencavel lands, whose lord was King Peter of Aragon.
42 See Petit Dutallis, Feudal Monarchy in France and England, p. 256. Petit-Dutallis asserts that Louis 
army was 'undoubtedly the biggest that a Capetian monarch had ever commanded'.
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recruitment of crusading armies. They do however provide valuable information 
regarding these issues in relation to armies in northern France in general. From looking 
at the narrative sources for the Albigensian Crusade it can be seen that a large number of 
the kings vassals from the He de France and a considerable proportion of the great 
magnates of the French kingdom were involved in the crusade from a very early stage. 
The duke of Burgundy and the counts of St Pol and Nevers were amongst the first to 
take the cross in 1209 and a good number of the French bishops, who presumably used 
their authority as feudal lords to recruit soldiers, also took part.
2.3 The Crusading Army
When considering the composition and recruitment of the crusading army several factors 
have to be taken into account. The sources used in this study have been mostly 
narrative and therefore present a problem when dealing with the actual institutions which 
lay behind the recruiting and funding of the crusading army. What can be ascertained 
from these sources, however, is the ebb and flow of the crusading army as its various 
contingents arrived and departed, and the various types of troops available to the 
crusaders. The numbers given by the chroniclers and poets must be considered with a 
good deal of circumspection. The documentary evidence available, from the reign of 
Philip Augustus especially, can give us a valuable insight in to the way armies in early 
thirteenth-century northern France were recruited and paid and of which elements they 
consisted. Working from the assumption that the French king, as a feudal lord, had at his 
disposal similar methods of recruiting armies and raising revenue to his magnates this 
evidence should be helpful in trying to establish the basis on which recruitment of the 
crusading army was carried out.
The frequency with which the normal forty day length of service, expected of the 
crusader, is mentioned in the narrative sources gives the impression that the majority of 
crusaders from northern France were recruited within a feudal framework. As time went 
on it became increasingly apparent that this was not sufficient in terms of the length of 
time served and the numbers that could be recruited. Basing the recruitment of a 
crusading army planning to go to the Near East on such feudal service presented
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difficulties. Crusading in the Languedoc could confer many of the spiritual advantages 
given to those who embarked on other crusading expeditions. The length of time that it 
took to travel between, for example, the île de France and the south west of France, 
however, was far shorter. The forty day length of service would seem to have been a 
feasible way in which to recruit and maintain an army if a sufficient flow of men could 
be maintained.43
The crusading army mustered at Lyons on 24 June 1209.44 yfte Chanson 
estimates the number gathered at Beziers, the site of the first major action, to have been 
some 20,000 knights and 200,000 ‘villeins and peasants’, ‘not counting the clergy and 
citizens’45. It can reasonably be supposed that such numbers are greatly exaggerated, 
the real number may have been in the region of 20,000 altogether.4® Many of that 
number would have been servants and camp followers. The Chanson tells how the 
people of Beziers remained confident that their town would not be taken because of the 
sheer numbers of the crusading army. They believed the army would fall apart in less 
than a fortnight, the Chanson describing it as stretching for a full league when strung out 
along the road, 42 The leaders of the expedition were to have considerable difficulty in 
mustering such numbers again during the course of the crusade. Numbers of soldiers 
recorded in the sources vary a great deal and should probably not be taken literally. For 
example, a force of 5000 German crusaders is recorded as being ambushed by men of the 
Count of Foix at Montgey and a force of a further 14,000 is said to have come to their 
aid.48 The figure of 15, 000 men is mentioned on a number of occasions as the number of 
the army of the crusaders. This number is also used to estimate the size of the southern 
army suggesting the use of a poetic convention.4®
For the ten years after 1208 the church would send bands of Cistercian monks to 
the North to preach and recruit men for the crusade. A steady supply of new recruits
43 One gains the impression, however, from narrative sources that the 40 day service began and ended 
when the soldier was actually fighting and did not include time for travel.
44 Historia, 82.
43 Chanson, v. 13,1-4.
4® See Sumption, The Albigensian Crusade, p. 86.
42 Chanson, v. 17,12-13.
48 Chanson, v. 70, 7.
4® For example Alice de Montfort arrives at Moissac with a force of 15,000 reinforcements for her 
husband (Chanson v. 116,14) whilst the force under the Young Raymond at Beaucaire is said to have 
been the same number (Chanson, v. 165, 6). At Toulouse numbers as large as 60,000 and 100,000 are 
said by the Chanson to have fought for the crusaders (Chanson, v. 205, 90 and v. 196,2 ).
3® For preaching of the crusade in the North see Roquebert, L ’Épopée cathare, vol. 1, pp. 221-231.
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was gained by this method, a supply, however, that was to dwindle as time passed. Yet 
the preaching of the crusade tells us very little about the actual process of recruitment. 
The crusaders would come in small bands to serve for forty days and then return home 
usually before the winter set in and the mountains became impassable. This created 
numerous problems as it meant the leaders of the crusade could only plan a few weeks in 
advance. It made the conduct of sieges particularly difficult. What is more, long, dravm 
out sieges were bound to sap the enthusiasm of even the most pious of recruits. The 
crusaders were extremely fortunate in the first few weeks of their campaign. Beziers fell 
within a matter of hours. At Carcassonne, had the siege gone on any longer the 
likelihood is that some elements would have begun to abandon the besieging army, as 
indeed happened immediately after the siege had ended and Simon de Montfort had been 
rewarded with the lands of the viscount of Béziers.^^
The short term nature of the service expected of the recruits resulted in many 
setbacks of this kind for Simon de Montfort. The count of Nevers left with his 
contingent soon after the siege had ended and was soon followed by the duke of 
Burgundy in September 1209.32 Between them the magnates had provided 500 knights. 
The Chanson states that after these magnates left the crusading army and returned home 
very few of Simon de Montfort’s army decided to stay on. 33 Fourteen named lords are 
mentioned as staying behind to serve under him along with others not n a m e d . 3 4  This left 
Simon de Montfort and his companions in great difficulties, leading them to come to an 
agreement with the Count o f  F o i x , 3 5  though this pact failed in the Autumn of 1209. 
Throughout the winter 1209/10 Simon de Montfort continued to lose ground3®
The origins of those who took the cross, as far as can be ascertained, seem 
extremely varied. On a number of occasions in the Chanson William of Tudela provides 
long lists of the different contingents which made up the crusading army. Much of this 
appears to serve the purpose of providing colour and variety to the poetry. For example 
the crusading army that mustered in 1209 consists of men from the Auvergne, Burgundy,
3* Chanson, v. 36. 3.
Historia, 108.
33 Chanson, v. 36, 3-5.
34 Chanson, v. 36,10-20, at Chanson, v. 90, 3. Simon de Montfort is described as having as group of 
300 companions with him at Carcassonne. It is possible that such a force may have formed the core of 
the crusading army.
33 Chanson, v. 41, 2-3.
3® Chanson, v. 42,1-5, again in the autumn of 1210 crusaders, who had been canq)aigning against the 
Count of Foix, leave ‘when the hot weather came to an end’ (Chanson, v. 84,17).
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the île de France, the Limousin, the Rourgue, Provence, Vienne and Germany as well as 
Poitevins and Gascons. 3? The anonymous author of the second part of the Chanson 
more often refers to the crusaders as merely French, this serving to emphasise the 
difference between the northerners and Count Raymond’s troops.®  ^The anonymous poet 
also writes of Bretons and Flemings as being ‘foreigners’ and this may be to mark them 
out as mercenaries.
The use of mercenaries by the crusaders in mentioned numerous times, although 
the references are more frequent in the second part the Chanson. This can be illustrated 
with a number of examples. Peter of Aragon, a man fighting on the side of the 
crusaders, is described as ‘a brave mercenary commander’ (‘w« mainader ardit).^^ 
Bishop Fouquet of Toulouse is reported as saying that he has sent preachers to the north 
in order to recruit men and collect money and that this will bring men, both ‘crusaders’ 
and ‘mercenaries’( ‘mainaders').^^ It is clear that some crusaders who had served their 
40 days stayed on to serve for pay. For example Robert of Picquigny, ‘a valiant soldier’, 
held a fief for which he was obliged to serve for 40 days. At the second siege of 
Toulouse he is described as serving for pay after his 40 days service has expired.®* In 
1215 Simon de Montfort wrote to pope Innocent III complaining ‘the great lords have 
deserted me leaving me alone with very few knights .... now I shall have to take on 
mercenaries who will only stay with me for a higher price than in other wars.’®2 The use 
of mercenaries and paid troops was therefore common in the crusading army though it is 
clear that Peter of les Vaux-de-Cemay tries to gloss over the fact in his Historia.
As well as knights and mercenaries the crusading army consisted of a number of 
other types of troops. Sergeants, both on foot and mounted are mentioned fi*equently in 
the sources. A force of 80 sergeants is described as being left by Simon de Montfort to 
guard his siege train at Carcassonne whilst he set out for Termes.®^  At Pujol the garrison 
which was besieged by southern troops consisted of knights, squires and sergeants.®  ^A 
force of sergeants are depicted as taking hostages from amongst the population of
32 Chanson, v. 13, 5-8.
38 For examples see Chanson, v. 172,100 and v. 205,24.
39 Chanson, v. 34, 5.
®® Chanson, v. 192, 51.
®*See Maitin-Chabot, Chanson, vol. Ill, pp. 67-68, n.4. 
®2 See Verbruggen, The Art o f  Warfare, p 139 
®3 Chanson, v. 55, 3.
®4 Chanson, v. 134, 26-29.
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Toulouse.®3 Crossbowmen and archers are also mentioned as being used by the 
crusaders, particularly at the siege of Toulouse in 1216.®® There are also numerous 
references in the Chanson to ordinary citizens, hangers-on and servants attached to the 
crusading army. These are sometimes referred to as ribaults and vilans and are 
portrayed on some occasions as being the major protagonists in the looting and 
destruction of towns and surrounding farmland. ®2 Peter of les Vaux-de-Cemay often 
refers to foot soldiers as ‘pedites perigrini ’.®8 Manpower of this kind was very useful to 
an army for carrying out physical labour such as filling in and digging ditches, moving 
and operating siege engines and mining operations.®® When Termes was besieged in 
1210 William, the archdeacon of Paris, set about organising groups of crusaders in the 
task of gathering wood and stone in order to construct additional siege engines and 
keep them supplied with ammunition.^® Material was also gathered which could be used 
to make the ground level where the machines were intended to stand.^ * The siege lasted 
for over 4 months and the crusaders, as time moved on, were apparently running 
desperately short of money to pay workers and buy supplies. The archdeacon of Paris 
therefore once again intervened by setting up a religious confraternity in order to keep 
the machines supplied with ammunition. 22
The motives of those taking the cross would have been as varied as for any other 
cmsading expedition. There would be varying degrees of enthusiasm for the expedition, 
many of the those who set out would presumably have had feudal obligations to their 
lords to fulfil. Religious motives will have encouraged some to go, not only to fight the 
heretical enemies of the Catholic Church but also to gain the plenary indulgence which 
40 days in the service of the Church would bring them.23 The Chanson states that men
®3 Chanson, v. 178, 43-44.
®® Chanson, v. 187,61 & v. 194, 87.
®2 The Historia calls them servientes excercitus (Historia, 90). See Roquebert, L 'Épopée cathare, 
p. 254. Roquebert suggests that the these ribaults were in fact mercenaries and that Peter of les Vaux- 
de-Cemay tries to disguise this fact in his description of them as servants.
®8 See Historia, 188,426 & 357.
®9 See R  Rogers, Latin Siege Warfare in the Twelfth-Century, p.61. Rogers here points out that at the 
siege of Jerusalem in 1099 non-combatant crusaders were essential in supporting the efforts to assault 
the city.
2® Historia, 175.
2* Historia, 175, here it is stated that the siege could not have been sustained without the help of 
William whom the author also credits with instructing the carpenters in the constmction of the 
machines.
22 Historia, 180.
23 For crusading indulgences see H.E. Mayer, The Crusades (Oxford, 1972) p.23-8.
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‘came flocking because the pardon offered to crusaders was so g e n e r o u s ’ .24  There would 
also be the prospect of gaining lands for themselves in the area of the Languedoc. In 
1199 a papal decretal of Innocent III had permitted the legal confiscation of lands 
belonging to heretics.23 The prospect of monetary reward and land would have also have 
been attractive as a way of compensating the crusaders for any expenses incurred.
The majority of the men who embarked on such an expedition would have been 
expected to arm and equip themselves. Most of those who travelled on crusade and 
pilgrimage to the Holy Land were privately financed and there is little reason to believe 
that this expedition differed dramatically. The first resource available to those who held 
land or property was to sell or mortgage it. Usurers, relations and lords as well as the 
church were involved in the lending of money for this purpose. Religious institutions in 
this period often acted as sources of credit and would accept lands, rights and services in 
return for money.2® Both the church and secular lords provided ways of aiding crusaders 
financially. The papal bull Quantum Predecessores of 1145 allowed for property to be 
pledged to the church in return for loans as well as freeing crusaders from paying loans 
on existing debts. A decree of Philip Augustus which accompanied the levy of a tithe in 
I I88 provided the precedent for the granting of a two year moratorium on the 
repayment of loans.
When the Albigensian Crusade was launched in 1208, therefore, the right of 
crusaders to raise money through selling and pledging property was established in both 
canon and civil law. The Church’s role in financing the crusade also involved the levying 
of taxes. As early as 1199 the papacy had resorted to taxation of the clergy, to raise 
money for the crusade in the Holy Land. A second tax had been imposed to support the 
Fifth Crusade in 1215. Innocent III in these cases had claimed one fortieth of the 
clergy’s income. In 1208 the French clergy were encouraged to mortgage their incomes 
for the next two years to help finance the Albigensian Crusade whilst bishops and nobles 
were asked to donate one tenth of their i n c o m e .22 It is not easy to ascertain how much 
was collected from this tithe. Although the contribution of the laity was voluntary.
24 Chanson v. 13, 13.
23 Sumption, The Albigensian Crusade, p. 80.
2® For methods used by crusaders to finance their expeditions see G. Constable, ‘The Financing of the 
Crusade in the Twelfth-Century’, Outremer, Studies in the History o f  the Crusading Kingdom o f  
Jerusalem, Presented to Joshua Prawer, eds. B. Z. Kedar, H.E. Mayer & R.C. Smail (Jerusalem, 1982), 
pp. 64 -88.
22 Sumption, The Albigensian Crusade, p. 80.
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constraint was used in collecting this money from the church even to the point of issuing 
ecclesiastical sanctions/* In 1221 after Honorius III had proclaimed a fresh crusade in 
the south of France, a new method of collection of the levy began to be used under the 
supervision of three of France’s archbishops . This would be in the form of a triennial 
twentieth on all church income in France. Unfortunately, little is known about the 
collection of the tax except where local disputes merited papal intervention. Bishops who 
took the cross against the heretics claimed exemption from the tax but were instead 
required to devote a similar amount for hiring mercenaries. In 1222 the pope told the 
archbishops in charge of collecting the tax to borrow money on the strength of the 
anticipated receipts in order to pay more mercenaries. It took as long as 10 years for all 
due tax to be paid and collected following the complications of local disputes and claims 
of exemption. Early attempts at papal taxation as a method of financing the crusade, 
therefore, proved to be far from successful owing to the haphazard way it was collected. 
It is therefore likely that previous attempts at the collection of contributions to the 
crusade were also flawed. 2®
The question of finance became increasingly important as the crusade progressed. 
More and more money was needed to pay mercenaries. The resources Simon de 
Montfort gained from his title of Viscount of Carcassonne could not cover all these 
expenses.*® Simon de Montfort established, on behalf of the papacy, an annual 
contribution from all his lands of 300 deniers per fief, a tax on excommunicants and also 
personally promised to pay the sum of 1000 marks of silver a year to aid the crusade. A 
prominent merchant of Montpellier named in the Chanson as Raymond of Salvanhac (or 
Cahors) gave considerable financial backing to Simon de Montfort, particularly around 
the time of the riege of Minerve for which has was rewarded with lands and titles. 
According to the Chanson he was also given all of the spoils of the capture of Lavaur.** 
It is probable that Raymond was also helped by other merchants from Montpellier. *2 At 
Toulouse in 1216 Simon de Montfort ordered the confiscation of the wealth of leading
2* See Y. Dossat, ‘Simon de Montfort’, Paix de Dieu et guerre sainte en Languedoc au X llT  siècle. 
Cahiers de Fanjeaux 4, ed. E.Privat (Toulouse, 1969), pp. 281-300.
2® See R  Kay, ‘The Albigensian Twentieth of 1221-3: An Early Chapter in the History of Papal 
Taxation’, Journal o f  Medieval History, 6 (1980), pp. 307-315 
*® See Dossat, ‘Simon de Montfort’ p. 288.
** Chanson, v. 72,1-8.
*2 See Dossat, ‘Simon de Montfort’, p.290.
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citizens of Toulouse in order to pay his troops.*^ In the Chanson he complains that his 
companions are threatening to leave him because he has nothing to reward them with 
suggesting that he no longer had the resources to do so.*4
When the crusading army was on the offensive, a regular supply of those willing 
to take the cross and serve for 40 days provided a satisfactory method of recruitment in 
many circumstances. *3 On some occasions the arrival of fresh recruits tipped the balance 
in favour of the crusaders.*® As the war progressed, however, and the crusaders found 
their fortunes reversed the arrival of new recruits often only matched in number the 
recruits that were flocking to the side of Count Raymond VI of Toulouse. Simon de 
Montfort, by the end of the winter of 1217/18, was extremely short of money and the 
paid troops he had under him were threatening to desert him. In May and June 1218 
reinforcements arrived for the crusaders,*’ however these new forces were soon 
cancelled out by the arrival of recruits for Count Raymond's army as well as the arrival 
of the army of the Young Count Raymond, his son.**
However, the short term service of troops did not prove helpful in the conduct 
of lengthy sieges . This was one of the major factors in insufficient numbers of men being 
available to invest large cities such as Carcassonne and Toulouse. At Penne d'Agenais 
the crusaders were forced to allow the garrison to surrender on extremely favourable 
terms because many of the crusaders had completed their 40 days service.*® At Moissac, 
until the crusaders were reinforced halfway through the siege, they were unable to 
surround the town: this was to be a recurring problem for the crusaders.®® The garrison 
of Moissac exploited this by occupying a hill to the west of the town from which they 
were able to launch raids on the crusaders' camp ®*
*3 Chanson, v. 179.
*4 Chanson, v. 199, 56 -57.
*3 See A. P. Evans, The Albigensian Crusade’, A History o f  the Crusades, vol. II, pp. 277-324.
*® For example in the Spring of 1212 de Montfort was able to re-conquer many of the fortifications that 
had been lost the previous winter owing to the arrival of fresh recruits, see Chanson, v. 111-126.
*2 In May the bishop of Toulouse and Alice de Montfort arrived with reinforcements 
(Chanson, v. 196, 36-40)as did the count of Soissons in June (Chanson, v. 200,103)
** Chanson, v. 201, 70, it is said here that he arrived with a force of over 5000 knights.
*® Historia, 334.
®® Historia, 344, the bishop of Toul bought a band of reinforcements for the crusaders which allowed 
them finally to surround the town, they were still however unable to take it by storm owing to the 
strength of the walls 
®* Chanson, v. 120,1- 4.
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The conduct of the siege at Termes provides a good example of the kind of difficulties 
face by the crusaders. Simon de Montfort was unable to surround the walls, due to lack 
of men and the delay in the arrival of his siege train. For some time after he arrived in 
July 1210 the castle garrison were able to come and go relatively unmolested by the 
c r u s a d e r s . ® 2  The longer Simon de Montfort delayed the more troops he lost Although 
there was a steady supply of new recruits, as soon as their 40 days of service were 
complete they drifted away a g a i n .® ^  Added to this was the threat of raiding parties from 
Cabaret sweeping down and making the roads north of Termes treacherous. Later in the 
month of August the siege train eventually arrived along with a contingent of Bretons.®4 
These were soon followed by a large party from île de France.®^  The crusaders were 
now able to cut off access to the castle but most of this force left before the harsh 
weather of Autumn set in. Heavy rain, snow and icy winds plagued the small force of 
crusaders that had decided to stay either out of personal loyalty to Simon de Montfort or 
because they had not completed their 40 days service. In mid October a party of 
crusaders unexpectedly arrived from Lorraine and once again Simon de Montfort’s force 
was large enough to surround the castle.
This sequence of events illustrates very well why some of the sieges during the 
crusade were so prolonged and how inadequate the crusaders’ methods of recruitment 
could be. A combination of this, inaccessible fortifications and extremely good natural 
defences sometimes succeeded in delaying the crusaders, for months on end. Once 
established in the South those northerners who had decided to remain were rewarded 
with confiscated lands, although establishing their authority became increasingly difficult. 
Spread over a wide area, most northerners were split up into small groups and left to 
garrison many small towns in the region. For example, Bouchard de Marly is recorded as 
garrisoning the castle at Saissac with a force of 50 men consisting of horse, foot and
®2 Historia, 173.
®3 The Chanson mentions that the crusading force at Termes was made up of men from Germany, 
Normandy, Bavaria, Frisia, Saxony, Anjou and Brittany. It also says that when the men had served 
their 40 days they would leave to be replaced by newly arrived recruits. (Chanson, v. 56, 20ff.). 
Historia, 169.
®3 Historia, 174., this force was led by the bishops o f Chartres and Beauvais.
®® Historia, 187.
®2 Historia, 188.
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archers. This number seems fairly typical of the numbers mentioned as making up a 
crusader garrison.®*
Such small numbers of crusaders could not succeed for long in attempting to hold 
areas of hostile territory. In the spring of 1216 when the Young Count Raymond 
returned and started his counter offensive against the northerners, the garrison at 
Beaucaire were, according to the Chanson forced to wait 4 months before 
reinforcements could be mustered. In contrast Raymond’s force received abundant 
supplies of men, the Chanson twice mentions the arrival of troops for Raymond's army®® 
and in one passage estimates that the strength of his force was 15,000 men.*®® When 
Raymond took Beaucaire, Simon de Montfort was 400 miles away in the north receiving 
official confirmation of his southern lands and titles fi’om the king.*®* A similar situation 
arose in September 1217 when Count Raymond entered Toulouse, taking the crusaders 
by surprise. Simon de Montfort was away from the city at the time. It was not until 3 
weeks after the entrance of Raymond VI into Toulouse that Simon de Montfort returned 
after he had received word from his wife Alice who had only a skeleton garrison with 
her.*®2 She could, therefore, do little except retreat to within the Chateau Narbonnais 
and wait for reinforcements from Carcassonne, 60 miles away.*®^
Such a situation did not bode well for the establishment of any form of permanent 
authority for the northerners. Prior to the dispossession of Count Raymond in 1215 some 
in the south had been prepared to aid the crusaders militarily. The crusading army on 
various occasions was aided by troops from the south for a number of reasons, mainly 
concerning political expediency and local rivalries. For example, at Minerve Simon de 
Montfort’s besieging army consisted of a force of French and German volunteers and 
well as a contingent of Gascons and levies fi*om Narbonne who had volunteered on 
account of the damage the town of Minerve was doing to their trade. *®4
®* Chanson, v. 41, 24. A number o f ‘no more than 60’ is taken by William de Contres to garrison 
Verdun (Chanson, v. 127,23.) and the crusaders garrison at Beaucaire is recorded as consisting of 50 
men (Chanson, v. 166, 45.)
®® Chanson, v. 163, 63. and v.162, 96 ff.
*®® Chanson, v. 165, 6.
*®* Historia, 573.
*®2 De Montfort had been away fighting in Bigorre and Provence, having left the city in September 
1216 he campaigned for the whole of the summer of 1217 in these areas, see Chanson, v. 180.
*®3 Chanson, v. 183, 15.
*®4 Historia, 152, for Simon de Montfort's relationship with Narbonne see Dossat Simon de Montfort ’ 
pp. 293-96.
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Simon de Montfort, as viscount of Carcassonne, also claimed the right to feudal service 
from the knights and other men of his lands. The Statutes of Pamiers, issued in 
December 1212, had established northern French practices in the confiscated lands held 
by the crusaders, just as institutions had been imported by the crusaders into the Latin 
East. Of the 46 articles several deal with the issue of land holding in relation to military 
service. Northern crusaders who had become land holders were required to give Simon 
de Montfort the unlimited service or their knights in proportion to the size of their 
possessions, with the threat of severe penalties for any who refused. No castles were to 
be built without the express permission of Simon de Montfort and those that were held 
by crusaders were required to be given up to their lord as and when r e q u i r e d .  Several 
references are made in the Chanson to the summoning of levies of troops from his 
southern lands by Simon de Montfort. For example, in one passage Simon de Montfort 
summons men from his southern fiefs and is depicted as saying ‘no one, sergeant or 
peasant must stay behind’, suggesting that levies of foot soldiers as well as knights were 
expected to undertake military service for their lord.*®®
Although the papacy encouraged the recruiting of crusaders to go and fight in the 
Languedoc, on several occasions during years between 1208 and 1226 the papacy's 
official stance worked against the military success of Simon de Montfort and his 
followers. Despite his launching of the crusade in 1208, the policy of Innocent III 
toward the expedition changed according to circumstances. In 1212 a crusade had been 
launched against the Moslems in Spain and Amauld Amaury, the abbot of Cîteaux, who 
had been one of the Albigensian Crusade's staunchest supporters and leaders, left the 
region in order to lead the expedition. In 1213 Innocent III put a stop to the crusade in 
southern France and instead encouraged the knighthood of Christendom to go and fight 
in the Holy Land after Peter of Aragon complained to the Holy See that the crusade was 
being turned into an instrument of Simon de Montfort’s personal ambition. *®2 When 
Innocent III died in July 1216, his successor Honorius III declared it as his ambition to 
reclaim the holy places of Palestine by means of a fresh crusade. After the failure of this.
*®3 See Roquebert, L 'Épopée cathare, pp. 502 - 505 
Chanson, y. 171,12.
*®2 Historia, 399 -411. For Innocent Ill’s involvement in the Albigensian Crusade see R. Foreville, 
‘Innocent III et la croisade Albigeois, Paix de Dieu et guerre sainte en Languedoc auXIIF siècle. 
Cahiers de Fanjeaux 4, ed. E. Privât (Toulouse, 1969), pp. 184-217.
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the Fifth Crusade in 1221, the crusade in southern France was blamed as being a major 
cause of deflecting recruits away from the 'true crusade'.*®*
From the evidence available from the narrative sources for the crusade several 
conclusions can be drawn. It appears that crusaders found the customary period of forty 
days service just as restricting in the conduct of major offensive campaigns as the 
Capetian and Angevin monarchs did. Although large number of troops could be recruited 
by the appeal of the Crusade, this method of recruitment lacked continuity. Such 
methods of recruitment were seasonal, unreliable and did not lend themselves to such 
necessities as the garrisoning of fortifications and the swift movement of reinforcements 
in times of crisis as well as the taking of fortifications. The evidence suggests that 
mercenaries were employed by the crusaders from a very early stage of the Crusade and 
that those who owed feudal service also served for pay. The crusading army was 
composed of the same elements that one finds in the royal French army of the time. 
Infantry and non-combatants becoming increasingly important for the role they could 
play in the taking and garrisoning of fortifications. The military situation in the 
Languedoc on the eve of the crusade must now be established in order to be able to 
better understand the nature of the conflict which followed and to draw comparisons 
between the crusading army and their southern opponents.
2.4 Armies in the Languedoc in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries.
When the crusading army invaded the Languedoc in 1208 they were entering a region 
with its own distinct identity, language, political structures and traditions which had 
developed very much independently from those of northern France. Distinct differences 
from northern practice concerning land holding, service and homage amongst the 
aristocracy of the South can all be observed and all affected, to a greater of lesser extent, 
the way that armies were recruited and rewarded. It is therefore very important to 
consider the political and social background in the Languedoc on the eve of the crusade 
in order to be able to reach a better understanding of the conflict which took place.
*®* J.M. Pov/eW, Anatomy o f  a Crusade 1213-1221 (Philadelphia, 1986) pp. 43-4.
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2.4.1 The Political Background and Land Holding in Southern France
From the collapse of the Carolingian Empire onwards, institutions in the South 
developed separately from those of the North and although the count of Toulouse 
nominally held his title from the French king, no count or abbot in these lands sought 
royal confirmation of their title. The counts of Toulouse in the form of the house of St. 
Gilles became the major power in the region in the eleventh century, whilst powerfijl 
principalities also developed to the north in Aquitaine and to the south east in 
Catalonia.*®® In the 1180s, when rivalries between the counts of Toulouse and the house 
of Barcelona developed, the effectiveness of the count of Toulouse’s powerful 
administration system began to fail. Although Raymond V made great efforts to assert 
his overlordship through the use of effective administration and the development of a 
chancellery, his son Raymond VI failed to maintain a grip on his increasingly 
independent vassals.**® This led to vassals such as the Trencavel viscounts of 
Carcassonne transferring their loyalty to the house of Barcelona.
The reason for the southern French defeat during the Albigensian Crusade is 
often seen as bdng the lack of binding feudal ties in that area. The initial success of the 
crusade seems to suggest that the southern nobility lacked cohesion and despite repeated 
rallies eventually collapsed because of disunity amongst themselves.*** It has also been 
suggested that vassalic ties were almost unknown in Languedoc prior to the Capetian 
invasion and this has often been cited as a cause for the eventual southern defeat. **2 The 
kind of ties of allegiance that existed in southern France between lord and vassal can 
perhaps be seen in the behaviour of the count of Toulouse towards the Byzantine 
emperor during the First Crusade. Raymond of St Gilles had been one of the few leaders 
of the expedition who refiised to swear allegiance to Alexius Comnenus. This may reflect 
the attitudes of those lords from southern France who took part in the crusade to the
*®® See Lewis, The Development o f  Southern French and Catalan Society, p. 312.
* *® For the development of the power of the counts of Toulouse in the eleventh and twelfth centuries see 
J, Dunbabin, France in the Making (Oxford, 1985), pp. 299 ff.
*** See Belperron, La croisade contre les Albigeois, pp. 3-40. Belperron argues the eventual defeat of 
the southern lords was inevitable, that Languedoc was incapable of uniting against an invader due to the 
decline of its decadent and decomposing civilisation and that it was the destiny of France to be united 
under the crown. See also A. Peal, ‘Olivier de Termes and the Occitan Nobility in the Thirteenth- 
Century’ Reading Medieval Studies 12, (1986), pp. 109-137.
**2 See Paterson, The World o f  the Troubadours, p. 15.
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idea of ties of a l l e g i a n c e .  **3 Raymond instead swore a modified oath, common in 
southern France, which was a kind of pact of non belligerence involving no personal tie.
Documentary evidence is particularly valuable in providing clues to the type of 
political and personal ties which existed between a lord and his vassals in the Midi. From 
the lands of the Trencavels there survive over 300 extant copies of oaths of fealty given 
in the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries. The form of these oaths tells us little 
about its social or political function. For the most part it assured the person to whom 
the oath was made that the oath taker would do him no bodily harm, would not betray 
him and would not deprive him of specific castles named in the o a t h .  **4 Comparison 
between vows of homage and fealty from the North and the South is instructive in 
revealing the similarities and diflferences which e x i s t e d . **3 Along with normal vows of 
homage and fealty it was common for lords in both northern and southern France to 
demand an additional guarantee that a vassal’s fortress would not be used against him. 
This could take the form of a lord insisting that he may take his vassals’ castles arbitrarily 
on demand (rendability) or an agreement that the castles’ use remain non-prejudicial to 
its owners’ immediate lord (jurability). The latter of these two practices was more 
common in the South.. A distinction, however, should be made between rendability and 
homage. In northern France and the Languedoc many charters state that castles are 
readable to a lord, but this does not constitute an act of homage except in the earliest of 
southern documents. The rendering of a fortress was something quite distinct from 
ordinary feudal duties.**® Such practices were taken extremely seriously in both areas, 
the ability of a lord to take unconditional possession of a castle being an important 
symbol of his power.
The underlying ideas behind the possession of fortifications therefore appear to 
have been very similar in both northern and southern France. Fundamental differences
**3 Ibid. p. 10.
* *4See F. Cheyette, ‘Castles of the Trancevals, a Preliminary Aerial Survey’, Order and Innovation in 
the Middle Ages: Essays in Honour o f  Joseph R. Strayer, eds. W. Jordan, B. McNab & T Ruiz,
( Princeton, N.J., 1976), pp. 255 - 272.
* *3 For royal fortress policy of the kings of both England and France in this period see C Coulson, 
Fortress Policy in Capetian Tradition and Angevin PracticeMng/o Norman Studies VI, ed. R..A. Brown 
(Woodbridge, 1984) pp. 13-38 and J. Yver, ‘Les châteaux forts en Normandie jusqu’au milieu du Xir 
siècle: contribution à l’étude du pouvoir ducal, Bulletin de la Société des Antiquaires de Normandie, 53 
(1955-56), pp. 28-115.
**® See C. Coulson, ‘Rendability and Castellation in Medieval France’, Château Gaillard, VI, (1972), 
pp. 59-67.
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appear, however, regarding concepts of homage and service. One explanation for the 
weakness or possible non-existence of feudalism, according to the northern model, in the 
south can perhaps be seen in the form of oaths of allegiance taken. Mention of homage is 
late and extremely rare in the South and the fief appears to have been a foreign concept 
before the coming of the crusade. A possible explanation for the development of 
characteristically southern land holding practices could be the survival of institutions 
from the Carolingian era as well as different notions of public and territorial interest. 
Northern practices such as the levying of aids and incidents did not develop in the 
South. There is a large amount of evidence, therefore, to point to major differences 
existing in practices concerning land holding and homage in the South. Arguments have 
been put forward, however, to suggest that the power of southern rulers, such as the 
counts of Toulouse, was not necessarily weaker than that of the Capetian monarchs of 
France because of such practices. Bisson, for example, cites political, personal and 
dynastic failures, not institutional ones as the main reasons behind the weakening and 
eventual destruction of the rule of the house of St. Gilles. Nevertheless, in certain 
regions of southern France vassalic homage was viewed with hostility or simply not 
taken seriously. In the mid-eleventh century 90% of land in the area was allodial which 
may indicate that personal vassilic ties simply did not exist. By the 1190s this figure was 
fifty percent, but this still indicates a vast difference from the heavily feudalised North. 
The free fee was in wide use in southern France which meant that the only obligation a 
land owner had to his overlord was to hand over fortifications if it was demanded of him.
This situation would appear to have major implications regarding the question of 
military service in relation to land holding in the south. Many soldiers in southern France 
appear to have been hired on an ad hoc basis when a lord needed extra men. This 
however does not appear to indicate that they owed the lord service as such. An 
analysis of vocabulary used in Occitan poetry shows that lands were often seen as a 
lord’s patrimony and castles and towns were seen as his possessions.Property
 ^ See E.Magnou - Nortier, ‘Fidélité et féodalité méridionales d’apres le serment de fidélité (X* - debut 
X ir  siècle)’. Les structures sociales de L'Aquitaine, du Languedoc e t de L'Espagne au premier age 
féoda\, pp. 115 - 152.
pp. 115-142 and Cheyette, ‘Castles of the Trencavels’, p. 262-7.
 ^ See T.N. Bisson, ‘Some Characteristics o f Mediterranean Territorial Power’, Medieval France and 
her Pyrenean Neighbours: Studies in Early Institutional History (London, 1989), pp. 257-264.
Ibid., p. 263.
Paterson, The World o f  the Troubadours, p. 20.
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ownership therefore appears to have been more important than personal ties. Outside 
the cities the physical geography of the area may have played a great part in determining 
political affiliations and relationships between vassals and their immediate lords. Barber 
has argued that lordships such as those of Minerve, Cabaret and Termes were helped in 
retaining their independence by the strong defensive positions the landscape afforded 
them. 121 This suggests that just as the king of France's authority was more apparent than 
real in the southern France in this period, so it was with the count of Toulouse’s in the 
late twelfth century.
The subject of land holding in relation to military service can also be related to 
the whole question of the role of the knight and the concept of knighthood. The knight 
was one of the most important components in any medieval army. A survey of vernacular 
literature from this period reveals, however, that concepts of knighthood and the ideas 
surrounding it many have differed dramatically in northern and southern France. Such 
literature can provide us with important clues as to how knights perceived themselves 
and how they were recruited and rewarded.
2.4.2 Knighthood and the meaning of the word * knight** in Southern France.
In southern France there appears to have been several different types of knights who 
fought in conjunction with other types of soldiers. The definition of a knight in this 
context is a question that involves the examination of their military and social role. In 
addition to the Chanson it will be of relevance to examine the role and definition of a 
knight in other vernacular literary works of both the lyric and epic genre fi"om both 
northern and southern France. Comparing the role and status of the knight in Old 
French and Occitan literature should then help in determining some of the major 
differences in the role of these men in the army of the crusade and that of their southern 
adversaries. Flori, in his study of the use of the words chevalerie and chevaleros in the 
Chansons de Geste of the twelfth century, concluded that these words can have only a 
loose definition in this period, which has little to do with cultural values, ethics or
2^1 See Barber, ‘Catharism and the Occitan Nobility’, p. 8-10.
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religion. 122 Tfig chevalerie of these works refers merely to heavy cavalry and evokes 
ideas of feats of physical strength in combat. During the course of the twelfth century 
however the word did undergo a change in meaning. He also concluded that there were 
various levels of knighthood. Under the direct command of the great lords there existed 
vassals as well as mercenary soldiers. There were also those that could be termed 
"companions" who worked in the permanent service of a master and lived in his 
household. The word chevalier in this context also evokes the idea of a hierarchy with 
knights at the top and squires and sergeants beneath.
Several comparable studies exist of the figure of the knight in southern French 
l i t e r a t u r e .  ^ 2 3  troubadour lyric the word cavalier can cover a wide range of social 
levels and may never have had any specific social meaning in the South. What emerges, 
however, is that the word does have certain connotations in distinguishing the knight 
from other levels of society. This included the great lords or magnates (often 
distinguished by the use of such terms as senhor, baron or ric ome), those warriors who 
are termed soudadier, the clergy and the peasantry {villans)P^ Switten’s conclusion that 
the "knights portrayed in literature reflect a reality we will never entirely recapture" is a 
pertinent point; however, vernacular literature of the period may be one of the best 
sources that we have for reflecting some of the military and social realities of twelfth and 
thirteenth century southern France.
As Paterson points out, the South can not be taken as whole when referring to 
such matters, as practices that were common in one area could be non-existent in 
a n o t h e r .   ^2 5  Even between certain towns there are significant differences. In Toulouse for 
example there appears to have been no rigid social division between the citizens and the 
knights. In Beziers and Carcassonne they were separated into relatively stable hereditary 
groups. Paterson divides the connotations of the word cavalier into several distinct 
categories. The word most often relates to military service in the context of what Flori 
termed ‘vassal knights’ and those that serve for a wage. These include urban knights,
^22 j. Flori, ‘La notion de chevalerie dans les chansons de geste du XIP siècle’. Le Moyen Age, (1975), 
p. 408448.
2^3 See Switten, The Chevalier in Twelfth Century French and Occitan Vernacular Literature’, 
Paterson, ‘Knights and the Concept of Knighthood in Twelfth-Century Occitan Epic’ and W. M. 
Hacked, ‘Knights and Knighthood in Girart de Rousillion’, The Ideals and Practice o f  Medieval 
Knighthood II: Papers from the Third Strawberry Hill Conference, 1986, eds. C. Harper -Bill and R. 
Harvey (Woodbridge, 1988) pp. 4045 .
*24 Switten ‘The Chevalier in Twelfth century French and Occitan Vernacular Literature’, p. 445.
*25 Paterson,’Knights and the Concept of Knighthood’, p. 116.
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who dominated the city of Toulouse and Other towns in the region. They were 
theoretically bound to lords through vassallic ties but they often played off multiple lords 
against one another to avoid any effective ties at all. In the twelfth century they were 
also beginning to become involved in trade from were they could earn an income and 
become more independent firom ties to their lords. This way of life was particularly 
southern, and Paterson suggests that this may have offended the sensibilities of the 
northern i n v a d e r s .  *26 Such prejudices may explain such acts as the expulsion of the urban 
knights from the city of Toulouse in September 1216 *27 jjjg anonymous poet of the 
Chanson protests that this left the city with virtually no means of defending itself. Such 
a singling out of a particular groups may suggest that the crusaders were particularly 
hostile to them. It could also be argued however that this was a sensible military 
precaution.
The group of knights which Flori describes as 'ministerials', that is, knights who 
lived permanently with their lord and carried out ofiicial functions appear to be almost 
non-existent in Occitan literature of the twelfth century. What are found are several 
categories of household knight including close family members who live under the roof 
of their more powerful relatives and poor knights who could act as a permanent muster 
of troops, living in the households of the vassals of more wealthy lords. *2*
It has been suggested that the more frequent use of mercenaries represents one of 
the main differences between the southern and northern practice. Mercenaries appear 
four times more frequently in Occitan texts than they do in Old French texts of the 
twelfth century. *29 These form a loose category of knights fighting for gain in the form 
of cash or in kind. They would be either permanently or regularly attached to a lord or 
recruited for a particular campaign. These knights could be referred to by the terms 
soudadier or logadier which implied no idea of rank.*^ ** Such mercenaries could be of 
noble birth or foreign extraction but the line between vassal knights and mercenaries in 
Occitan literature is often very blurred. The mercenaries which appear in Occitan
*26 Ibid. p. 121
*27 Chanson V. 177,77.
*2* Paterson, ‘Knights and the Concept of Knighthood’, p. 123,
*29 Ibid. p. 124.
*30 The term soudadier is a problematic one. See Switten, ‘The Chevalier in Twelfth-Century French
and Occitan Literature’, p. 411. Switten appears to imply that in some contexts the word could convey 
the idea of a soldier ranked below a knight in social status and in others to imply no connotations of 
social status at all.
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literature are often paid in advance. It appears that vassals, if their period of service ran 
out, could be kept on by receiving the same pay as these mercenaries. The greater 
numbers of mercenaries to be found in Occitan literature could be explained by the 
nature of southern feudalism and a more developed monetary economy. Many knights 
only owed dues to a lord in kind and were therefore free to hire out their services 
elsewhere. The lords whom these knights served could be vassals of a greater lord but 
generally acted independently. There was a great variety of types of fief in southern 
France in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Honores were held by powerful nobles, 
castellanies held by castellanes or vavassors i.e. rear vassals. It should be noted that 
the word vassal does not necessarily denote any idea of being a feudal vassal but merely 
a warrior.
The Chanson is a valuable source when discussing knights and knighthood in 
southern France. It is an excellent historical source for the detail it gives, both 
concerning social and military matters.*^* As in much of the literature of the South it 
portrays no notion of an “order of chivalry” and does not seek to portray an ideal of 
knighthood. The anonymous poet of the second half of the work however does portray 
certain qualities as admirable including impetuosity, ferocity, courage and the use of 
good fighting technique, qualities that the Young Count Raymond is portrayed as 
exemplifying. The concept of paratge is also a dominant theme in the second half of the 
poem. The word can only be approximately translated into English and is linked to the 
concept of territorial rights and the honour of those who would regain them. It implies 
attachment to the land, justice and the defence of the South against an invader and 
concerns neither courtly ideas nor religion. Through an extension of this meaning 
paratge is also associated with honour and the virtues and qualities associated with the 
status of being a land holder. The anonymous poet links this also with the qualities of 
independence and generosity, qualities a lord cannot possess if he has been deprived of 
his lands. Those that have had their lands confiscated by the crusaders are reduced to 
the status of a faiditz, dependant on another’s generosity and therefore not 
i n d e p e n d e n t .  *^2 xfig idea ofparatge as portrayed in the Chanson therefore offers
131 See Paterson, ‘ La Chanson de la Croisade Albigeoise’, p. 197.
*^ 2 See C.P. Bagley, "Paratge in the Anonymous Chanson de la Croisade Albigeoise’, French Studies, 
XXI (1967), pp. 195-204.
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important clues to the relationship which existed between landholding and loyalty in 
southern France.
Words such as chevaler and adjectives related to them have a strictly functional 
meaning in the Chanson in common with other Occitan literature It is the same with the 
epithets that are attached to these knights. They are praised for being efficient warriors, 
not because they adhere to an ethic. The notion of knighthood as portrayed in the 
Chanson therefore is essentially practical. The poem shows knights using such weapons 
as clubs and c r o s s b o w s .  ^  not portrayed as being shameful to use such weapons as 
it sometimes is in the literature of the North of this period. The Chanson does not 
convey the idea that it is dishonourable for a knight to engage in combat with a man who 
is not a knight. The only thing that appears to be important is victory and survival. It is 
evident from the Chanson that those who held fiefs from the count of Toulouse did not 
owe him a military obligation. On the rare occasions where the word vassal does appear 
in the text of the Chanson it is not clear whether they are expected to fight without some 
kind of financial recompense.. There is only one passage in the Chanson where 
Raymond summons his cavalaria which suggests a link with a feudal bond.*^^
An analysis of the vocabulary used to describe the different types of soldiers in 
the Chanson illustrates not only the remarkable variety of combatants described, but also 
shows that it is the knight who dominates above all the other groups of fighters, if one 
takes as the major criteria the number of times they are mentioned in the text. Other 
types of soldiers are commonly mentioned in the Chanson, however, and these also 
played an important role in the southern army. These included mounted and foot 
sergeants, urban levies, archers and crossbow men and the citizens of besieged towns.
Chanson, v. 102,12 and v .l95, 76.
*^ 4 Chanson, v, 199, 22-27.
*25 See table in Paterson, ‘La Chanson de la Croisade Albigeoise’, p. 203, this shows that the cavaler 
is mentioned 384 times in total in the two halves of the poem, the nearest single other group being the 
borzes mentioned 92 times.
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2.4.3 Infantry, Mercenaries and Specialist Soldiers in the South
The term sergeant is used most often to describe the infantry soldier used in the 
S o u t h .  *26 Another term often used is sirven. As well as acting as infantry they are 
reported as carrying out a variety of tasks including escorting siege trains and carrying 
out manual labour such as filling in ditches and mining in addition to keeping watch at 
barricades and garrisoning some castles. Citizens or burghers also played a part in 
defending their towns and cities and contributing to offensive military operations. In an 
attacking army they would often form squadrons with groups of sergeants and were also 
a valuable source of funding. Forces of citizen militia are recorded in the Chanson as 
being present at Muret although they appear to have played a limited role in the 
battle. *27 Men fi*om Toulouse also fought under the command of their count at Pujol and 
Toulouse. *28
Thriving and wealthy cities such as Carcassonne and Toulouse possessed an 
influential and wealthy bourgeoise who had a large part to play in the political life of the 
city. These citizens guarded their political rights extremely jealously and this often led to 
conflict with the nobility and also the church. *29 Citizens also had a major role to play in 
the organisation of military forces. The crusaders on more than one occasion had the 
political strength and fierce independence of the inhabitants of the cities of the South 
demonstrated to them. The resistance of the people of Beziers to the crusading army in 
1209, though in part a consequence of their confidence in the town’s defences, was also 
a demonstration of how the people of the town valued their independence. *4<* The 
citizens of Toulouse became implacable enemies of Simon de Montfort determined to 
show their independence and resistance to his rule. Simon de Montfort responded to this 
with his increasingly harsh treatment of the city. He finally resorted to the desperate 
measure of attempting to gain for himself a new power base by destroying the power 
of the old city and proposed the building of a new town to the west of the suburb of St
*26 In the North of France the term sergeant is used to refer to both foot soldiers and lightly armed 
cavalry. This does not appear to be the case in the south where they are referred to as ecuyer.
*27 Chanson, v . l3 6 ,19.
*28 Chanson, v. 133,6.
*29 See Paterson, The World o f  the Troubadours, pp. 48-9 & 151-85.
*^*® See Roquebert, L ’Épopée cathare, vol. 1 , pp 251-252. Roquebert demonstrates this by quoting 
Chanson, v. 17,8-9 ‘the crusaders will not get one penny worth of our possessions or change the mle 
over our town’, seeing this proclamation of the independence of the people o f Béziers as pivotal to 
understanding the nature of the war.
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Cyprian which lay across the river Garonne.*'** This he planned to populate with 
immigrants from the North,
The anonymous continuator of the Chanson is keen to depict the solidarity of the 
people of the South against the crusaders. *^*2 He shows groups of women, bourgeois, 
municipal militia, sergeants, ecuyers^ '^ '^  archers and crossbow men all taking part in the 
armed resistance to the crusaders. All these groups of combatants have epithets of praise 
attached to them. The most important element of their contribution is their efficiency 
as soldiers and not their social rank.*'*'* Archers and crossbowmen were amongst many 
soldiers who used specialist weapons in southern French armies. Southern writers 
appear not to have been so prejudiced against the use of the bow as their northern 
counterparts. *'*5 In the Chanson archers are clearly regarded as important support for 
the knights and infantry both covering their advance and playing a defensive role behind 
fortifications. The southern French often used the composite or Turkish bow which 
may have been an import from Spain via contact with the Muslim inhabitants of the 
Iberian Peninsula.*'*  ^ The Chanson also mentions the use of winched crossbows by both 
sides. Guy de Montfort is struck by a bolt from one of these weapons at the siege of 
Toulouse.*'*7 Such weapons were often used by mercenaries of Spanish origin.*'** Other 
specialist weapons are mentioned in the Chanson including a kind of light spear used by 
Gascon and Navarrese dardiers which could penetrate chain mail *'*9
As stated above, judging from Occitan literature it is likely that southern armies 
had a higher proportion of mercenary soldiers fighting in them compared with forces 
recruited in the north. It is possible, however, that this could be the result of southern 
writers having a different attitude towards them. The term ‘mercenary’ proves to be a 
problematic one in this context. As has been discussed above, knights and soldiers who 
fought for wages in the North were distinguished from the routiers who were employed
*'** Chanson, v. 189, 85.
*'*2 See Verbruggen, The Art o f  Warfare, p. 145 where it is suggested communal armies of foot soldiers 
raised in the Northern Italian cities gained unity and solidarity from their common origins. This may 
also be the case with troops raised in southern French cities.
*'*2 Squires, not the apprentice knight of northern literature but men of more humble origins whose 
major military role appears to have consisted of ravaging land and gathering supplies.
*'*4 Paterson, ‘ Le Chanson de la Croisade Albigeoise’, p. 202.
*'*5 Ibid. p. 203.
*'*^  See Paterson, The World o f  the Troubadours, p. 52.
*'*7 Chanson, v. 205,119.
*48 Paterson, The World o f  the Troubadours, p. 52.
*'*9 Ibid., p. 53.
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in bands and had an extremely dubious reputation. In the Chcmson mercenary soldiers 
play an important role in the armies of both the crusaders and the southerners. They are 
not all necessarily hired mercenary bands of the type known as routiers, however, though 
the term is often used to describe forces used by both sides. In the first part of the 
Chanson written by William of Tudela, mercenaries are often associated with heretics 
and the two are frequently mentioned together. Here the use of mercenaries by the 
crusaders is mentioned on only a few occasions. They are more frequently seen fighting 
on the side of the southerners. For example, Navarrese mercenaries helped to defend 
Penne in 1212,*^ ° whilst at the siege of Moissac in the same year the defenders of the 
town were aided by 300 mercenary soldiers who are recorded as being killed by the 
crusaders. This garrison was reinforced by troops sent by Count Raymond to aid the 
town against the crusaders. Raymond of Termes also reinforced his garrison with 
mercenary soldiers when the village of Termes was besieged by the crusaders in July 
1210.151
The treatment defeated mercenaries received or at least feared they would 
receive at the hands of the crusaders was often very harsh. At Termes the Spanish 
mercenaries employed by Raymond of Termes are depicted as being anxious to 
conclude a negotiated surrender as quickly as possible, after several months of enduring 
siege. This is probably due to the fact that it was unlikely they would be given quarter if 
their defences were taken by storm. *52 Such fears were often justified. At Moissac the 
principal condition for the surrender of the town had been the delivery of the garrison of 
mercenary soldiers and Toulosain troops. *53 According to Peter of les Vaux-de-Cemay 
they had their throats cut by the crusaders. *54 The mercenary captain Martin Algai, 
who was employed by both the crusaders and Count Raymond, is also known to have 
been a trusted employee of King John of England. *55 He is recorded as being at 
Castelnaudary with 20 of his men and is reported as fleeing the battlefield when the day 
goes badly for the southern allies. *56 He was eventually hanged by the crusaders at
150 Chanson, v. 115, 5.
151 Chanson, v. 56,34-37, these are described as being Brabançons, Aragonese, Catalans and men from 
Rousillion., also see Historia, 172.
152 See Bradbury, The Medieval Siege, p.237.
153 Chanson, 116,20.
154 Historia, 535, the Chanson reports that over 300 were killed here (Chanson, v. 124,4).
155 See Warren, King John, p. 91.
156 Chanson, v. 93, 6.
56
Biroa where he had been placed in charge of the g a r r i s o n , .  157 Various other mercenaries 
are named in the Chanson as fighting for the Southerners. A mercenary named Raymond 
of Perigord is depicted as fighting against the crusaders at Montferrand. The poet 
records that the mercenary is very much afraid because he expects death if he is
captured. 158
The second, anonymous part of the Chanson frequently mentions the use of 
mercenaries by both sides in the crusade. They are variously referred to as voters, 
companhas, Brabançons, Navarrois md Allemand.^^^ Both authors of the Chanson 
appear to have an ambivalent attitude towards the use of mercenaries. The term voter is 
generally used in a pejorative sense. William of Tudela uses this term more often than 
the anonymous poet, and most fi-equently accuses them of looting and destruction of 
property. The anonymous poet attributes crusader successes to the use of mercenaries 
and in one passage goes so far as to emphasise that the Toulousains succeeded in 
repulsing the crusaders without the use of foreign troops, i^ ® He treats with hostility the 
Flemish troops used by the crusaders. The count of Toulouse is nevertheless seen to 
employ mercenaries who are depicted as being efficient and courageous warriors, i^ * As 
suggested above, one of the main reasons suggested for the prominence of mercenary 
troops in southern France is that the society of the region had never developed along 
such militarised lines as that of the North. Land was often not held in return for military 
service meaning that a vassal's military obligations to his feudal superior were minimal. 
Such a situation could mean that the southern magnates such as the count of Toulouse 
became increasingly reliant on mercenary soldiers to provide them with military support. 
Frequent and heavy reliance on mercenary soldiers may have been a threat to the 
authority of the count and would also have drained much of his resources. Such a 
situation could have resulted in power being devolved to the more powerful of the 
count of Toulouse's vassals including the counts of Foix and N a r b o n n e . * ^ ^
The practice of employing such mercenary soldiers had been strongly 
condemned by the church on numerous occasions. In 1179, at the third Lateran Council,
Chanson, 116, 1-6.
*58 Chanson, v. 73, 7.
*59 See Paterson, ‘La chanson de la croisade Albigeoise’, p. 201. 
*^ ® Chanson, v. 183, 27-28.
*^ * Chanson, v. 56, 37, v. 200, 27 and v. 199, 75.
*^ 2 See Sumption, The Albigensian Crusade, p. 20.
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it was not only heretics that the faithful were encouraged to take up arms against but 
also mercenary soldiers (ruterii)}^^ One of the main charges levelled against Raymond 
VI in 1208, when the Albigensian Crusade had been launched was not only that he 
tolerated heretical practices within his lands but also that he employed mercenary 
soldiers, for this he had been excommunicated. One of Raymond’s most prominent 
mercenary captains was Hugh d’Alfaro from Navarre, who rose to become his seneschal 
in the Agenais. *^ 4 xhe Chcmson mentions the raising of mercenary troops from 
Navarre and Catalonia by R a y m o n d .  *^5 xhe hiring of mercenaries did bring with it certain 
risks and disadvantages, however. For example, the Chanson refers to an incident in 
1212 when the mercenary leader Savari de Mauléon kidnapped the count of Toulouse’s 
son and demanded a ransom of 10,000 livres because he had not been paid for his 
services in the count’s army at Castelnaudary in September of 1211.*^  ^This perhaps 
illustrates that the count did not have the resources to maintain large numbers of 
mercenaries for any length of time.
2.5 Conclusion
Comparison of the crusading army and their southern enemies allows a number of 
conclusions to be formed. Because of the nature of land holding in the south the same 
concept of military service did not exist as it did in the North. Both in the North and the 
South however knights would fight for monetary reward. There is evidence to suggest, 
however, that in both the North and South these knights were distinguished from 
mercenary soldiers known as routiers. Documentary evidence which exists regarding 
mercenaries employed in the army of Philip Augustus provides a rough guide to how 
much these men could expect to be paid but a lack of evidence regarding the finances of 
southern magnates prevents us from knowing how revenue was spent on these troops. 
Whilst it has often been assumed that lack of feudal ties led to the existence of a 
disunited southern aristocracy which relied on mercenary soldiers for military support, 
this portrait is disingenuous. The Chanson suggests that dispossession of the southern
*63 seg Strickland, War and Chivalry, p. 297.
*^ 4 The History o f  the Albigensian Crusade, trans. W. A. & M.D. Sibley , Appendix D, p. 300 
*^ 5 See Belperron, La croisade contre les Albigeois, p. 332.
*^  ^Chanson, v. 123, 7-10, also see Historia, 58.
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aristocracy at the hands of the crusaders was a powerful cohesive force, depicting it as 
more important in the recruitment of men to fight for the cause of Raymond of 
Toulouse than any notion of service owed to a lord.
There are some noticeable differences in the composition of the two armies.
Cities such as Toulouse had the power to raise their own levies of infantry at the behest 
of the civic leaders and use them to their own political ends. The wealth and political 
autonomy of such cities allowed this and the evidence appears to suggest that cities of 
the Languedoc had more in common with the cities of northern Italy for example in this 
matter. Although large forces of infantry in the North were recruited by the king there is 
little evidence to suggest that the crusaders had access to such numbers, although some 
of the sergeants mentioned in the Chanson do appear to have been infantry. Because of 
the nature of the written sources available, it is perhaps inevitable that the knight appears 
to dominate the armies of both the crusaders and the southerners. Southern sources, in 
some cases, do not appear to be so prejudiced against mercenaries. The Chanson often 
attaches epithets of praise to them but they are also vilified. Perhaps it would be more 
accurate to say that sources such as the Chanson describe mercenary soldiers more 
accurately than northern sources written by churchmen, praising them for their skills and 
bravery where praise is due but also acknowledging the depredations they could cause.
Because of the difference in the nature of the available evidence the task of 
comparing armies in northern and southern France is problematic. Little documentary 
evidence is available for southern France, that which is available for the North also has 
its limitations. The evidence from the Chanson could be deceptive as the poets portray 
the crusaders through southern eyes and are not perhaps aware of differences between 
the North and the South regarding the institutions behind military service. It is also 
possible however that southern authors do not have the same prejudice against for 
example the use of mercenaries and therefore do not attempt to hide the fact that the 
crusaders used them just as often as the southerners when the need arose.
Having thus established this background it is now the intention to move on and 
examine the type of military encounters which took place during the crusade. As siege 
warfare played such an important part in this, what follows is an examination of the 
types of fortifications which existed in the Languedoc in this period and a comparison of 
these with their northern counterparts.
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Chapter 3
3.0 Introduction
This part of the study aims to make a comparison between fortifications used in 
northern France and its neighbours and those used in the area affected by the 
Albigensian Crusade. By making this comparison it may be possible to ascertain 
whether changes and improvements in fortifications in the Languedoc during the 
thirteenth century can be directly attributed to the coming of the crusade and the 
eventual union of southern France with the royal domain. The close of the twelfth 
century has often been seen as a time of great iimovation and major change in military 
architecture and siege warfare techniques, the former having a great effect on the latter. 
As siege engines became more powerful and accurate and methods for undermining 
fortifications were improved and modified improvements in the design of fortifications 
were also becoming increasingly necessary. Much of this innovation has traditionally 
been seen as taking place in northern France in the late twelfth and early thirteenth 
centuries, particularly in areas associated with the conflict between the Angevin 
monarchs of England and the Capetian monarchs of France. During the reign of Philip 
Augustus in particular, building work on royal castles in northern France increased. 
Philip’s reign was a period in which much innovation and experimentation in castle 
architecture may be observed. It also spanned the years which immediately preceded the 
launch of the Albigensian Crusade.
3.1 Development of Fortifications in Northern France from the Early Twelfth 
Century.
With the close of the twelfth century major changes can be observed in castle 
architecture in both France and England. This has been seen as typified by several 
trends, notably the use of the polygonal or so called ‘transitional’ keep and the
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development of keepless ‘enceinte’ type castles, as can be seen at Framlingham and 
Boulogne.* One possible starting point for an analysis of castle building in northern 
France during the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries is the programme of royal 
castle building carried out during the reign of Philip Augustus (1180-1223). This 
illustrates very well the kind of fortifications that were being constructed in northern 
France in the years immediately preceding the start of the Albigensian Crusade.
The conquests of the early and middle part of Philip’s reign stimulated him to 
take stock of his fortresses and pursue a policy of castle construction during the years 
1203 - 1214. There is much evidence of royal castle building in Normandy after 1204 
for example at Gisors, Vernon, Rouen, Lillebonne and Falaise. These works are all 
extremely similar in design and construction. Using the available sources it is possible to 
build up a picture of types of fortification that were being built the improvements that 
were being made to existing structures during this period. There are several 
contemporary texts which refer to the location and building costs of fortifications 
constructed and improved by Philip Augustus. Register A (1204-1211) contains a list of 
royal castles which existed in 1209. The list contains the names of 113 castles and 
fortresses with three major concentrations in the areas around Paris, the Seine valley 
between Paris and Rouen and on the northern border with Normandy. Register C (1211- 
1220) and Register E (1220 -1270) also contain information on royal castle building. The 
Compte General of 1202/03 contains 18 entries concerning royal expenditure on 
fortifications, whilst the Actes of Philip Augustus mention the construction of royal 
castles at the Louvre, Dourdan, Bourges and Sully. From these original sources is 
possible to ascertain that work on at least 40 royal castles was carried out during the 
reign of Philip Augustus. The conservation of most of these works today however, is 
extremely poor.2
! * See P.E. Cumow, ‘Some Developments in Military Architecture c. 1200 : Le Coudray Sabart’, Anglo-
I Norman Studies. II (Woodbridge, 1979), pp. 42 - 62. For Bolougne see P. Heliot, ‘Le château de
[ Boulogne Sur Mer et le chateaux gothiques de plan polygonal’. Revue Archéologique, 27, (1947),
pp. 41 - 59.
2 For the castles built and improved during the reign of Philip Augustus see A. Chatelaine 'Recherche 
sur les châteaux de Philippe Augastd, Archéologie Medievale, XXI (1993), pp. 115-161 and 
A. Erlande - Brandenburg, ‘L’architecture militaire au temps de Philippe Auguste; une nouvelle 
conception de la defence’. La France de Philippe Auguste: le temps de mutations, ed. E.Bautier (Paris, 
1980), pp. 595-603 For fiscal iwords relating to castle building see Baldwin, The Government o f  
Philip Augustus, pp. 394 - 423
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There are a number of castles which are similar in design and construction to works for 
which we have documentary evidence to indicate they were constructed during the reign 
of Philip Augustus. It can therefore be assumed that these fortifications are likely to be 
part of the same program of castle building, which took place during his reign. The 
ground plan of the castle at Montlhery, for example, shows the keep to be a regular 
pentagon with cylindrical towers at the angles. Although mostly now in ruins it is very 
similar in plan to that of Dourdon, which is known to have been built during the reign of 
Philip Augustus owing to the fact that its construction is mentioned in the Actes^
(Figure 1). In addition to these fortifications, many other castles constructed and 
augmented during the reign of Philip Augustus have a number of features in common. 
Many share such features as an enceinte with quadrangular plan and regularly spaced 
flanking towers, whilst some show a marked trend towards the donjon becoming a less 
integrated part of the castle.^
One of the most fi-equently used features is the round donjon with those at 
Issoudun and La Roche Guyon having a ‘beaked’ donjon and therefore sharing 
characteristics with Château Gaillard and Le Caudray Sabart. ’ Each donjon had roughly 
similar measurements and was constructed with uniformly cut blocks of stone of 
comparable quality. Such features appear to point towards a unified building policy 
carried out, not only as a defensive measure, but also to establish visual symbols of the 
king’s authority and suitable sites for centres of the developing royal administration. 
These visual symbols of the king’s authority could also be interpreted as a symbol of 
Philip’s triumph over the Angevin kings, as many of their captured strongholds were 
added to and improved by him, for example at Rouen and Falaise ( Plate 1). The use of 
similar plans and materials also suggests the existence of a corps of engineers and 
buildCTS working in the royal employ. In the accounts of 1202-03 several "masters" are 
named of whom 4 were involved in construction work for the king on various projects.^
2 Chatelaine, ‘Recherche sur les chateaux de Philippe Auguste’ p. 117 ff, Cumow, ‘Some 
Developments in Military Architecture’, p. 47.
 ^ Chatelaine, Recherche sur les chateaux de Philippe Ausguste’, p. 136.
5 Cumow, ‘Some Developments in Military Architecture’, p. 48. For Issoudon see J. Vallery-Radot, ‘La 
tour Blanche d’Issoudun’, Château Gaillard, I, (1964), pp. 149-160.
 ^ For Philip Augustus’ programme of building works and the masters used in building of royal 
fortifications see Baldwin, The Government o f  Philip Augustus, pp. 299 - 303 . See also E.Audouin, sur 
l 'armée royale, p. 100. Audouin notes that those employed in constmcting and repairing fortifications 
were paid a wage of 15 denier a day.
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Philip was able to pay for his building programme out of royal revenues greatly boosted 
by the consolidation of the king’s conquests in Champagne, Flanders and Normandy. 
These increased by some 76% after Philip took Angevin lands in Normandy. 20,000 
livres were raised from ransoms collected after the battle of Bouvines alone. The king 
was also scrupulous in his collection of royal rents and fines.  ^His building programme 
cost an estimated 40,000 livres} This compares quite favourably with 50,000 Angevin 
livres (34,000 livresparisi) Richard I of England spent on the construction of his 
complex of fortifications at Chateau Gaillard.9
To secure and stabilise his annexations of Normandy and the Loire valley, Philip 
found it necessary to consolidate his hold on the castles of those areas by treating with 
his vassals in order that fortifications could come into his possession.*** On the eve of the 
Albigensian Crusade, Philip Augustus controlled a large number of substantial 
fortifications in strategic positions throughout his realm. The defensive features which 
can be seen in these constructions and the style of architecture being used should be 
compared with that of the earlier twelfth century in order to ascertain whether significant 
differences and improvements can be found. Fortifications proliferated in northern 
France during this period and there can be little doubt that one of the most important 
factors in this was the rivalry between the Capetian kings of France and the Anglo- 
Norman kings of England.** Both Henry I and Henry II of England improved or renewed 
nearly all of the royal castles of Normandy. *2 The strategic placing of fortresses along a 
hostile border was a policy which had been employed since the time of Henry II’s 
grandfather, Fulk Nerra, Count of Anjou and one which was continued by the kings and 
England and France in the twelfth century. *2
7 See Baldwin, The Government o f  Philip Augustus, pp. 137 - 175.
* See Ibid, p. 300.
9 M. Powicke, The Loss o f  Normandy, 2nd edn, (Manchester, 1961) pp 204 - 206.
*** Baldwin, The Government o f  Philip Augustus, p. 301, also sœ  C. Coulson, Fortress Policy in 
Capetian Tradition and Angevin Practice’, Anglo Norman Studies, VI (Woodbridge, 1984), pp. 14 -38. 
11 For castle building by the kings of England in Normandy from Henry I onwards see Powicke, The 
Loss o f  Normandy, passim, R. A. Brown, Royal Castle Building in England 1154 -1216’, Castles, 
Conquest and Charters (Woodbridge, 1989), pp. 19-74 and J.Yver, ‘ Les châteaux forts en Normandie 
jusqu’au milieu du XIF siècle; contribution à l’étude du pouvoir ducal’. Bulletin de la Société des 
Antiquaires de Normandie, 53 (1955-56), pp. 28 -115.
*2 Powicke, The Loss o f  Normandy, p. 72 ff.
*2 See B. Bachrach, The Angevin Strategy of Castle Building in the Reign of Fulk Nerra’, American 
Historical Review, 88 (1983), pp. 533-560.
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By the 1150s the earlier ‘motte and bailey’ style of castle was being superseded by stone 
fortresses with a central donjon protected by walls and sometimes a moat.*'* It has been 
suggested that the square keep of the early to mid twelfth century exhibited serious 
design flaws regarding its defensibility*  ^ Square comers in castle walls and towers have 
been seen as extremely vulnerable to missiles and also a favoured site from which to 
begin the undermining of walls. It has also been suggested that 90° corners also 
provided dead angles that sheltered attackers from arrows and other missiles launched by 
defenders. It is possible that, to remedy this flaw, keeps began to be built in polygonal 
form. Examples of early polygonal keeps can be seen at Gisors, Chilham and Tickhill. 
The argument for the polygonal keep being a defensive improvement on the square form 
relies mostly on the assumption that a greater resistance to assault can be achieved with a 
construction that had the fewest dead angles, the logical conclusion being that a curved 
surface and therefore a round keep provides the best possible design.*^
To counter this argument, however, it has been pointed out that the polygonal 
and round plan of keep had the advantage of using less masonry and would therefore 
cost less to build. *^  Polygonal keeps have been called ‘transitional’ structures, for 
example in the works of Brown.** This suggests a development from older and less 
sophisticated forms of defence. Heslop however has suggested that the polygonal shape 
in fact made the keep even more vulnerable to attack. *9 His work on Orford suggests 
that the design of this particular castle lay more in the desire for domestic comfort and a 
fashion for palace architecture than any true concern for strength or defence. Heslop 
concludes that the idea of transition in castle architecture is based purely on hindsight 
which implies a ‘kind of Darwinian evolution’. Coulson is also an opponent of the view 
that changes in castle architecture should be seen purely in terms of defensive 
improvement. In several studies, he has advocated the idea that the principal purpose of
*'* For the development of castle architecture in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries see S. Toy,
A History o f  Fortification, (London, 1955), pp. 104 -147.
*5 See Toy, A History o f  Fortification, p. 104.
*^  For changes in castle architecture designed to counter advances in siege technology see 
D. J. Cathcart King, The Castle in England and Wales (London, 1988) pp. 90 - 106 
*7 See D. Renn, Norman Castles in Britain ( London, 1968) p. 71.
*8 R  A. Brown, English Medieval Castles (London, 1954), pp. 52-3. Brown himself has pointed out that 
that the possession of a polygonal or round keep does not necessarily point to a more advanced form of 
castle architecture, many castles were being built with square keeps well into the the thirteenth century 
and some castles such as Framlingham never had keeps at all.
*9 T. A. Heslop, ‘Orford Castle : Nostalgia and Sophisticated Living’, Architectural History, 34 (1991), 
pp. 36-58.
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the castle was for accommodation and that ‘social functions almost always transcended 
military ones’ in castle architecture even as early as the late twelfth century. This, he 
argues, is because improvements in mechanical artillery and siege technology had 
reduced the castle to the role of personal protection and prestige. He has also points out 
that very few castles were actually capable of sustaining a siege for more than a short 
period of time and that ‘capacity to hold out against blockade depended upon factors 
quite unrelated to castle architecture’.2<* Coulson has criticised such authors as Cathcart- 
King for writing of hypothetical advances in siege-crafl being matched with putative 
architectural responses’ and refuses to adhere to this ‘ traditional mechanistic hypothesis’ 
insisting that the French custom of rendibility and the English practice of licenses to 
crenellate show that the castle was very rarely a threat to royal power and was therefore 
principally a residence. He concludes that the ‘pervasive and stunting influence of the 
battering ram and boiling oil brigade’ 2* are largely to blame for the rigid categories in 
which castles have remained in the study of castellology until more recent studies which 
have taken different approaches’.
Coulson is quite correct in his observation that, from a very early date in the 
history of the castle, it is extremely difficult, in most cases, to separate developments in 
military and domestic architecture.22 It is possible, however, to take such arguements 
too far. Recent work on the castle in England, by authors such as Pounds have 
continued to advocate the view that the purpose of the castle in the twelfth and 
thirteenth century was still primarily military and a ‘prerequisite for the physical control 
of the land.’23
Coulson’s conclusions have also been echoed in the work of French historians. 
Heliot has illustrated the growing trend in the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries for 
royal and ducal fortifications in Normandy and England taking on the role of residential 
and administrative centres, rather than merely fulfilling a defensive role.24 These castles
2** C. Coulson, ‘Structural SymboUsm in Medieval Castle Architecture’, Journal o f  the British 
Archaeological Association, CXXXII, (1979), pp. 73 - 90.
2 * For a sununary of recent scholarship in castle studies in England see C. Coulson, Cultural Realities 
and Reappraisals in English Castle Study’, Journal o f  Medieval History, 22,1996, pp. 171 - 201.
22 See C. Coulson, ‘Freedom to Crenellate by Licence, a Historiographical Revision’ , Nottingham 
Medieval Studies, XXXVIII, 1994, p. 114.
23 N.J.G. Pounds, The Medieval Castle in England and Wales : A Social and Political History, 
(Cambridge, 1990), p. 44.
24 P, Heliot, 'Sur les résidences princières bâties en France du X* au XH® siècle'. Le Moyen Age, 61 
(1955). pp. 27-61.
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are dubbed by Heliot ‘donjon palaces’, the spaces of the upper storeys of these 
fortifications often being used for such functions as private chapels or for providing 
additional living space. It could be argued that by the twelfth century the degree of 
comfort evident in these living quarters appears to have improved to such an extent that 
these fortifications underwent an abrupt change of function.25 There is substantial 
evidence, however, to suggest that earlier wooden castles and halls provided a 
comparable standard of physical comfort for their inhabitants.^  ^There is probably less 
evidence for this in the fortifications built by lesser nobles, those castles that did serve as 
residences tending to have living quarters away from the donjon which served as the 
castle’s main defence.
The castle’s function as a symbol of power and means of displaying wealth has 
also been emphasised along with its role as lordly residence.27 Brown gives the 
example of Orford, in his view, constructed with not only with a defensive purpose but 
also as an impressive display of royal power calculated to overawe the growing of 
influence of the Bigod Earls of Suffolk. 2* Similarly, the rebuilding of the castle of Ghent 
by Philip of Flanders in 1178 may have been a reaction to the growing number of 
aristocratic residences being erected by knights and the wealthy bourgeois within his 
lands.29 Along with its defensive and residential roles, it has recently been suggested that 
a change in the castle’s role can be observed in the mid eleventh century, this change 
being directly linked to economic changes, with castles increasingly being used as 
instruments for 'controlling and milking the population'^ **. Such changes may also be 
linked to changes in castle architecture, with larger areas being set aside for 
administrative fimctions.
Whatever the impetus behind these changes it can be clearly observed that 
developments were taking place throughout the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. By the 
middle of the twelfth century, keeps commonly occupied a strategic point on the castle’s
25 See D. Barthélémy, ‘Civilising the Fortress’ , A History o f  Private Life, eds. P. Ariès and G. Duby, 
4 vols., (London, 1988), vol. 2, pp. 404 - 429
26 For example see R. A. Brown, English Castles (London, 1976), p. 36 where a description by Lambert 
of Ardres of the castle of Arnold of Ardres, built in c. 1117, is given. This wooden hall, as described 
here, shows considerable evidence of comfortable and sophisticated living quarters.
27 See Brown "Royal Castle Building in England’ p. 52 and J. Le Patourel, The Norman Empire, 
(Oxford, 1976), p.351.
28 See Brown, English Castles, pp 220-21, see also Heslop, ‘Orford Castle’ p. 42.
29 See Barthélémy, ‘Civilising the Fortress’ p. 416 
3** Bartlett, The Making o f  Europe, p. 305.
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curtain wall Examples of this type of keep were built at La Roche Guyon, Etampes and 
Chatillon sur Indre. Other improvements introduced in the twelfth century included the 
strengthening of strategic points on the curtain wall by the building of closely spaced 
square towers.3* This became the hallmark of royal works built or improved during the 
reign of Henry II including Orford, Dover, Chinon and Gisors.32 These also show a 
tendency to have higher walls, flanking towers and powerfiil gatehouses, all with good 
communications between the different parts of the castle, thus indicating a change from a 
purely passive form of defence. This can also perhaps be observed in the rapid 
development of such features as arrow loops in this period.33 Another development can 
be seen in the general strengthening of mural towers which Cumow sees as an 
acknowledgement of their importance in providing ‘more than passive defence’.34 Angle 
towers during this period also tended to become stronger and more integrated with the 
defences of the curtain wall.35 Renn suggests that the increasing tendency of the central 
keep of a castle to be used for domestic purposes, with rooms stacked on top of one 
another, together with the weakening of walls for the provision of staircases, sanitation 
and storage purposes meant the future of the castle, in terms of defence, lay in providing 
an enclosure capable of containing a fair sized garrison, with walls studded with towers. 
An example of such developments can be seen in the curtain walling at Eynford.36
An example of new trends in castle building in France can be seen at Houdan, 
which was built in 1130. This was built with a keep that had circular outer walls and 
projecting turrets, the curve of the wall between the turrets possibly preventing full use 
of flanking fire. At Etampes, a royal castle built in 1140, an innovative and attractive 
four leaf plan was used, consisting of intersecting round towers. Once again this design 
also overcame the problem of flanking fire. Another innovation used at Etampes is 
the use of ribbed stone vaulting, in this instance, supported by a central pillar. Such 
designs may point to the adaptation of a ‘gothic’ style of architecture in castle building,
3* Tçs^,A History o f  Fortification, 1 .^ 106.
32 Cumow, ‘Some Developments in Military Architecture’, p. 47. For Gisors see J. Mesqui, ‘Le château 
de Gisors aux XIT et XIII® siècles’. Archéologie Médiévale, XX,(1990), pp. 253-317.
33 For the increased use of arrow loops see D. Renn, ‘Defending Framlingham Castle’, Proceedings o f  
the Suffolk Institute o f  Archaeology, xxxxiii, part 1, (1973) and P. Jones & D. Renn, ‘The Military 
Effectiveness of Arrow Loops. Some Experiments at White Castle’, Château Gaillard, ix-x (1982), pp. 
445 - 55.
34 Cumow, ‘Some Deveopments in Military Architecture’, p. 61.
35 Ibid. p. 50.
36 Renn, Norman Castles in Britain, p. 71.
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suggesting that the gap between secular and ecclesiastical forms of architecture was not 
as great as is often imagined. Another, simpler solution to the problem of flanking fire 
which has been suggested is the use of a cylindrical ground plan and the thickening of 
the wall of the keep on the exposed side with a spur. This design was used at La Roche- 
Guyon and Château Gaillard (Figure
Gaillard, completed in 1197/8, provides an excellent example of a naturally well 
defended position enhanced by the construction of fortifications which, some authors 
have argued, appear to be markedly advanced for their date. Powicke, for example, has 
referred to this fortress as "a turning point in the history of Western fortification. ".3* It 
could be argued, however, that Gaillard, although containing some unique features in 
its design and impressive in its position and stature had very little part to play in the 
actual development of castle architecture in this p e r i o d . 39 It does, however, exemplify the 
type of design that some authors believe were being developed to combat 
improvements taking place in the efficiency of siege warfare, for example in the 
elimination of so called "dead angles" beneath the walls of the castle, which could prove 
costly in a siege situation. It has been suggested that Gaillard’s large sloping base was 
designed so that missiles hurled from the walls of the castle would ricochet and strike 
the enemy, whilst deep battered plinths strengthened the lower walls. Amongst other 
features. Gaillard has been cited as being amongst the first castles in Western Europe to 
have stone machicolations.'*** Most of its characteristic features, however, are already in 
evidence in earlier fortifications in northern France the most significant example being 
La Roche Guyon, built around 1190 by Philip Augustus. The donjon here exhibits a 
similar design to that of Chateau Gaillard but with plain instead of buttressed surfaces.'** 
The use of such defensive features as machicolations, along with merlons, 
hourds, brattices, barbicans and drawbridges was becoming increasingly common in the 
second half of the twelfth century suggesting that castle defences were indeed becoming 
more sophisticated. True arrow loops began to appear in the 1190’s as can be seen in 
the Avranches tower at Dover and at Framlingham and Carrickfergus castles.'*^  The
37 Toy, A History o f Fortification, pp. 104 -109
38 Powicke, The Loss o f  Normandy, p. 289.
39 Cathcart King, The Castle in England and Wales, p.79. 
'*** Warner, Sieges o f  the Middle Ages, p. 124.
'** Toy, 4  History o f  Fortification, p. 131-134.
'*2 Renn, Norman Castles in Britain, p. 72.
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prevention of assault by scaling ladder may have been the reason behind the increasing 
trend in this period for curtain walls to be raised by several metres in height and the 
adding of a second enceinte in some castles. Increasingly, towers were being built closer 
together, they were also becoming higher and larger in size. In many castles, bases of 
walls were thickened and in some ditches were paved to inhibit sapping. The most 
important modification which can been seen is the contraction and concentration of the 
castle’s defensive elements. This resulted in a simpler, more geometric d e s i g n . 43 The 
available evidence suggests that progress in defensive technology in castle architecture 
advanced alongside provision for domestic comfort, increasing displays of wealth and a 
taste for palace style architecture. It is impossible to know what the builder of any 
particular castle had in mind when designing his structure, defensive capability did not 
necessarily preclude domestic comfort, a strongly defended castle may also have created 
the impression of a rich and powerful occupant dwelling behind its walls.
Heslop suggests that a Byzantine/Near Eastern influence may be detectable in 
castle architecture of the twelfth century, as exemplified by Orford castle. 44 it has long 
been assumed, by some authors, that evidence exists for the introduction of innovations 
in castle architecture by returning crusaders. Much of the evidence for this, however, is 
highly ambiguous. Innovations such as the abandonment of the central donjon, the 
adoption of round rather than square towers and the introduction of such defensive 
features as stone machicolations all started appearing from the mid to late twelfth 
century onwards. All have been cited as evidence for the existence of middle eastern 
influence appearing in castle architecture in western Europe during this period. *^5 it 
appears however that no firm conclusions can be reached on this matter until a closer 
study has been made of the military architecture of not only the middle east but also of 
Spain and Italy. One of the seminal studies of this subject, T.E. Lawrence’s work on 
crusader castles, argues that of the castles in the middle east occupied by crusaders, 
many were originally of Byzantine origin. Those newly built were of a type imported 
from the west and on the whole no major influence in castle architecture can be seen in 
the west from crusader castles. Lawrence, however, overlooks the possibility of Muslim
43 See Contamine, War ifi the Middle Ages, p. 114, also see Warner, Sieges o f  the Middle Ages, 
pp. 13 - 23 for the development of such defensive features 
Heslop, ‘Orford Castle’, p. 44.
*^5 H. Kennedy, Crusader Castles (Cambridge, 1994), p. 186.
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influence. On the whole, his conclusion that there are few grounds for believing that 
changes in castle architecture in France in the late twelfth century can be attributed to 
anything other than European influence is valid. There is a much stronger case for 
influence on the West from the East in the thirteenth century. It is perfectly possible, 
however, that similar types of castle may have evolved independently in both Europe 
and the middle east.'*^
One argument against such a theory is the timing of the appearance of these 
features in western castle architecture. If direct influence did take place, which led to 
important changes in castle architecture, it should perhaps have manifested itself earlier 
in the twelfth century. Perhaps a more important factor in the development of castle 
architecture in this period, particularly in France north of the Loire, is the rivalry between 
the Capetian monarchs of France and the Angevin kings of England. The conflict 
between them was one in which control of fortresses played a major part. Heliot 
advocates this view, arguing that although Château Gaillard, for example, has been seen 
as a remarkably advanced piece of military architecture for its time, most of its elements 
are evident in many contemporary and earlier castles in Northern France and England.
He also remarks that the development of professional corps of engineers and the 
employment of mercenary soldiers played a great part the advance of castle architecture 
and siege warfare at this time.
Although Heliot acknowledges the possibility of siege techniques being learnt and 
perfected in the Levant by crusaders and the importation of certain architectural features 
such as machiolations, he remains convinced that Gaillard and other castles of the period 
owe little of their basic conception to the influence of the East. Cumow uses the
example of Le Coudray Sabart in Poitou to demonstrate how castles in the ‘shooting 
line’ of the Anglo-French conflict show signs of rapid development and experimentation 
with fortification. 48 Typical and also more advanced features demonstrated here include 
a regular plan, flanking angle towers with intermediate towers on the traverse walls.
46 For a summary and critique of Lawrence’s work see the introduction by D. Pringle in T.E. Lawrence, 
Crusader Castles, a new edition with introduction and notes by Denys Pringle (Oxford, 1988) 
pp.i - xxxix
*^2 See P. Heliot, ‘Le Château Gaillard et le fortresses de XH* et XIII® siècles en Europe occidental. 
Château Gaillard, i (1964), pp. 53-75.
*^8 Cumow, ‘Some Developments in Military Architecture’, p. 44.
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beaked towers with large thick walls and an internal gallery in the curtain wall with 
evidence of substantial strengthening of walls/*^
Another factor militating against the introduction of dramatic advances in castle 
architecture from the Near East is that castle building in western Europe varied widely 
according to geographical area. Crusaders journeyed to the Holy Land from all over 
Western Europe yet evidence, cited for the influence of crusaders’ experiences on castle 
architecture in Western Europe mainly refers to northern France and England. The 
fortifications built by Frederick II in Italy, for example, do not have the round towers 
becoming common in Capetian France and cited as evidence of crusader influence, yet 
Frederick was probably one of the monarchs of Western Europe most in touch with 
Arabic and Byzantine influences throughout his reign. 5o Large numbers of noblemen 
from Southern France had a major role to play in the First Crusade in particular. There 
is little evidence, however, to suggest that their experiences of military architecture in the 
Holy Land had any influence on the design and building of castles in the Languedoc. The 
debate regarding influence being transferred, from the Holy Land and beyond, in the 
sphere of both military architecture and technology provides interesting paralells with 
the present study. The issues involved in such a debate illustrate the difficulties faced in 
studying an area where many factors are almost impossible to quantify.
On the eve of the Albigensian Crusade, therefore, it can be seen that castle 
architecture in northern France and England had been exhibiting noticeable changes in 
design over a period of many decades, influenced either by an increasing demand for 
domestic comfort and diversification in the function of these buildings or by changing 
and improving techniques of siege warfare. What must now be examined is the type and 
function of fortifications existing in the Languedoc in the period immediately preceding 
the coming of the crusade and the way these fortifications were utilised during the period 
of the conflict. In this way it is hoped comparisons may be drawn between the form and 
function of fortifications in northern and southern France.
49 Ibid. p. 45.
50 -Cathcart-King, The Castle in England and Wales, p. 79.
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3.2 Fortifications in the Languedoc from the Eleventh to the Thirteenth 
Century and their Role in the Albigensian Crusade.
The following section aims to examine the different types of fortifications which existed 
in the Languedoc during the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries; their forms, 
functions and use as a means of defence against a besieging army. The aim here will be 
to utilise both the physical evidence which exists in the form of the remains of the 
fortifications and also the written evidence, obtained from contemporary sources. These 
describe the fortifications as they were and how they were used during the period of the 
Albigensian Crusade. It must be borne in mind that both archaeological and written 
evidence are both unsatisfactory in a number of ways. The written evidence is often 
impressionistic in descriptive passages and the physical remains of the fortifications are 
often ruined or have undergone considerable rebuilding in a later period. It is proposed 
to undertake this survey by dividing the fortifications into two main sections, the fortified 
cities and towns of the Languedoc and the smaller defences which took the form of 
castles and fortified villages. At the beginning of the thirteenth century the Languedoc 
was an area with a vast number of fortifications, ranging from small fortified villages and 
isolated mountain castles to walled cities. The sheer number of fortifications which 
existed reflects, in many ways, the political situation which existed in the region. Each 
type of fortification provided its own unique solution to the problem of defending its 
positon. What must also be borne in mind, when examining how these fortifications 
were defended during the Albigensian Crusade, is the unique circumstances under which 
each were besieged. Many different factors must be taken into consideration when 
assessing the effectiveness of these fortifications under assault.
One of the distinguishing factors of the warfare which took place during the 
Albigensian Crusade was the use of large scale urban fortifications. The existence of 
thriving and expanding cities such as Carcassonne and Toulouse reveal a more urbanised, 
wealthy and politically active population than that which existed in the cities of the 
North in this period. It also shows a legacy of urban fortification stretching back to 
Visigothic and Roman times which had been maintained in various forms over many
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centuries. Cities appear to have been an essential military device in stopping the progress 
of the crusaders and providing centres of resistance. Both Carcassonne and Toulouse 
provided formidable obstacles for the crusading army to overcome and will be used in 
this study as examples of urban fortifications utilised during the crusade.
The steep escarpment which exists above the river Aude at Carcassonne has 
been fortified since the sixth century BC, the inner wall of the fortifications which exist 
today roughly corresponding with the line of a wall erected in the fifth century AD, part 
of which still exists.(Plate 3). The stronghold which it enclosed was occupied by the 
Roman and subsequently Visigothic rulers of the city.^ * This curtain wall had originally 
consisted of two faces of masonry alternating with courses of brick, the middle portion 
being filled with rubble. The towers, which were cylindrical on the outside and square on 
the inside, rested on a cubical base and were raised above these walls (Plate 2).^  ^ When 
cut off from the curtain wall it has been suggested that these could be used as 
independent forts.
The Roman/Visigothic fortifications were reinforced and repaired in 1120 and it 
is possible that at around the same time the castle on the western side of the city was 
constructed. This castle is seen by some as one of the earliest examples of so-called 
‘scientific fortification’, that is, fortifications built employing the use of flanking towers 
as a means to eliminate dead angles. It has also been cited as the earliest castle built 
without a donjon (Plate 4).^ 4 However, there appears to be no specific mention, in 
written sources, of the existence of a castle at Carcassonne until 1191. Suggestions that 
the castle dates from an earlier period and shows advanced defence features for its age 
remain doubtful. ”  In the twelfth century the city wall was defended by a series of 26 
towers and documentary evidence exists to suggest that in 1126 these fortifications
For the history of the fortifications at Carcassonne see J.Poux, La Cité de Carcassonne, 5 Vols 
(Toulouse, 1922-1938). For later Roman urban defences see RM. Butler, ‘Late Roman Town Walls in 
G m \\ ArchaeologicalJoumal, 116 (1959), pp.25-50
See E.E. Viollet- le- Duc, Military Architecture (London, 1990) pp 10 - 13 
Viollet- le- Duc, Military Architecture, p 12.
Cathcart- King, The Castle in England and Wales, p. 91.
Ritter has suggested a date of 1130 for the comital castle at Carcassorme but his work depends on the 
authority of Poux who takes the ‘palatium’ of the Trencavels, mentioned at this early date to mean a 
castle. (Îathcart-King, The Castle in England and Wales, p. 91, points out that there are no specific 
references in written sources to a castle until 1191, the castle as it exists today, in its heavily restored 
state could even be too advanced for this date. See also P. Heliot ‘L’age du cMteau de Carcasorme’ 
Annales de Midi, LXXVIII(1966), pp. 7-21 who maintains that the castle was substantially a 
construction of the de Montforts and Capetians.
73
belonged to, and were defended by, 16 different families resident within the city, showing 
that communal responsibility for the maintenance of the city’s defences existed from the 
early twelfth century onwards.
Written sources such as the Chanson show that Carcassonne was seen by the 
population of the surrounding area as a place of refiige and was indeed used as such, for 
example in 1208. Refugees who fled in the path of the crusading army as it advanced 
from Beziers through the Aude valley took refiige at Carcassonne. This worsened the 
situation for those already living in the city, particularly as little time had been left to 
them to prepare for the coming of the crusaders. The ancient city walls held out well 
against the assault of the crusading army: lack of water and overcrowding were the 
main factors in the fall of the city rather than the military superiority of the crusaders.
In common with many of the cities and towns of the area, Carcassonne was surrounded 
by suburbs, the result of the city’s expansion due to its growing prosperity. (Figure 3). 
The bourg of St. Michael to the north was the largest of three with the Castellare to 
the south and the peripheral suburb of St. Vincent between the city and the river. St 
Vincent was unprotected and was the first part of the city to fall to the crusaders, thus 
effectively cutting it off fi*om the river. Despite its strong fortifications, Carcassonne had 
serious weaknesses in its ability to defend itself against a besieging force. It was too far 
from the river to sustain a lengthy siege, the only source of water inside the citadel being 
wells within the city walls. The main access to the city was over a narrow wooden bridge 
which the city’s garrison, enclosed within the city walls, would be unable to command. 
The weakest points in the city’s defences however were the suburbs to the north and the 
south which lay outside the main defensive wall. These were defended only with low 
walls and sparsely defended towers. Once the crusaders had penetrated into the suburbs 
of the city they were at a distinct advantage in that they could use the houses of the city 
for cover, gaining ground street by street.
Written evidence suggests that the existing fortifications at Carcassonne were 
reinforced, once news of the crusaders’ approach reached the city. Raymond Roger 
Trancavel, in preparation for the coming siege, ordered the demolition of the refectory 
of the cathedral canons so that the building stone could be utilised to reinforce the
Sumption, The Albigensian Crusade, p.21. 
57 Ibid. p. 95.
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existing fortifications.5^  Another precaution that has been suggested was carried out at 
such times was the building of wooden hourds atop the city and castle walls. The 
subsequent improvements to the fortifications at Carcassonne by Louis IX appear to 
address many of the problems which made the fortified city vulnerable to attack and 
siege, particularly in the building of the massive barbican commanding the banks of the 
Aude^^(Figure 4). Viollet-le-Duc’s restoration of the Cité has been criticised by some, 
for its lack of sensitivity to regional styles and the decision to restore to a single period.^  ^
The defences which survive at Carcassonne in the present day, however, provide a 
unique insight into how the medieval walled city may have appeared in the thirteenth 
century. Therefore, they are a very valuable tool in any study of the military actions 
which took part in and around them during the Albigensian Crusade, in conjunction with 
the written sources available.
In the case of Toulouse, contemporary written sources are of even more value, 
as very little remains of the defences which existed in the thirteenth century. Like 
Carcassonne, they were based on roman fortifications and consisted of a defensive wall 
with attached towers (Figure 5 ).^  ^%be description of the siege of 1217 which is 
contained in the Chanson provides a good impression of the way the city’s defences 
could be utilised and describes some of the main defences within the city.^  ^ Written 
evidence also suggests that these defences had suffered much damage since the arrival of 
the crusaders in the South and therefore may not have been as effective as they were 
previously. For example, during Prince Louis’ brief campaign of 1215 parts of the city 
walls of both Narbonne and Toulouse were demolished under his orders. In September 
1216 Simon de Montfort continued the demolition at Toulouse after unrest amongst its 
citizens.^ By the beginning of the siege of 1217/18, however, much of this damage had 
been rapidly repaired and the walls were once again defensible. At this time the 
defences of Toulouse included 16 barbicans and the captains appointed by Count
5* Historia, 93
5^  See Viollet-le-Duc, Military Architecture, pp. 58-9.Violiet-le-Duc provided the castle at Carcassonne 
with such wooden defences in his reconstruction began in 1844. (Plate 4)
^  See Viollet-le-Duc, Military Architecture, pp. 47-67.
See L. MacClintock, ‘Monumentality Versus Suitability - Viollet-le-Duc’s St. Gimer at Carcassonne’, 
Journal o f  the Society o f  Architectural Historians,Ad, (1981) pp. 218 - 235.
For the roman defences at Toulouse see M. Labousse, Toulouse antique (Paris, 1968).
For the city of Toulouse in the thirteenth century see E. Delaruelle, ‘La ville de Toulouse vers 1200’, 
St Dominque en Languedoc, Cahiers de Fanjeaux, \  (Toulouse, 1969), pp. I l l  - 132.
Chanson , v. 178, 51.
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Raymond to defend them during the siege are celebrated in the Chanson.^ ^ In 1216 
Count Raymond’s reinforcements were able to enter the city via the Pont Neuf due to 
the existence of a pair of these barbicans on the banks of the river defending the bridge.^  ^
Another major feature of the defences at Toulouse was the Château Narbonnais, 
used by the crusaders as their headquarters. This dated back to Roman times but 
appears to have been not originally designed for defending or controlling the c i t y .  ^ 7 The 
Château is described in the Chanson as having two great towers, one at the north and the 
other at the south of the fortress. Both were built of baked clay and flint with lime, the 
whole construction was then enclosed with large stones without the use of mortar. One 
of these towers is called the ‘Tour Ferrande’ in the Chanson which may indicate the use 
of iron or lead to reinforce the stone construction.^^ Chanson describes the 
Château’5 wall as being sarrisin, this epithet appearing to refer to constructions of 
Roman origin in Occitan Literature of this period. From its position and orientation it
is possible that the Château Narbonnais may have been originally intended to protect 
the city from an attack from the south. Its north face, described in the Chanson as being 
pierced with galleries and windows, was extremely vulnerable to attack, particularly 
from the siege engines of the Toulousain army. 7o
The Chanson also indicates that considerable use was made, by both the 
crusaders and the Toulousains, of churches, religious establishments and other buildings 
of substantial construction for defensive purposes. In the early stages of the siege, 
crusaders attempted to fight their way in through the east and southern gates of the city 
in an attempt to occupy the fortified church of St Etienne.7  ^ By October 1217 most of 
the major churches of the city had been utilised by the Toulousains as fortresses. De 
Montfort’s troops occupied the Hôpital St. Jacques and launched an attack against the 
partially destroyed Pont Neuf from here using siege engines {calabres)?'^  According to 
the Chanson, during the early part of the siege in 1217, groups of crusaders, trapped by
5^ Chanson, v. 214, 15-99.
^  Sumption, The Albigensian Crusade, p. 193.
67 Ibid., p. 194.
6* See Viollet-le-Duc, Military Architecture, p. 10. Viollet-le-Duc suggests that this stonework was held 
together by means of iron plates run with lead. See also Martin-Chabot, Chanson, vol. 3, p. 127, n.4.
6^  See Martin-Chabot, Chanson, vol. 3, p. 13, n.6.
70 Sumption, The Albigensian Crusade, p. 194. For the Château Narbonnais see Labousse, Toulouse 
antique, pp. 281-286.
71 Chanson, v. 173, 13ff.
77 Chanson, v. 198, 28 ff.
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enraged citizens defended themselves from inside the bishop’s palace, the Tour de 
Mascarorf^ and the town house of the count of CommingesJ^
From the description of the siege in the Chanson it is also evident that the Pont 
Neuf, spanning the Garonne to the east of the city, was protected with substantial 
defences. In May 1217 a heavy rainstorm led to flooding which swept away much of 
the bridge.75 Nevertheless, two of its masonry piles which supported tall stone towers 
fortified with portcullises which were designed to block passage over the bridge, 
remained défendable despite being isolated in the middle of the river. Toulouse was 
similar to Carcassonne in that it had poorly defended suburbs, the existence of which the 
besieging crusaders tried to exploit. They attempted to gain access to the city by way of 
the suburb of St Cyprian by splitting into two forces, leaving one half on the east bank 
of the river whilst the other half crossed over to the other bank utilising raft bridges. 
Once across the river an attempt was made to seal off the suburb. This was thwarted, 
however, by the Count of Foix who succeed in rallying his forces and resisting the 
crusaders’ attack. When an attempt was made to take the suburb a second time the 
crusaders approached from the west bank, only to find that a deep ditch had been dug 
around St. Cyprian. The crusaders were therefore forced to set up camp outside the 
suburb until flooding filled these defensive trenches with debris and silt. The crusaders 
were then able to occupy the suburb by launching an amphibious assault with a fleet of 
boats.76 Toulouse, therefore, provided the crusaders with a considerable challenge, its 
sheer size eventually defeating a force which was not large enough to take and control a 
city of such proportions.
Smaller fortified towns such as Beaucaire also played a prominent part in the 
crusade and proved just as difficult as to take. Beaucaire shares some features with other 
smaller fortified towns, for example the castle at Beaucaire was outside the town walls, 
rather like those at Termes and Minerve.77 Standing on the edge of a steep cliff on the 
west bank of the river Rhone it provided a retreat for the crusader garrison when under
75 Chanson, v. 172, lOOff.
7^* Chanson, v. 173, 9.
75 Chanson, v. 198, 13ff.
76 Chanson, v. 198, 13ff.
77 For a description of the fortifications at Beaucaire see C. Saleh, Dictionnaire de Châteaux et de 
Fortifications, (Strasbourg, 1979) pp 117-118. See also M. Contestin, ‘Le château de Beaucaire’, 
Bulletin Monumental, 131 (1973) pp. \29~'i6 2o\à Beaucaire, notes historiques et archéologiques, oàs. 
O. Lombard, A. Michelozzi, M. Contestin & J. Roche (1974)
77
siege from the Young Count Raymond. In the thirteenth century the river covered the 
base of the cliff, it has since receded some distance (Figure 6 ). The remains of the castle 
which exist today date mainly from the early fourteenth century, when it was 
substantially rebuilt and became the centre of royal administration for the area. Its 
position remains the same, however, and it is still possible to trace the topography of the 
medieval town in relation to the castle (Plate 5). The crusaders, as well as holding the 
castle, had possession of a large triangular outlying tower known as the redorte which 
overlooked it. The detailed description of the siege of Beaucaire contained within the 
Chanson once again gives a clear impression of the nature of warfare within the besieged 
town.78 It is clear, judging from written sources, that in times of war, towns and cities 
such as those described here not only relied on existing fortifications but were able to 
reinforce these rapidly using stone, wood and other materials, blocking the narrow 
streets by using barricades and strengthening curtain walls.
Judging from written evidence and what remains of the defences today it is clear 
that towns and cities of the Languedoc besieged by the crusaders had substantial and 
extensive fortifications. Other fortifications, although smaller in scale, proved just as 
effective in slowing down the progress of the crusaders for various reasons. The sheer 
number of fortifications which were built in the Languedoc during the middle ages rules 
out an in depth survey being carried out of them within this study. Although large 
numbers of remains still exist there are, however, difficulties in studying these 
fortifications, particularly those most associated with the warfare which took place 
during the Albigensian Crusade. The approach taken here therefore has been to deal with 
a small number of the better preserved castles which I have been able to study at first 
hand and also those fortifications most featured in the written evidence as the location of 
protracted and important sieges. Modem scholarship appears to indicate that the nature 
and location of such fortifications was strongly associated with social, economic and 
political considerations, all of which need to be examined in the context of how this 
affected the nature of the warfare which took place during the Albigensian Crusade.
Between 1050 and 1150 an increasing number of castles and fortified towns and 
villages were being built in the mountainous heartland of the Languedoc. This has been 
seen as leading to the development of a distinct class of castellans who carved out
7* Chanson, v. 153-171.
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territorial domains for themselves. Such developments have also been linked to the 
collapse of the authority of local viscounts and the development of a new militarism 
within southern French society. I t  has also, however, been argued that the notion of 
powerful castellans carving out territories in this area is difficult to sustain given the 
distribution of castles; the kind of independence that could lend itself to the creation of 
new domains needed both wealth and a certain degree of isolation, but a truly isolated 
castle may indicate a possessor who could not command a great deal of material wealth. 
Equally, where castles were in the midst of rich farmlands there were nearly always 
other castles and castellans nearby, suggesting that large territorial domains would have 
been difficult to build up under such circumstances.^® Such an argument suggests 
therefore that isolated mountain fortresses in south western France did not exist to 
exploit the resources of the surrounding countryside and its population as it has been 
suggested was the case in northern France.
By the beginning of the twelfth century, fortifications in south western France 
were beginning to spread into areas where hitherto fortification had been rare. Such 
castles were often church or allodial possessions. The possession of some of these 
fortifications was divided between the possessor and their allodial lord. This practice 
was known as holding a castle in feudo or beneflciofi^ The spread of the authority of 
independent castellans has been linked to the increase of private war and violence during 
this period which in turn led to the rise of the Peace and Truce of God movements in an 
effort by the church to curb such violence. *7
The building of such fortifications may also have had an effect on the 
relationship between the peasantry and older aristocratic families. By imposing heavier 
demands on the peasantry who lived near these castles, personal dependence on the 
nobility increased and an important change in settlement patterns may have been the 
result. Peasants increasingly came to live in settlements concentrated around castles, as
7^  Lewis, The Development o f  Southern French and Catalan Society, p. 292.
Cheyette, ‘The Castles of the Trencavels’, p.271-72.
Lewis, The Development o f  Southern French and Catalan Society, p. 292.
*7 In relation to this phenomenon see A. Debord, ‘The Castellan Revolution and the Peace of God in 
Aquitaine, The Peace o f  God, Social Violence and Religious Response in France around the Year 1000, 
eds. T. Head & RLandes (New York, 1992), pp. 135-164, J. Maitindale, ‘Peace and War in Early 
Eleventh Century Aquitaine’, Medieval Knighthood TV, Papers from the Fifth Strawberry Hill 
Conference, 1990, eds. C. Harper-Bill & R  Harv^ (Woodbridge, 1992), pp. 147-176 and E. Delaruelle, 
‘Paix de dieu et croisade dans le chrétienté du XII® siècle. Paix de dieu et guerre sainte. Cahiers de 
Fanjeaux, 4, pp. 51 - 71.
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well as around monasteries in the twelfth c e n t u r y .  *5 Many fortified sites in the south, 
therefore, were more in the nature of fortified villages and towns. Without the natural 
protection of the mountains many of the settlements on the plains at the beginning of the 
thirteenth century were enclosed towns or villages surrounded by a ditch and/or a wall. 
With the royal takeover of the South the practice of placing an enceinte around villages 
appears to have stopped. For the most part the castra of the plains consisted of two 
parts. The upper part acted as a stronghold and was usually the dwelling place of the 
lord whilst the lower part was occupied by the villagers and enclosed by a wall, though 
even within this general pattern there was a large variety of plans. In some cases a village 
had an upper and lower enceinte.*'^
By 1200 old dispersed settlement patterns came to be replaced by the new type 
of castra settlements. In an area where feudal ties such as labour services were not 
highly developed, the residents of these castra became increasingly independent and in 
some cases self governing. Many local towns won for themselves increasing levels of 
political a u t o n o m y . * ^  As has been discussed above, growing urban centres, which were 
Roman and Visigothic in their origins, were also developing. For example Carcassonne, 
Toulouse, Marseilles, Narbonne and Orange. This was closely connected with the 
growth of external commerce with cities in Italy and Spain but was also initiated by the 
local nobility that had been involved in the Spanish Reconquista and the First and
Second Crusades.*6
The main characteristics of castle fortifications built in the Languedoc during the 
earlier Carolingian period were the use of a rectangular tower surrounded by a polygonal 
enceinte without flanking towers, made of rough stone work sometimes with the 
inclusion of simple loop holes.*  ^ In the tenth and eleventh centuries the castle in 
Languedoc remained a very simple construction, the main innovation of this period being 
the expansion of the living space within the castle enclosure. This was composed mainly 
of an agglomeration of buildings standing against the main ramparts. Such fortifications
*5 Given, State and Society in Medieval Europe, p. 22.
^  M. Bourin-Derrau, ‘Valeur stratégique et valeur symbolique de fortifications castrales en Bas 
Languedoc XT - XIT siècles’, Castum 3, Guerre, fortification et habitat dans le monde Méditerranéen 
(1988)pp. 99-106.
*5 See J. Given, State and Society in Medieval Europe, p. 22.
6^ For urban and economic development in these areas see Lewis, 'Patterns of Economic Development 
in Southern France 1050 - 1150', pp. 60-65.
See A. de Pous, ‘L’architecture militaire occitaine (DC - XTV® siècles)’. Bulletin archéologique du 
comité de travaux historiques et scientifiques, series 5, 1969, pp. 41-139
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housed members of the local aristocracy who wielded fragmentary power in the 
immediately surrounding area.^* Between 1012 and 1020 Bernard d’Angers the author 
of the Miracles o f St Foy de Conques, travelled through southern France. His work 
provides important clues to the nature of early fortifications and lordly residences in the 
Languedoc. He describes the dwelling places of the local nobility as consisting of a 
collection of assorted buildings dominated by a turris which usually consisted of three 
levels. The bottom level appears to have been only accessible from above, whilst the 
second level would be the dwelling place of the lord. This level possessed the only 
outside access in the form of a door leading to the interior of the enclosure. The tower is 
usually described simply as a residence for the garrison with wives and family residing in 
a separate mansiofi^
The elevated sites chosen for some of these fortifications suggest that a great 
deal of skill and specialisation may have been needed in order to overcome such 
problems as transport of materials and building on extremely precipitous and uneven 
ground. The castles of Peyrepurtuse, Quéribus, Montségur and Puylaurens are all 
particularly well preserved and provide good examples of the kind of fortifications that 
could be built on such sites. These castles all originally comprised of a simple parapet at 
the edge of an escarpment, sometimes with a rampart on the more vulnerable side. The 
living space in castles situated in such positions would have been extremely cramped.
The site of such castles, however, effectively limited the number of attackers that could 
approach these fortifications. Suitable sites for the placing of siege engines may also have 
been difficult to find. It is possible that the defence of such sites would be more passive 
than active, meaning that it was not necessary in install large garrisons. Joumot 
suggests that this could have led to military strategies that did not necessarily involve the 
reduction and taking of fortifications as its primary aim.®® This theory does not, 
however, appear to be borne out when the large number of sieges which took place 
during the Albigensian Crusade is considered.
More advanced defensive features and more elaborate designs in the castles of 
the Languedoc start to appear mainly as the result of the royal rebuilding and
See F. Joumot, L'habitat seigneurial en Haut Languedoc (X* - XIV® sèicle), approche archéologique 
de l'aristocratie méridionale'. Cahiers de Civilisation Médiéval, 35, (1992), pp. 351-366.
See St Foy de Conques,{^\ Leger Vauban, 1965), pp. 152- 153, also Barthélémy, ‘ Civilising the 
Fortress’ p. 404.
®® See Joumot, ‘L’habitat seigneurial en Haut Languedoc’, p 355.
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improvement of certain castles in the mid-thirteenth century. Castles such as those at 
Peyrepertuse, Quéribus, Puylaurens and Termes owed their continued use mainly to 
their strategic position on the French/Aragonese border after the signing of the Treaty of 
Corbeil in 1258, when the northern line of the Pyrenees was adopted as the border 
between the two kingdoms.®* Some of these castles continued to have royal garrisons 
into the seventeenth century and are therefore in a better state of repair than many 
others more frequently mentioned in the written sources for the Albigensian Crusade. 
The remains of these castles therefore provide better physical evidence and are included 
in this study for this reason. The extent of the rebuilding at such sites does, however, 
make it difficult to ascertain what the fortifications looked like in the late twelfth and 
early thirteenth centuries.
Several well preserved examples show this incremental building. Work on 
Peyrepertuse originally began under the counts of Barcelona in the early twelfth century, 
the castle consisting of a curtain wall and later a rampart flanked by two semi-circular 
towers. In the thirteenth century the castle was improved and expanded, with a large 
semi-circular tower being placed against the eastern facade, a new curtain wall joining 
this to the apse of the chapel. This was crenellated with merlons and pierced by a postern 
gate. A pentagonal tower, named San Jordi, was built to the west of the second donjon 
and was flanked by three semi-circular towers and a high wall was built between these 
two donjons.(Figure 9 and Plate 7 ) Extensive rebuilding work also occurred at 
Puylaurens where three distinct periods can be distinguished in the building in the 
thirteenth century. Before 1258 a second enceinte was built on the original tenth- 
century foundations with a single entrance. After 1258, when the castle came into royal 
possession, two round towers, one to the north of the donjon and another to the south 
were built. Finally, at the end of the thirteenth century two new round towers were built 
(Figure 10 and Plate 6 ).®7
Analysis of such structures may suggest that the development of castle 
architecture in the Languedoc was rather slow in the tenth to early thirteenth centuries. 
After the early thirteenth century there appears to be a contrast between those castles on
®* See H. J. Chaytor, A History o f  Aragon and Catalonia (London, 1933), p.88.
®7 de Pous, ‘L’architecture militaire occitaine’, p. 89-90. For Peyrepertuse see Saleh, Dictionnaire de 
chateaux, pp. 432-3 and R. (Juehen, La seigneurie de Peyrepertuse, son histoire, se château 
(Montesquieu-Volvestre, 1975)
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the French side of the France/Aragon border and those of the Aragonese side. In the 
French area of influence some castles which continued to be used as royal fortresses 
show signs of a growing sophistication in their structure and design, whilst those on the 
other side of the border remain simpler in style.®^  Castles in other areas also give 
important clues to the development of castle architecture in the south. The castle at 
Montségur shows a very simple, unsophisticated design and relies almost entirely upon 
its position for its defence (Figure 11 and Plate 8). Most of the original building work 
on the castle was carried out during the early part of the thirteenth century and although 
subsequent rebuilding went on after the castle was taken by crusaders 1244, the structure 
remained simple. The donjon of the earlier castle may have been situated in the centre of 
the main enclosure, a new donjon being added later to become an integral part of the 
defensive system, a feature very much more common in northern France. The castle on 
the whole however shows little of the elaborate additions evident in other castles of the 
area.®"*
Some castle sites in other areas such as the Rouergue were effectively 
abandoned after the Albigensian Crusade and the take over of southern France by the 
Capetians. Changing political structures introduced new forms of fortification in the 
manner of fortified lordly residences.®  ^ Debord suggests this was a process which was 
beginning to take place before crusade in some areas in the south, the northern invasion 
merely accelerating it.
The political structures which existed in the South appear to have some influence 
on the nature of its fortifications and the way they were used. The practice of 
coseigneurie, where rights over an individual castle were split between two or more 
lords is one which seems common in the Languedoc from the eleventh century onwards. 
For example, at Termes documentary evidence exists of an agreement being made 
between Raymond of Termes and his brother Guillaume in 1163 in order that ownership 
of the castle be split. ®6 The donjon was divided between the two brothers in the ratio of
®5 de Pous, ‘L’architecture militaire occitaine’,p. 104.
®"* For Montségur see J. Sarret, ‘Le château de Montségur’, Revue annuelle du C.A.M.L, Supplément au 
Tome 3 (1985)
®5a Debord, 'Châteaux et société dans le Rouergue medieval (X® -XIII® séicle)'. Château Gaillard, XIV 
(1988) pp. 7 -28. The eventual abandonment of some the border castles, however, did not take place 
until after the signing of the Treaty of the Pyrenees in 1659 when the disputed areas of Rousillion and 
Cerdagne were ceeded to France, see Kamen, Spain 1469-1714, pp. 209-10.
®6 Histoire générale du Languedoc vol. 5, col. 1277.
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1:2 stories, the highest part of the complex of fortifications being bounded by a common 
wall adjacent to which each brother placed various buildings. At the foot of the castle a 
new chapel was built as well as an enclosure, which may have been fortified. This 
contained the dwelling places of the brothers’ knights which was divided equally 
between t h e m .® ^  Another of example of co-seigneury can be seen in the case of Lambert 
of Montélimar, depicted in the Chanson as fighting on the side of the crusaders at the 
siege of Toulouse. He was co-suzerain of Montélimar along with his cousin Gerald 
Adhemar who fought for Raymond of Toulouse.®*
Perhaps the most well known example, however, of this practice in the south of 
France is that of the knight-troubadour Bertram de Bom who shared his castle at 
Autafort with his brother between 1159-69. ®® The practice of co-seigneury in the south 
appears to be in evidence in the arrangement of some fortified towns and villages, for 
example at Peyriac where the upper part of the village was split between Roger of 
Béziers and his two brothers. In certain places the donjon had been replaced by a group 
of buildings held by co-seigneurs and other knightly families. After the mid twelfth 
century many seigneurs abandoned living in the donjon altogether.*®®
The question of lordship over a castle not only involved its possessor but also his 
overlord. The authority of a vassal’s immediate lord over his castle appears to have 
taken two forms in southern France, that of rendability and jurability. In the South 
rendering a castle to one’s lord was a fundamental duty, refusal being regarded as a 
major transgression of a vassal’s duties to a lord. In the mid thirteenth century in 
Catalonia the wording of documents makes it clear the no excuse will be accepted for 
refusal to hand over a castle to a lord.*®*. The survival of documentary evidence 
regarding the holding of castles is quite rare in the areas that were ruled by the counts of 
Toulouse and the viscounts of Béziers, the lands most immediately affected by the 
Crusade. It may, however, be legitimate to infer that a similar situation existed in these 
lands to that in Catalonia, from where a great deal more documentary evidence
®7 M. Bourin-Dermau, ‘Valeur stratégique et valeur symbolique’, p. 102 
®* Chanson, v. 180, 42, see also Martin-Chabot, vol. 3, p.261-2, n.9.
®® See The Poems o f  the Troubadour Bertram de Bom, ed. W. Paden, T. Sonkovitch & P. Stâblien 
(Berkley, 1986), pp. 19-20.
*®® See Bourin-E)erruau, ‘Valeur stratégique et valeur symbolique’, p. 101.
*®* C. Coulson, ‘Readability and Castellation in M ed ie^  France’, p. 62.
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s u r v i v e s .  *®7 in Catalonia castles were usually granted on terms of sworn fealty, that is, a 
promise to restore the castle upon a ruler’s command. In the twelfth century the castle 
became assimilated with the fief which was increasingly regarded as hereditary. Another 
form of agreement made over the rights to castles consisted of a promise not to use such 
fortifications to aid a lord’s enemies or deliver the castle into their hands. Such 
agreements carried on well into the thirteenth century.*®^
Documentary evidence from the domains of the Trencavel family is particularly 
well preserved. It appears from this evidence that very few of the fortifications in these 
lands were actually owned by the family. Cheyette suggests that the few castles for 
which oaths were given were of major strategic importance in guarding the main roads 
which passed tlirough the territory. He concludes from this evidence and the castles’ 
distribution that the Trencavels seem to have regarded castles principally as a means of 
controlling traffic rather than controlling population.*®"* Those that they laid claim to 
were mainly where the population was densest or were used to guard roads, for example 
on the western fi-ontier of the Trencavel lands which faced the lands of the counts of 
Foix and Toulouse, clustered at strategic points. The principal purpose of many of these 
fortifications, therefore, may have been relatively peaceful, namely to extract tolls and 
dues for safe conduct, although some still retained a strategic importance. Cheyette 
supports his theory with the evidence of aerial photography suggesting that certain 
villages appear to have acted as “magnets” on the road pulling merchants, pilgrims and 
other travellers aside from the roman highway to pay tolls before passing on. Strategic 
or commercial considerations regarding their fortresses and those of their vassals may 
therefore have been uppermost for lords such as the Trencavels. Controlling the lords 
of fortified villages, where most of the wealth of the area was produced could also have 
been a major political aim. It was not the fortifications of the plain however that played a 
major role in the resistance that the crusaders met.
Despite the presence of a plethora of fortifications on the plains in the lands of 
the Trencavels, when the crusaders arrived, there appears to have been no major
*®7 See T.N. Bisson, ‘Some Characteristics of Mediterranean Territorial Power’, Medieval France and 
her Pyrenean Neighbours: Studies in Early Institutional History (London, 1989), pp. 257-264. Bisson 
sees die main difference between the situation in Catalonia and the lands of counts o f Toulouse being 
that the count of Toulouse had more difficulty in maintaining control over castles in his lands. Those 
that he did control were not suitably distributed for this purpose.
*®5 Lewis, Southern French and Catalan Society, p. 292.
*®"* Cheyette, Casdes of the Trencavels’, p. 266.
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obstacles to their progress westwards towards Carcassonne. According to the Chanson 
no major military action took place until the crusaders come to Béziers, the crusaders 
finding that much of the population of the towns of the plains had fled.*®^  Such actions 
on the part of the local population may suggest that that the people had no confidence in 
their fortifications. The crusaders, therefore, went on to take Béziers and Carcassonne, 
the other towns in the region surrendering their fortifications and offering no resistance. 
The hundreds of fortifications which clustered around the foot of the Moure Mountains 
appear to have been returned to their lords once the crusaders established themselves in 
the area. *®6
If these fortifications were abandoned so readily, it begs the question what sort 
of warfare were these constructions designed to meet? It has been suggested that the 
twelfth century could be seen as a period of decline in the use of the castle in southern 
France as a strategic fortification. *®’ A progressive abandonment of the strong central 
donjon or enceinte and the relative weakness of the resistance of the castra on the plain 
to the army of the crusade may lead to the conclusion that the fortified villages of the 
plain had lost most of their defensive value. *®* This argument is further backed up by 
events during the Albigensian Crusade. The castles of the plains did not provide the 
main centres of resistance to the crusaders. It was the mountain fortresses such as 
Termes, Minerve and Cabaret which served as centres from which raids could be 
launched during the Crusade and would have represented a permanent threat to the 
crusaders established on the plains. It was therefore necessary to take them and ensure 
the domination of the countryside.
Judging from the time it took to besiege and take castles such as Minerve and 
Termes this was not an easy task. According to the written sources, it took one month to 
take Minerve and just under 5 months to take Termes. At Cabaret, however, which was 
judged by the author of the Chanson to be equal to them in strength, the castle was 
surrendered when news reached the defenders that reinforcements for the crusaders had
*®5 The abandonment of castles is again mentioned at Chanson, v. 112, 12-14 which states that this is 
the result o f fear amongst the local population precipitated by the arrival o f new reinforcements for the 
crusaders in 1212. This flight allowed the crusaders to garrison fortresses at La Garda and Puycelci. 
*®6 Bourin-Derruau, ‘Valeur stratégique et valuer symbolique’, p. 103.
*®7 Ibid. pp. 105-06. Bourin-Derrau (hstinguishes 3 different types of fortification, identified in written 
sources, in the area the villa, castrum and a larger type of fortified tow n, the castra.
*®* Ibid. p. 102. Such an argument, however, fails to take into consideration the fact that the crusading 
army was much larger and more powerful than any army that these fortifications had been designed to 
defend against.
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arrived from the North, This appears to indicate that the lords of the mountain fortresses 
only showed confidence in their defences when the odds were in their favour. All three 
major written sources for the crusade insist on the superior strength and position of the 
castles of Minerve, Termes and Cabaret. For example, William of Puylaurens uses the 
term castra fortia when describing all three. There is nothing however, in design, to 
distinguish these castra fortia from the other fortifications of the plains apart from their 
lofty position. According to the Chanson, Raymond of Termes considered the crusading 
army to be ‘ . none of them worth a button, for no one ever saw a stronger castle than 
his’*®® Castles such as these, however, do not appear to have had particularly advanced 
defensive features. It was the site chosen which allowed them to be defended effectively 
for such relatively long periods of time. The taking of Termes appears to have been such 
a devastating blow to the southern resistance to the crusaders that once it was taken 
most of the other castles of the area were abandoned or surrendered.**®
The decision to besiege Minerve followed repeated raids, launched from the 
castle, during the winter of 1210/11. Despite little remaining of the fortifications today, 
it is still clear from the position of their ruins that it was a remarkable natural fortress 
consisting not only of a castle but also a of a large fortified village (Figure 12 and Plate 
9) Situated five miles north of the Aude river and sited at the confluence of two steep 
river gorges it was protected on three sides by ravines of up to 300 m deep.*** The only 
way to approach the village was from the north side via a narrow strip of land defended 
by a powerful citadel and steep fissures in the rocky ground. **7 William of Tudela 
describes the fortress and the attempts of de Montfort and his crusaders to besiege it 
thus;
He laid siege to the place as he had planned, and set up his catapults.. .He 
smashed openings in the high walls and in the stone built hall, mortared 
with sand and lime; many a good penny they had cost and many a gold 
coin. If the king of Morocco and his Saracens had sat down all around the
*®® Chanson, v. 56, 29.
**® Chanson, v. 58.
*** See Saleh, Dictionnaire de châteaux,p. 757 and J. Bousquet, ‘Minerve’, Conff"èsArchéologique, 
(1973), pp. 92-113 .
* *7 Historia, 152. Peter of les Vaux des Cemay here describes the fortifications, the nature of which
caused de Montfort to divide his army in order carry out siege operations.
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place, by St Catherine, they could have done no damage worth an Anjou
half penny Minerve castle is not in a plain but stands..........on a
high spur of rock, there is no stronger fortress this side of the Spanish 
passes, except Cabaret and Termes at the head of the Cerdagne. William, 
lord of Minerve, had shut himself into the castle with his whole troop and 
was taking his ease there.
After the taking of Minerve in July 1210, Termes remained one of the only hostile 
fortresses south of the Aude until November 1210 when it was taken after a siege of 
almost five months. The castle may have been of little strategic importance, being near 
neither any major roads or centres of population, but the crusaders could not afford to 
leave it in the hands of their enemies.**"* It dominated a narrow river valley in a region 
which had few roads, those which did exist were impassable for much of the winter. This 
was an important factor in the strength of such fortifications, exemplified by the decision 
of the bulk of the besieging crusader force to leave in the autumn of 1210. Termes stood 
on a narrow rock from which two fingers of land extended northwards towards the 
valley of the Orbieu.**  ^ One of these fingers was protected by vertical cliffs, the other by 
a small isolated turret called the TermeneO^^ Peter of les Vaux de Cemay’s description 
of the position speaks eloquently of the strength of the fortifications at Termes:
The castrum of Termes was in the territory of Narbonne, five leagues 
from Carcassonne. It was marvellously, indeed unbelievably, strong and 
in human estimation appeared to be quite impregnable. It was situated on 
the summit of a very high peak, overlooking a huge natural cliff, and 
surrounded on all sides by very deep and inaccessible ravines, with water 
flowing through them, surrounding the whole castrum. In turn the ravines 
were surrounded by huge crags, so difiicult to climb down that anyone 
wishing to approach the walls would need first to throw himself into the 
ravine and then, as it were, “crawl back towards heaven” So
**5 Chanson, v. 48 - 49.
* *"* Sumption, The Albigensian Crusade, p. 121.
**5 For the defences at Termes see A. de Pous, Les Termenès (Paris, 1963) and Saleh, Dictionnaire de 
châteaux, pp. 1162-3.
**6 This is described in/fw/or/a 171 as being (of) modest (size) but strong.
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situated Termes could be approached from one side only, where the rocks 
were lower and less inaccessible.’**7
To the south of the village was a fortified suburb and a thin neck of rocky land, which 
offered the only access to the castle, as described above. Termes remains better 
preserved than many other castles in this area due to its continued use as a border 
fortification. The ruins of the curtain wall which still exist today show an irregular 
pentagonal plan, the wall being pierced by loopholes and having traces of what appears 
to be a wall walk The wall is reinforced by mounds crowned with watchtowers in the 
north west and south east comers and a round tower stands to the north east. The 
highest point is occupied by the rectangular donjon, the only entrance to the castle being 
the north postem. The original fortifications were built by Pierre Olivier of Termes in 
1084 *** and important reinforcement work was almost certainly carried out on the 
castle at the beginning of the Albigensian Cmsade, two lines of fortifications on the 
south side being dated to this period.**® In common with other fortified towns of the 
area. Termes possessed a small suburb (hurgum) that proved to be the most vulnerable 
part of the complex of fortifications and which was taken first during the siege of 1210. 
(Figure 13 and Plate 10). *7®
The existence of castles such as those at Termes, Minerve and Cabaret reveals 
the differing nature of the fortifications of the Languedoc from those of northem France. 
These differences can be attributed to a number of factors. Topography obviously played 
an important part in the location and design of many of the fortresses of the Languedoc, 
particularly those in mountainous areas. Good natural defences may have led to simple 
forms of fortification persisting into the thirteenth century, whilst the greater numbers of 
castles and other fortifications in the Languedoc reveal a different political structure to 
that which existed in the north.
The very fact of the decline in the number of fortifications being built and used in 
southern France from the mid-thirteenth century onwards is revealing. The castles 
required by the royal administration were not the same type of fortifications which had
**7 Historia, 171 (trans. W.A. & M.D. Sibley)
*** C. Saleh, Dictionnaire de châteaux e t des fortifications p. 1162. 
**® de Pous, ‘ L’ architecture militaire Occitaine’, p. 93-94 
*7® Historia, 176.
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previously existed. Those mountain castles which continued being used were 
strategically placed to protect the borders of a kingdom, not to provide strongholds for 
fiercely independent minor nobles as they had done before. The coming of direct royal 
rule to southern France brought with it a need to display the power and wealth of the 
monarchy The rebuilding and elaboration of castle and city defences in the royal period 
may herald the importation of more sophisticated building techniques and also reveals 
the wish of the Capetian monarchs to stamp their own identity on a part of France 
formally only nominally under royal control. Just as Philip Augustus had done in 
Normandy with the captured castles of the Angevins, so Louis IX and his successors did 
with the fortifications of the Languedoc. The strengthening and elaboration of the 
fortifications at Carcassonne provides a prime example of this. The Cité was established 
as a royal fortification and in 1247 the bastide of the lower town was begun.
Carcassonne was then established as the key centre of military administration on the 
French/Spanish border.
The nature of the fortifications of the Languedoc at the beginning of the 
thirteenth century reflects a diverse region with a complex political and economic 
situation. Just as it is impossible to separate purely military considerations fi’om political, 
social, economic and domestic factors in the design and construction of the castles of 
northem France, so should such factors be taken into consideration when discussing the 
fortifications of the south. Having thus established this background, it is now intended to 
show how these fortifications were defended and besieged during the Albigensian 
Crusade and to make comparisons with siege warfare taking place in other theatres of 
conflict in the same period.
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Chapter 4
4.0 Introduction
The importance of sieges and the successful reduction of fortifications during the 
Albigensian Crusade is evident from the most cursory survey of the available written 
evidence. The number of sieges described in the major written sources for the 
Albigensian Crusade reveals them to be the most important part of the military activity 
which took place. An examination of these sieges must therefore play a major part in 
any survey of the military aspects of the Albigensian Crusade. The detail with which 
these events are treated in the written sources also ensures that an examination of the 
sieges of the Albigensian Crusade can contribute much to overall knowledge of how 
siege warfare was carried out during the early thirteenth century. This chapter therefore 
intends to examine typical siege weapons used during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries 
and link this to the way they were utilised during the Albigensian Crusade.
It has been suggested in the previous chapter that fortifications in south western 
France showed a marked tendency towards a growing sophistication, perhaps as a result 
of the political take-over of this area by the French monarchy. It would therefore seem 
appropriate to examine whether the crusaders had access to more sophisticated siege 
machinery than the southerners, owing perhaps to an ability to command the services of 
more skilled engineers and craftsmen. To begin with, however, it will be appropriate to 
examine how siege warfare was being carried out in northern France on the eve of the 
Albigensian Crusade, taking as examples a number of the sieges carried out under the 
command of the French king Philip Augustus, who, along with the kings of England in 
this period, had at his command some of the most skilled engineers,architects and 
craftsmen available.
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4.1 Methods of siege used by the army of Philip Augustus
The French king in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries could command the skills of a 
considerable number of engineers and craftsmen in the pursuit not only of his policy of 
building and renewing castles but also in the sphere of siege warfare. The kind of 
manpower and technology that could be commanded can be demonstrated by the military 
career of Philip Augustus. By studying the siege warfare carried out by the king’s army it 
is possible to detect sophisticated and innovative methods being used to overcome large 
fortified cities and castles alike, much the same obstacles with which crusaders in the 
south west of France were to find themselves challenged.
The king was also a crusader in the East and in April 1191 Philip Augustus, with 
Richard I of England began a lengthy siege of the city of Acre. The evidence provided 
by the writtten sources for the military operations at Acre show the considerable 
resources that the two monarchs could command between them along with the other 
participants in the crusade. Before the arrival of the two monarchs, Pisan and Genoese 
sailors along with the men of Henry of Champagne and the Bishop of Besançon had 
constructed many siege engines including siege towers protected with hides, mining 
engines, mangonels and a ram consisting of a ship’s mast under a protective cover of 
iron, a combination which suggests the involvement of the Italian sailors in the design of 
the siege engine. These were attacked fi'om within the city by the engines of Saladin who 
also employed greek fire against them. The crusaders fortified their camp by throwing 
up a barrier from shore to shore in front of the walls running round the city. This was 
reinforced with shields and timbers, a task which, no doubt, would have taken a 
considerable amount of manpower to perform. Philip Augustus and a large number of 
fi*ench nobles arrived at Acre on 20th April and remained until 1st August . He was 
followed very closely by Richard who offered to pay those who were taking part in the 
siege four besants a week, as opposed to the 3 besants being offered by Philip Augustus. 
This clearly indicates the rivalry which existed between the kings which may even have 
led to a certain amount of competition developing in the building of siege weapons.
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It is clear from written sources that the French king had siege engines transported in 
ships to Acre whilst others may have been constructed from local materials. One of these 
was a petraria named Malvoisin which eventually breached part of the city wall. Other 
machines built by the French king included a ‘cat castle’, presumable a kind of mobile 
mining engine and a Hestudo\ which was destroyed by Greek fire fuelled with 
brushwood. Philip’s men undermined the tower named Maledictum at one comer of the 
city’s defences making a cavity which was then supported by props. The Turks 
countermined however and cut them off. Richard also had a testudo built which was 
guarded by crossbow men whilst the sappers protected by it undermined the city wall.. 
Also taking part in the siege were contingents of Hospitallers and Templars and a force 
led by the count of Flanders. When the count was killed Richard was given his siege 
engines to add to his battery, which consisted of five mangonels of varying sizes and a 
siege tower which was protected by wood and twisted ropes. Ambroise reports that 
Richard had special ‘sea stones’ for his machines bought from Messina.* The siege of 
Acre saw the coming together of a large army consisting of men from a variety of 
origins. The combination of this and the situation created by besieging a strongly 
defended city in hostile territory may possibly have led to technical innovation, the 
exchange of ideas and transfer of skills.
Large scale earthworks, such as those employed at Acre, can again be seen in 
use at Evreux which was besieged in 1194 by Philip Augustus. A ditch was dug 
around the town and reinforced with wicker hurdles.^ The ingenuity and skill of the 
king’s engineers was demonstrated once again at Gumay in 1202 when the dyke 
surrounding the town’s defensive moat was pierced by a digging engine. The water of 
the river Epte inundated the town and demolished its defences.^
All three of these examples illustrate how the besieging of towns and cities could 
be carried out to devastating effect with the correct amount of manpower and skill. It is 
the siege of Château Gaillard, however that provides us with one of the best examples of 
how Philip Augustus employed his resources, ingenuity and determination to take a 
fortress. The siege of Château Gaillard in 1204 is one of the best documented military
* See Ambroise, The Crusade o f  Richard the Lion-Heart, , trans. M.J. Hubert & J. L. La Monte 
(New York, 1976), pp 144 - 206.
7 Gesta Philippi August!, 72, p. 192.
5 Ibid. p. 208
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incidents in the narrative sources for the reign of Philip Augustus."* It therefore provides 
an excellent example of the techniques available to Philip Augustus and used by the king 
in siege warfare. This is mainly due to the detailed description of the siege provided by 
William the Breton in his two works the Gesta and Philipiad. He first of all describes the 
complex of fortifications constructed by Richard I above the Seine, noting that the town 
of Les Andelys, which lay within the shadow of Château Gaillard was entirely 
surrounded by water, on one side by the river Seine and on the other by the diversion of 
a stream which ran out of the river. The entrances to the town were defended by fortified 
bridges. The castle itself was situated above the town on high cliffs. The whole complex 
of fortifications on the rock was said by William to extend over 400 paces in length, the 
right bank of the river being entirely commanded by the castle and the walled town. In 
the middle of the river opposite the village was a fortified islet which contained a small 
garrison. It was here that Philip first attacked. Siege engines were erected on the 
southern bank of the river, these fired stones against the ramparts of the island fortress. 
The garrison of the island returned fire with missiles and arrows.
Seeing that no further advance could be made the king ordered that a flotilla of 
barges be brought up river. From these barges he formed a pontoon bridge. When the 
bridge was complete Philip had a portion of his troops go across the river by means of 
the pontoon bridge in order to begin besieging the town. A further encumbrance to the 
French troops lay in the form of a row of stakes embedded in the river bed. Philip sent 
divers to destroy this underwater stockade and then land on the fortified island. Once this 
was achieved the fortifications on the island were fired, assaulted and taken, thus 
overcoming a major obstacle and allowing the French to attack the town more easily.
The town was taken and its inhabitants fled to the protection of the castle. The king’s 
troops now settled down to what they knew would be a protracted siege.
William the Breton mentions several times the impregnability of Gaillard, stating 
that the banks of the river were so steep and high that King Philip could not hope to take 
the place by storm. He therefore made plans to blockade the castle over the winter, 
preventing anybody entering or leaving the place. The king ordered wide ditches to be 
dug around the fortress which were flooded with water. 7 wooden counter forts were
"* The siege of Château Gaillard is described in the Gesta Philippi Augusti, 121 - 129. Also see 
Powicke, The Loss o f  Normandy, p. 374-7 and K.Norgate, John Lackland (London, 1902), p. 95-100.
94
constructed at equal distances from each other along this ditch. Each had a drawbridge 
and a garrison of its own. In the spring the siege proceeded once again in earnest. Philip 
had the slopes around the castle flattened and "machines and petrarias" drawn up along 
the now level ground. Roofs made of wood and wicker were used by those who 
flattened the slopes to protect them from missiles. A siege tower made of oak and 
wicker was drawn up to the walls and a musculus (digging machine) was also employed 
to undermine the foundations, the crew which operated it also being protected under a 
roof. The garrison of the besieged castle possessed petrariis and mangonellis (siege 
artillery).
The French now attacked with the musculus under a protective roof at the angle 
of the castle’s wall where a tower joined it. A deep ditch which had only been half filled 
however prevented them from making further progress. By means of ladders they 
climbed into this ditch up the other side protecting themselves with their shields. Under 
the cover of these shields, they proceeded to tunnel under the foundations of the tower 
with picks and shovels. Staves were then inserted to support the roof of the tunnel, 
these were then ignited and the tower collapsed allowing the French to force themselves 
into the outer bailey of the castle. William the Breton notes, however, that the French 
found the inner bailey more difficult to take.
The castle chapel which had been added by King John had a window opening 
out onto one of the outer walls. Underneath this window was an outlet from a 
garderobe. A small band of men climbed up the latrine’s outlet channel until they came 
out under this window. Swinging themselves through the window they entered the 
chapel and set fire to it, making a great noise in order to cause panic amongst the castle’s 
garrison. In all the smoke and confiision the defenders retreated to the keep. A musculos 
was now employed to undermine the walls of the castle keep and a petraria named 
Chadabula fired rocks and masonry from the ruined walls. A breach was eventually 
made, large enough for the French troops to enter and the castle was taken with a 
garrison of 40 knights and 120 men at arms surrendering.
The description of the siege of Château Gaillard given by William the Breton 
demonstrates that Philip Augustus had considerable manpower and engineering 
expertise at his command. The military force needed to surround and blockade Gaillard 
for several months would be considerable. The digging of such earthworks would also
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have required substantial manual labour. As well as soldiers and labourers, skilled 
engineers and carpenters would have been needed to construct artillery pieces, mining 
devices and the defensive forts. The construction of a pontoon bridge again points to the 
use of skilled military engineers. The mining operations also appear to have been 
sustained and extensive. Employing such men for long periods of time would no doubt 
have cost the king a considerable amount of money. Not only do their wages need to be 
considered but also the cost of materials for the construction of the engines.
These examples of siege warfare carried out by the army of Philip Augustus 
provide ample evidence for the way siege warfare was being carried out in the late 
twelfth century in Northem France. The crusaders who travelled to the Languedoc, 
wliilst not necessarily possessing the resources that the king of France could command, 
nevertheless were presumably familiar with the type of machines and techniques 
described above. Using written evidence, it is possible to examine the types of weapons 
used by the crusaders and their opponents and to compare the methods used each of 
them.
4.2 Siege Weapons of the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries and 
their use during the Albigensian Crusade
As can be seen from the above examples, siege weapons of this period can be divided 
into three basic types, siege towers, devices used for undermining walls and affording 
protection for those doing so and missile throwing engines. The former two types often 
performed the same function. Table 2 shows the frequency with which each type of 
engine was used during the crusade according to the Chanson. Each type of engine will 
now be examined individually and examples given of how and when they were used 
during the Albigensian Crusade.
4.2.1 Siege Towers
The siege tower was a device designed to carry out two primary functions, that of 
covering mining operations against a wall and providing a means by which the top of the
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wall might be reached. 5 The use of the siege tower by the Romans is well documented, 
its use during the middle ages in Western Europe, however, does not appear to have 
been common until the eleventh century and early references to them are most 
commonly found during the First Crusade. These large mobile siege engines are 
variously referred to in Latin as berfredum, castellum ligneum, castrum, turris and 
ambulatoria and were constructed with the use of four vertical comer beams slanted 
inwards. Some had internal stairways to allow for the movement and protection of 
troops. As with other siege engines, such structures were extremely vulnerable to 
incendiary attack and were often covered with materials such as semi-cured animal hides 
soaked in water to protect against such an assault, hung in strips in order the facilitate 
their quick removal.^
Siege towers could be armoured with layers of osier or wickerwork to absorb 
the shock of missiles thrown against them, some were even iron plated. They were 
moved by means of either wheels or rollers, this of course necessitated the smoothing of 
a path in order that the tower could be manoeuvred into position.^ Large teams of men 
would have been required, therefore, to level an approach, filling in ditches with any 
material that was readily available. The Chanson mentions the use of a siege tower 
during the Albigensian Crusade only once, this by the cmsaders. Table 2 shows the 
frequency with which each type of siege machine was used according to the Chanson. 
The tower is referred as a castel and is described as being placed against the town walls 
of Beaucaire in an effort to relieve the cmsader garrison *. The use of such a device as a 
siege tower would have been extremely difficult bearing in mind the sites of many of the 
castles besieged during the crusade, placed as they were on lofty pinnacles where a 
smooth approach would have been very difficult to achieve.
5 Bradbury, The Medieval Siege, p. 241.
6 Ibid, p. 242.
7 Rogers, Latin Siege Warfare, p. 253.
* Chanson, v. 162, 92.
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4.2.2 Mining, Rams, Bores and Armoured Roofs
A second type of siege machine commonly used during the middle ages was that used to 
facilitate the undermining of fortifications. These consisted of two main types: machines 
used for excavation and boring and protective roofs used to protect engineers and 
workmen carrying out this work. Often the two functions would be combined. Boring 
machines used for undermining defences are referred to by a variety of different names in 
Latin and vernacular sources including mouse {musculus) and cat (catus or gatus, in 
Provençal). Such machines often consisted of a rotating beam with an iron head which 
would be used as a kind of drill.^
The cat appears to have been one of the most widely used of the siege engines 
employed during the Albigensian Crusade by the northern invaders. This device is 
mentioned in the Chanson as being used at the sieges of Moissac^®, Beaucaire*  ^and 
T o u l o u s e ^ ^  xhe anonymous contintuator of the Chanson depicts Simon de Montfort 
boasting that the cat he will use at Toulouse will be able to accommodate 400 knights 
as well as archers and men at arms.^  ^Simon de Montfort’s carpenters are said to have 
spent a month building this cat.^ "^  It is clear that this device was under constant 
bombardment from the missile throwing siege engines of the defenders of Toulouse. A 
trebuchet firing from within the city scored a direct hit upon this cat. Simon de 
Montfort’s men started to repair it when a sortie was launched and a major struggle 
ensued to save the engine, illustrating the importance placed on the engine by the both 
the defenders and the crusaders.
At Moissac Simon de Montfort had wood transported in order that a cat could 
be built by his carpenters. These carpenters were guarded by a force of crusaders as 
they worked and were continually harassed by the defending garrison, who on one
 ^Rogers, ÎMtin Siege Warfare, p. 252.
Chanson, v. 119, 7.
Chanson, 162, 92.
Chanson, v. 200, 80.
Chanson, v. 22, 84.
Simon de Montfort ordered the cat to be made at the beginning of May 1218 as well as a siege tower 
and artillery pieces {Chanson, v. 196, 30)
Chanson, v. 120, 8 - v. 121, 3, the machines are described in provençal as being 'peireiras', 'gata' 
and a 'bosson', these are presumably the same machines mentioned in Historia, 119, where the 
archdeacon of Paris was active in helping in the construction of these siege engines.
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occasion succeeded in destroying the cat that was under construction, once again 
illustrating the major importance placed on the destruction of potentially dangerous siege 
engines.
The name for a protective roof and the boring machine it protected often appear 
to have been interchangeable. These roofs are often referred to as a cattus, gattus, 
testuda or vimineus. They came in various sizes, small roofs differing very little from 
shields, and were use to protect labouring crews in areas within missile range. Larger 
roofs were also designed to protect workmen who were preparing the ground for the 
approach of large siege engines such as siege towers which needed a smooth approach to 
be able to be put in position for an assault on a wall. Such large roofs were also used 
for the protection of crews working rams. Large mobile protective shields were used by 
the crusaders at the first siege of Toulouse in June 1211 as a means of protection for 
men who were carrying material up to the walls of the city in an attempt to fill in the 
ditch that surrounded it.^  ^A cat is one of the major features of William of Puylaurens 
short description of the siege operations at Toulouse. He describes it as being a machine 
of wood which was used as a cover in order to allow the crusaders to drag wood and 
earth closer to the city walls and fill in the ditches which surrounded them in order to 
make the ground level.
A device described as a carrum was used by the crusaders at Carcassonne to 
undermine the wall of the Castellare suburb. It is described as having four wheels and 
being covered in ox hides. The sappers, who were protected by this wheeled shelter 
succeeded in undermining the base of the wall, the shelter, however, was then destroyed 
by fire. This device is described as being constantly threatened by the city's defenders 
hurling stones, and burning wood. The Chanson describes the use of gatas at 
Carcassonne made from tree trunks which were used after the ditches around the walls 
had been filled in.
Metal tipped tree trunks were often used as rams and were often integrated into 
a protective roof. These are variously referred to by names such as aries or bercelleum 
{bofo or bosson in Provençal) and were slung under a wooden frame and protected by a
Chanson, v. 121, 5fF. 
Chanson, v. 80,1-6. 
Chronicle, 28 
Historia, 96
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covering known as a mantlet. Occasionally a two pronged fork is known to have been 
used to grip the end of the ram in order to over turn it.^ o The ram was a weapon that was 
also used widely by the both sides during the Albigensian Crusade for example at Penne 
d'Agenais i^ and Beaucaire^ .^ At Beaucaire the Young Count Raymond's men 
constructed a battering ram to assault the castle wall.^  ^ The defenders attempted to 
keep the ram at bay by showering the men who operated it with missiles and also by 
lowering over the wall, on a chain, a mixture of burning sulphur and oakum wrapped in 
a piece of cloth in an attempt to choke the attackers. "^  ^ They also used a lasso type 
device which briefly succeeded in snaring the end of the battering ram.
4.2.3 Siege engines:- missiles throwing weapons
A third common type of siege engine used during this period was that designed to hurl 
missiles. These were used in both an offensive and defensive capacity. Terms commonly 
used for such engines in Latin and vernacular sources include fundae, tormentum, 
tormenta, petraria, mangonell, balistae, fonelval, springald, paterell, brigoles, 
algarradas, calabres, chaabala and mangana. These terms are often interchangeable.^^ 
The usage of effective and efficient artillery very much depended on the availability off 
men skilled in the art of building and operating such machines. Such machines are known 
to have been widely used by Greek and particularly Roman armies. There are some 
fundamental problems with the available written evidence for the continued use into the 
Middle Ages of the types of torsion weapons used by both the Romans and Greeks.
Almost all our knowledge of artillery weapons of this kind is derived from 
narrative accounts and the terms used by most early authors are often inconsistent, 
confusing and almost always lacking in detailed description. It is very difficult therefore, 
to attempt any sort of reconstruction of these weapons using early medieval written 
sources. It is only in the thirteenth century that more detailed descriptions of siege
Warner, Sieges o f  the Middle Ages, p. 29.
Chanson, y . WA,  21.
Chanson, v. 158, 36.
Chanson, v. 164,12. This machine is called a bosso and is described as being long, straight and 
pointed with a steel tip,
24 Chanson, v. 164, 123 -127.
25 Bradbury, The Medieval Siege, p. 251.
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weapons appear, owing to an emerging interest in the science of warfare and the 
popularity of treatises on the subject.^  ^ One of the earliest references in the Middle Ages 
to the use of siege artillery is in Abbo’s description of the siege of Paris in 885. 2? This 
provides a good example of the confusion caused by early descriptions of siege artillery, 
the terms he uses having been variously interpreted to mean both torsion and lever 
artillery. The Chanson, in common with other written sources of the period, provides the 
reader with few clues as to the nature of such machines. There is also the added 
difficulty of dealing with a poetic work where the variety of vocabulary is presumably 
intended to add to the effectiveness of the poetry. The reader, therefore, can never be 
sure if the poet is referring to different types of machine or the same device but merely in 
a different manner.
Narrative accounts of the use of siege artillery are seldom enough to provide any 
clue as to the exact type of weapon being described. Latin terms such as ballista, 
catapulta and tormentum were still commonly used during the Middle Ages, but were 
gradually being replaced with other terms such as mangona, mangonell and petraria.
This use of different terminology has caused much debate over the continuity in the use 
of torsion weapons into the Middle Ages and the date for the introduction of counter 
weight trebuchets as opposed to those using human leverage.2*
The traction trebuchet relied on manual leverage provided by a team of men 
pulling on ropes whilst other types of trebuchet used a counterweight. There is little 
evidence that the counterweight device existed before the twelfth century. The first 
mention of traction trebuchet in a written source appears in a description of the siege of 
Lisbon in 1147 when a battery of this type of engine was used.2  ^ The traction trebuchet 
was probably a light, easily handled weapon, capable of hurling only small and medium 
sized missiles. It also used considerably more manpower than a counterweight device 
and the operating crew would have been particularly vulnerable to attack. The counter 
weight trebuchet appears to have been invented in the Mediterranean region in the 
twelfth century, the first unambiguous description of one spearing in 1199 in an Italian
26 Rogers, Latin Siege Warfare, p.254.
22 Contamine, War in the Middle Ages, p. 105.
2* For a summary of the debate over torsion and lever artillery and the introduction of the traction 
trebuchet see Rogers, Latin Siege Warfare, pp. 255 - 273.
29 For the introduction of the traction trebuchet to the west see D. Hill Trebuchets', Viator, 4 (1973), 
pp. 99-117.
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source. From here its use spread rapidly to northern Europe. It was probably far more 
accurate and consistent device, able to throw heavier missiles for longer distances.^® 
There is some evidence to suggest that a transitional device using both human 
traction and a counterweight existed and it is possible that such a device may have been 
in use during the Albigensian Crusade A relief carving exists in the church of St. 
Nazaire at Carcassonne (Figure 14) which may show this type of device. The carving 
has often been interperated as depicting the death of Simon de Montfort at Toulouse in 
1217. De Montfort was killed by a heavy block of masonry hurled from a machine 
described in the Chanson as a trabuquet 2^ The carving depicts a machine which not 
only appears to have a fixed counterweight but is also being pulled by a team of men and 
women. At the top a projectile is placed in a sling, at the bottom to the left appears to be 
the engineer and at the end of the shorter side of the throwing arm is what could be a 
counter weight.^  ^To the right can be seen figures using ropes to provide traction. A 
passage in the Chanson describes how the ropes of the trebuchets used by the 
Toulousains were pulled by 10,000 men, an exaggeration, but indicating a large number 
nevertheless. This description may offer an important clue as to the type of engine being 
used. The large number of men needed to provide this kind of leverage may indicated 
that a counterweight machine was not in use, but rather a device using human traction. 
The use of a trebuchet is described only three times in the Chanson, at Carcassonne, 
Castelnaudary and Toulouse. On all of these occasions they are used by troops fighting 
of the side of Raymond of Toulouse. This may or may not be significant. If it is true that 
the trebuchet was first developed in the Mediterranean region and spread north, such 
evidence could suggest that the southerners had access to more advanced technology. 
This is not certain, however, and there is evidence to suggest that such a device was in 
use in northern France at a similar date. For example. Prince Louis of France is 
described as using a trebuchet during his invasion of England in 1216.^ 4
In order to build some of the larger types of traction engine a large supply of the 
wood would, naturally, have been needed. The beams for these machines alone would
Hill, ‘Trebuchets’, pp. 103-5.
Rogers, Latin Siege Warfare, p. 269.
2^ Chanson, v. 205,124. The machine is described as being operated by a team of women and standing 
on a platform above the walls of the city.
J. Fino, Forteresses de la France médiévale (Paris, 1970) p. 149.
4^ Renn, Norman Castles in Britain, p. 109.
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have been several metres long, the longer the beam, the heavier the projectile it could 
throw.35 Such beams may even have required a certain type of wood which had been 
specially treated for the purpose. If this is the case, it is unlikely that such machines 
could have been constructed on-site using local materials. The transport of such 
machines must be then be considered as an option. It has been estimated that the 
maximum length of the beam for a large siege engine may have been in the region of 
30 ft. There would have been considerable difficulties in transporting a machine as large 
as this. ^ 2 If one considers the terrain which exists in some areas of the south west of 
France and the location of some of the fortifications besieged during the Albigensian 
Crusade, transport of siege engines by the crusaders could have presented a major 
problem. The written sources for the crusade refer on several occasions to the building 
of siege weapons on site at certain locations. They also, however, refer to such 
weapons being transported for long distances. For example, when Simon de Montfort 
left Carcassonne for Termes in July 1210, he left William de Contres with instructions 
that his siege train was to be packed and transported to Termes as soon as possible. The 
machines transported are described as being 'peirriers' and 'mangonneaux'^ ^ This siege 
train was delayed by the rough terrain and lack of roads in the area and took several 
weeks to travel the distance of approximately 15 miles.
Counterweights and ammunition for artillery machines were probably obtained 
locally. Problems could have arisen, however, if the local stone used for this purpose 
was too soft to withstand the impact when hurled from the machines against defensive 
walls. This appears to have been the case at Castelnaudary where Count Raymond’s 
army are depicted in the Chanson as being in possession of a trebuchet. They found that 
they could not find suitable stones to use as missiles because the ones they found locally 
shattered on impact, against the walls of the town. 4o Fortifications which maintained 
siege engines permanently may very well have kept suitable ammunition on site. Shaped 
stone balls weighing between 41 and 97 kg have been found at Carcassonne which date
5^ Rogers, Latin Siege Warfare, p. 254.
36 Ibid., p. 254.
32 Ibid, p.271.
3* For example at Termes, Toulouse and Beaucaire.
39 Chanson, v. 54 ,4 ,13  and 27.
4® Chanson, v. 92,13-17. As mentioned above, Richard I may well have been aware of such problems, 
as he is reported to have had missiles transported from Sicily to Acre to be used by his siege engines.
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from the thirteenth century, implying that a battery of such engines were kept there at 
this time.4^
There are numerous examples of artillery weapons being used by both sides 
during the Albigensian Crusade. The use of petrarie by the crusaders is described at the 
siege of Carcassonne^ .^ The stones being launched from these engines are described as 
travelling in a wide arc upwards and over the wall of the Castellare suburb suggesting 
that the type of machine in use was either inaccurate or was being used in an anti- 
personel capacity. The crusaders when assaulting the city’s main defences also used 
missile throwing engines. The Chanson describes the use ofpeireiras and calahras 
which were dragged up to the city walls and employed to batter it with huge boulders.^  ^
The siege of Beaucaire provides an excellent example of how different types of siege 
engine could be used in concert with one another. A siege tower and cat were flanked 
with a catapult which operated constantly against the town gates and walls and had some 
success in breaking off stones from its crenellated top. This constant hail of stones was 
presumably intended to prevent a sustained assault on the crusaders’ other engines as 
they worked against the wall, thus showing such machines being used in a defensive 
capacity.44 The Young Count Raymond also used a variety of artillery type weapons at 
Beaucaire, ordering the building of machines described as mangonels and gousas along 
with other siege engines.45 Siege engines fired from within the town by Raymond’s men 
gradually demolished the upper parts of the keep of the castle.46
At Moissac it is reported that the nephew of the archbishop of Rheims was 
captured, hacked to pieces and shot from the mangonels of the garrison inside the 
town.42 The crusaders’ machines destroyed a large part of the town's wall. The Chanson 
records that a peirier assaulted the walls both night and day until a breach was
4^  See Fino, Forteresses de la France Médiévale, p. 149
42 Historia, 96.
43 Chanson, v. 25, 4.
44 Chanson, v. 162,87-96. Later on in the Chanson's description of the siege {Chanson, v. 166,15-17) 
the poet describes how a catapult o f the crusading army severely damages the town walls at the Vigne 
gate (see plan) as well as the rampart of the castle.
45 Chanson, v. 159,12. Martin-Chabot notes that this list o f engines and defences is very similar to 
that of a passage in the work of the troubadour Rambaud de Vaqueiras {Chanson, Vol. 2, p l25, n 4  ). If 
it is the case that the vocabulary used to describe such engines is in conscious imitation of other literary 
works then caution needs to be used in drawing any sort of conclusion about the exact nature of weapons 
being described.
46 Chanson, v. 164, 18.
42 Historia, 343.
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eventually made.4* At Minerve the crusaders’ machines succeeded in destroying a 
covered passageway which led to the castle’s only water supply whilst the rest of the 
citadel had become badly damaged during the course of its bombardment, showing that 
their machines must have been reasonably accurate in their aim.
The siege of Termes provides an example of how the use of siege engines could 
be hampered by inaccuracy and the unsuitability of the site it was erected on. A 
mangonel is reported to have been erected by the crusaders, to bombard the isolated 
tower (Termemt) which formed part of the town’s fortifications. This effectively cut off 
the tower and caused it to be abandoned. The crusaders however were still able to make 
little headway in the task of reducing the castle. The only ground suitable for setting up 
machines was almost out of range and the damage that the machines did to the eastern 
wall of the castle was soon repaired by the garrison, suggesting the machines did not hit 
the same point in the wall with any consistency or regularity. Each time a breach was 
made that was large enough for the crusaders to enter, they found their way blocked by a 
makeshift barricade hastily constructed from wood and debris^ .^ As fast as the wall was 
being destroyed from the outside it was being shored up from the inside. The defenders 
of Termes also had machines of their own. Peter of les Vaux de Cemay mentions the 
use of a mangonel. 5o The only siege engine of the crusaders that appears to have done 
any great damage to the castle was a mangonel which was sited on a cliff opposite the 
castle walls and separated fi'om the crusaders camp by a deep cleft in the rock. 51 This, 
however was attacked and set alight by the garrison in one of their periodic sorties. It is 
said by Peter of les Vaux de Cemay that Simon de Montfort had 300 men guarding this 
one machine, an indication, perhaps, of the worth which was placed on its contribution 
to the siege o p e r a t i o n s . ^ 2  i n  October the crusader’s siege engines were moved closer the 
to walls and returned to attacking them, under the supervision of the archdeacon of 
Paris.
It appears that a wide variety of siege engines and methods were used with 
varying degrees of efficiency by both sides during the Albigensian Cmsade. In common
4* Chanson,, v. 123, 5, It was the sight of this breach according to the Chanson which caused the towns 
people to panic and seek to negotiate with de Montfort, although the Historia does not mention this.
49 Historia, 178.
5® Historia 190 
5^  Historia 179
52 Historia 179
53 Historia 188
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with many other periods and conflicts, one of the major problems in studying the use of 
siege engines is the terminology employed in the written sources, particularly regarding 
siege artillery which can be extremely vague. It is often very difficult to ascertain with 
any certainty by which mechanism these machines were driven . What does emerge from 
the narrative sources however is the use of skilled engineers, miners and craftsmen by 
both sides to operate and build these and other machines.
4,3 Engineers
Men skilled in building and operating siege engines and undermining fortifications played 
an essential role in any army engaged in siege warfare. These were often the individuals 
who could command some of the highest wages in an army and were also key figures in 
the development of siege warfare. ^ 4 The key role that these men played is hinted at by 
the substantial rewards they could command for their services. Surviving English and 
French royal records show that some were endowed with land and pensions as a reward 
for their services. The period of the mid-twelfth century provides some of the earliest 
written evidence for specialist engineers in the employ of the monarchs of both France 
and England.55 There are many references to engineers being employed by the kings of 
France and England in narrative sources also. Records from Normandy show that 
engineers employed by Richard I and King John received a wage of around 4 shillings a 
day. For example, a ‘Master Urric’ is mentioned as having been endowed with land by 
both these kings. 56
The royal records of France also show that Philip Augustus retained sappers and 
engineers in his employ, paying them a wage of 18 deniers a day. 5? There is also evidence 
for substantial expenditure on the construction of siege engines in the French royal 
records. A figure of 12s and 4d is noted in the Compte General of 1202 for expenditure 
on ropes and equipment for engines. Balistae are also mentioned as being made by one
54 Rodgers, Latin Siege Warfare, p. 82.
55 Cathcart-King, The Castle in England and Wales, p. 91
56 See Powicke, The Loss o f  Normandy p. 332 for engineers in the employ of the kings of England and 
their pay, see also Brown, ‘Royal Castle Building’, p. 35-42 for the use of teams of royal engineers and 
their pay.
52 See Auduion, Essai sur l ’armée royale, p. 65, this figure is noted in the returns in the Con^te 
General for Lyons de Forêt.
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Renier de Montfort who was paid a wage of 2 shillings per day. 5* Royal Register A 
contains a list of armaments for 1200-1202 stored in border castles in Normandy. A 
later inventory for the castle at Chinon records a peiriere and 9 large chaables whilst 
the castle at Falaise contained 2 peirieres, 2 mangonels and 50 pairs of ropes 
(presumably used in the operation of the engines).^  ^ Is difficult to say whether all royal 
castles stored such engines or whether this was a common practice at the time.
It is evident, therefore, that specialist engineers, miners, and craftsmen were in the 
employ of the monarchs of France and England for the purpose of carrying out siege 
warfare from the mid-twelfth century at least. The written sources for the Albigensian 
Crusade also reveal substantial use of men skilled in the arts of building and operating 
siege engines and undermining fortifications. At the siege of Beaucaire, for example, an 
engineer working for the Young Count Raymond is described filling a large pot with 
flaming tar and pouring it on men attempting to undermine the walls of the town.^o The 
same man, or another engineer working for Raymond, is also described as directing the 
operation of a bofo and supervising excavations in an effort to undermine the castle wall 
at Beaucaire. Later in the Chanson, deliberations between Raymond of Toulouse and 
his advisors over how best to defend Toulouse are described. Once again an engineer is 
present, named Master Bernard’ by the author. He is instructed to build several siege 
engines, named as peirers, calbres and a trabuquet, in order to demolish the Château 
Narbonnais.62 When the order was given by the count to begin the bombardment of the 
Château two other men named Master Gamier and Bernard Parayre are in charge of 
operations.63
The crusaders also employed an number of engineers. At Minerve Simon de 
Montfort’s largest machine, known zsMalevoisine and described by the Chanson as the 
‘queen of the stone-throwers’^  ^was operated by men whose wages are said to have cost 
de Montfort 21 livres a day each.65 Expertise appears to have come from another
58 Ibid. p.lOl.
59 See Contamine, L'armée de Philippe Auguste', p. 582.
6® Chanson, v. 167,10-13.
6* Chanson, v. 164, 12.
62 Chanson, v. 191, 108 and v. 192, IfiF.
63 Chanson, v. 198, IfiF, Martin-Chabot contends that the title of master probably denotes a master 
carpenter {Chanson, vol.3, p. 126, n .l)
64 Chanson, v. 48, 6.
65 Historia, 152.
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quarter, in the form of the archdeacon of Paris, described by Peter of les Vaux de 
Cemay as helping to design and build siege engines at the siege of Termes.
Working from the evidence contained within this survey there is little evidence 
to suggest that either side during the Albigensian Crusade had access to more advanced 
technology than the other. It is particularly difficult to come to any firm conclusions 
regarding types of artillery in use owing to the nature of the written evidence. No 
evidence appears to exist for the transfer of new technologies from one area to another. 
Examining the use of siege engines and the employment of engineers during the 
Albigensian Crusade can show us the technology and skills available to the crusaders. It 
is only by examining the circumstances under which siege warfare was carried out during 
the Albigensian Crusade that a fuller picture can be built up.
4.4 The conduct of siege warfare during the Albigensian Crusade.
As can be seen in Chapter 3 the crusaders were forced to contend with a variety of 
fortifications from the high mountain strongholds, to the fortified towns of the plains and 
the centres of urban population. Each presented a new challenge to the cmsaders, each 
needing to be dealt with in a specific way. The well fortified cities of the Languedoc 
were to prove one of the most difficult challenges for the crusaders. Besieging such 
cities bought special problems of its own. At Carcassonne and Toulouse the crusaders 
found it very difficult to muster enough troops to surround the fortifications which 
extended for several miles. In the case of Carcassonne, however, the nature of the 
fortified city was to prove an advantage to the crusaders as they were able to attack a 
weak points in the suburbs. The nature of warfare within a town or city meant besiegers 
could attack defenders’ positions under the cover of houses. The defenders, however, 
could slow down the attackers by erecting barricades in the narrow streets. At 
Carcassonne, after the cmsaders had gained control of the Castellare suburb, they were 
forced to retreat by the city’s defenders. Observing the use that had been made by the 
cmsaders of the cover of the houses in the suburb, the defenders of Carcassonne
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deliberately set the buildings of the Castellare on fire, thus denying the besiegers this 
shelter. 66
At Beaucaire, the layout of the town allowed for the erecting of a wall between 
the relieving crusading army and the army of the Young Count Raymond. This 
effectively meant that the besiegers themselves were under siege. Barricades made of 
wooden beams and posts were established in the streets and these were guarded 
constantly by Raymond's troops.62 Because of the arrangement of the town of Beaucaire 
in relation to its fortifications the crusader garrison became completely cut off once the 
Young Count’s troops had taken the outlying redorte. As can be seen in Figure 6, with 
the town to the South, the redorte to the north and the river to the east, patrolling on 
which was a fleet of barges,68 the garrison was completely cut off from a relieving force. 
The road was also closely guarded to the west. The garrison in the castle, however, held 
out for more than 4 months. It was not until the first week of June 1216 that Simon de 
Montfort reached Beaucaire with a force of men. By this time the besiegers were well 
established behind their lines on the hill beneath the castle and the aforementioned wall 
had been built stretching from the town wall to the redorte. 69 The garrison could make 
no sorties into the town and the crusading force was unable to get close enough to 
relieve them.
The siege of Toulouse provides us with another example of how siege warfare 
could be carried out against a large fortification. After Count Raymond had entered the 
city, his supporters proceeded to launch an assault on the crusaders defending the 
Chateau Narbonnais. The people of Toulouse under the wall of the Château had erected 
barricades and other defences including a wall, which the Chanson describes as having a 
covered passageway to protect against the arrows and crossbow bolts of crusaders who 
were stationed on the walls of the Château. 20 It is also described as having walkways 
and wooden hourds. These defences were manned with men armed with baskets of 
stones, and other missiles as well and lances and hunting spears. The building of these 
defences is described as being a communal effort in which the highest to the lowest of
66 Historia, 95.
62 Chanson, v. 156, 36-38.
68 Chanson, v. 155, 26.
69 Chanson, v. 158, 6ff. This is described as having a platform (wall-walk?) and stone foundations and 
was constructed by a workforce consisting of both kn i^ ts and women from the town.
2® Chanson, v. 183, 6 Iff, these fortifications prevented all travel along the main south-north roads into 
the city, see also Historia, 600 and Chronicle, XXIX for description of the these walls.
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the social scale took part.21 The Toulousains prepared for an attack from outside the city 
by barricading the streets at all the entrances to the city. Guy de Montfort was repelled 
by the defenders of these barricades with heavy losses when he tried to attack at the 
Porte de Montoulieu^  ^ When Simon de Montfort arrived in the city in late September 
1217, a continuous line of trenches extended from the Garonne to the cathedral and 
reinforcements for Raymond were coming from Spain as well the surrounding 
countryside.23 It was the people of the city themselves, however, that provided the 
backbone of the defence. Those who were not fighting were ordered to keep watch or 
dig trenches. During the winter of 1217/18 the crusaders did not succeed once in 
penetrating the lines of defence established by the Toulousains.
The use of amphibious assault and defence occurred on more than one occasion 
during the crusade. At Beaucaire Raymond's troops were kept well supplied by the river 
traffic from T a r a s c o n . 2 4  Simon de Montfort on the other hand, had to rely on receiving 
supplies from the towns of St Gilles and Nimes, and what is more, the flotilla of boats at 
Raymond's disposal were also preventing the relieving army from gaining access to 
drinking water. 25 At Toulouse, the Pont Neuf to the south west of the city became the 
centre of activity during the siege of 1216/17 as described above.
Destruction of siege engines appears to have been a paramount objective of 
besieged defenders and many sorties and raids were undertaken with this aim. At 
Minerve on the night of 18 July the garrison made a sortie in an attempt to destroy the 
crusaders’ siege engines. The machines were set on fire and the flames were fuelled 
with dry wood, animal fat, bales of straw and f l a x .26 The crusaders, however, were 
woken by the noise and the fire was put out. The Chanson records that Pierre Roger of 
Cabaret made a daring attack on the crusaders’ machines which had been left outside 
the walls of Carcassonne with an escort of less than 100 men22. The force from Cabaret 
which mounted a night-time assault on the machines and their guardians was reckoned to
2  ^For examples see Chanson, v. 172,71 & v. 183,65-70.
22 Chanson, v. 184.
23 Chanson, v. 185,65ff.
24 Chanson, v. 162, 67jff, the poet tells us that Raymond's troops had all the supplies they could wish for 
whilst the castle garrison were running out of both food and drink rapidly (no doubt because of 
Raymond's unexpected arrival at Beaucaire). Also see Chronicle 50CVI, where it is said they were 
even reduced to eating their horses.
25 Chanson, v. 162, 79.
26 Historia,\5Z.
22 Chanson, v. 54, 4.
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have numbered 300.28 raids and sorties follow a familiar pattern common in 
warfare in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries and occurred frequently during the 
Albigensian Crusade.
The ‘scorched earth’ policy employed by southerners against the crusaders in the 
countryside surrounding Carcassonne is again a familiar feature of warfare of this period. 
The gathering in of food-stuffs and destruction of potential supplies for those besieging 
the city as well as the floating water-mills on the river is described in the Chanson.
This policy does not appear to have been very successful in this instance, however, as 
the Chanson records that the crusaders traded salt for bread at very favourable prices.29
Water and food supply was a deciding factor in the outcome of many of the 
sieges. The Chanson emphasises the suffering of the people inside Carcassonne during 
the siege of 1212.80 It had been an unusually dry summer with unbearable heat. This, 
coupled with the overcrowding within the city caused rapid spread of disease in cramped 
and unhygienic conditions. On August 14th the garrison of the city, exhausted by lack of 
food and water and weakened by disease, agreed to the terms of the crusaders. At 
Minerve it became immediately apparent that it would be very difficult to take the town 
by storm due to its excellent natural defences. The one weakness that Minerve had was 
its lack of a good water supply within the fortifications. The fortress was built on rock 
and the only water supply in the vicinity came from a well, situated at the edge of a 
ravine 250 yards above the river. This was however only 60 yards away from the 
besiegers who were stationed on the other side (Figure 12 ). The approach to the well 
was protected by a covered passageway. If the storage tanks in the castle were empty 
and this covered passageway was destroyed then the castle garrison would have no way 
of reaching a water supply. It were therefore opposite the covered passageway that the 
crusaders sited some their siege engines.
At Termes, although Simon de Montfort was unaware of the fact, by the fourth 
month of the siege the garrison by were desperately short of water. In October 
Raymond of Termes offered to surrender the castle and his lands for the duration of the 
winter. 82 This was probably an attractive offer to de Montfort, most of his forces being
28 Chanson, v. 54, 10.
29 Chanson, v. 30, 20. 
8® Chanson, v. 30, 9ff.
8^  Historia, 181.
82 Peter of les Vaux de Cemay says that Raymond of Termes was determined to negotiate with de
I l l
anxious to leave before winter set in, he could expect few new recruits until the spring of 
the next year. Simon accepted Raymond's terms and the majority of his force prepared 
to depart the next day. *3 However that night, after a long period of drought, heavy 
rainfall filled the cisterns within the castle leading the garrison to refuse to surrender as 
agreed. De Montfort could now do little as the bulk of his force had now departed in 
order to return to the North. The bishop of Chartres attempted to negotiate*  ^with the 
garrison but to no avail and when they emerged from the castle it was only with the 
intention of taking the opportunity to destroy the crusaders siege engines. *5 In 
November, however, dysentery began to effect the men of the garrison due, no doubt, 
to the increasingly unsanitary conditions they had been forced to live under. It can be 
seen therefore that strength of fortifications and efficiency of attack were not the only 
factors effecting the outcome of a siege.
One particular feature of the warfare carried out during the Albigensian Crusade 
that is often commented on is the appalling cruelty suffered by the inhabitants of some 
of the fortifications taken by the crusaders, heretics and orthodox alike. The massacre 
of the inhabitants of Beziers carried out by the crusaders is otfen cited as an example of 
the indiscriminate punishment meted out to those who refused to surrender heretics to 
the c r u s a d e r s . 8 2  At Minerve, William of Minerve sought to surrender to the crusaders 
and although the garrison were allowed to leave u n h a r m e d * *  a large number of Cathar 
perfects were burned on huge pyres outside the t o w n .  *9 This was the first example of a 
practice that was to become a regular feature of the war in the south as it progressed. 
Heretics and those who abetted them were in many ways seen as operating outside the 
boundaries of Christian society and treated accordingly.
Montfort until the night of the downpour which made him more confident that the garrison could hold 
out. It was originally agreed that the castle would be returned to Raymond on 3rd April the following 
spring. See Historia, 181.
83 Historia, 181, the author notes that de Montfort and his wife both pleaded with the departing 
crusaders to stay for a few more days, perh^s suspecting duplicity on the part of Raymond; the bishop 
of Chartres eventually relented and agreed to stay.
84 Historia, 185.
85 Historia, 186.
86 Chanson, v. 56, 45. The Historia however does not mention this and says it was the panic caused by 
the crusaders proceeding to undermine the walls o f the castle which caused the flight of the garrison. 
See Historia, 189.
82 Chanson, v. 21-22 & Historia, 91.
88 Historia, 153, the author writes that he was present during the negotiations between de Montfort and 
William.
89 Chanson, v. 49, 11.
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It can be clearly seen that different circumstances merited different reactions from 
the victors of a siege. When the castle garrison at Termes made an attempt to escape, 
some of them succeeded in getting away whilst others were discovered and captured or 
killed and the castle taken. Raymond of Termes himself was captured and died a few 
months later in captivity, as Raymond Roger Trencavel had done after the capture of 
Carcassonne. Their treatment was no doubt due in some part to the breaking of their 
agreement with the crusaders to surrender the castle. Such harsh measures were in no 
way unusual in such circumstances and many examples of similar treatment can be found 
ranging widely in their date and geographical location. The siege of Château Gaillard 
provides an example of comparable behaviour on the part of Philip Augustus who left 
the civilian population of the town of Les Andelys to starve during a harsh winter on the 
slopes beneath the castle after they had been sent out of the castle by its garrison but had 
been prevented from passing through the barricades set up by the king’s troops.^ ®
On the question of the treatment of the defeated, it can be observed that 
although there are many examples of the crusaders carrying out acts of appalling cruelty 
on other occasions self-interest led them to restraint. It is possible that Carcassonne was 
treated relatively mildly compared to Beziers for this reason.^! It was necessary that they 
should be able to provision and house themselves at Carcassonne so the city and the 
countryside around it needed to be preserved as well as possible. This was also very 
much in the interest of those who hoped to profit from confiscation of lands in the South. 
At Moissac when the townspeople surrendered they paid 100 gold marks each to stop 
the crusaders pillaging their property.92 The Southerners were sometimes guilty of acts 
of comparable cruelty against the crusaders, yet at Beaucaire on 24 August 1216 Simon 
de Montfort accepted terms of surrender and the crusader garrison was allowed to leave 
the castle unharmed.^^
It is clear, judging from the available evidence, that the crusaders although able 
to command the services of skilled engineers and craftsmen very often suffered from a 
lack of manpower. Although fortifications were eventually taken, factors other that the
9® Gesta, 126.
91 Evans, ‘The Albigensian Crusade’, p. 289.
92 Chanson, v. 124, 5.
93 Chanson, v. 170, 46fif. Also see Chronicle, XXVI, Guillaume de Puylaurens records that the 
surrender of the garrison and lifting of the siege at Beaucaire rallied many to the cause of Raymond and 
led to many southerners refusing to acknowledge the legitimate lordship of Simon de Montfort.
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attacking strength of the crusading army were at play. In many cases blockade was the 
only option open to the crusading army and this could only carried out effectively when 
suitable manpower was available. Such a situation was by no means unusual or unique to 
the Albigensian Crusade as can be seen in the case of Château Gaillard. Philip Augustus, 
however, had far greater resources at his disposal and eventually was able to take 
Gaillard by storm owing to the effective use of mining and siege artillery. In common 
with much of the warfare of this period the Albigensian Crusade was dominated by 
sieges although what makes the conflict important to the military historian is the sheer 
volume of written evidence available. Warfare in the field, however, should not be 
ignored and it is to this aspect of the conflict that this study will now turn.
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Chapter 5
5.0 The study of field warfare and battles as an approach to military history
The question of the role of the army in the field and the importance of pitched battles is 
one that has, no doubt, been over emphasised by many military historians in the past. It 
is, however, an area which should not be ignored in the context of the present study for a 
number of reasons. Many battles in the middle ages were fought as the direct result of 
sieges, these encounters often being between a besieging army and a relieving force. 
Encounters in the field were therefore inextricably linked to siege warfare and this is the 
case with many of the armed encounters known to have taken place during the 
Albigensian Crusade. Nevertheless, the rarity of such encounters must be emphasised. The 
avoidance of battle appears to have been a common aim in the warfare of the middle 
ages, a full scale encounter bringing huge risks and uncertain benefits. Gillingham has 
observed, that ‘victory in battle normally offered rewards sufficient to offset the risks 
involved only in those societies where the science of fortification was relatively poorly 
developed. ’ ‘ Smail, in the same vein, emphasises that the outcome of battle was always 
uncertain and although success in battle nearly always gained the object of war more 
quickly and certainly, ‘ a commander who aims at victory in battle always risks defeat and 
its consequences’.^
The decision to engage in battle was, therefore, often one of last resort, but, 
battle was important as a means to ‘gain an end of war’. Encounters during the 
Albigensian Crusade can be used to illustrate how the decision to engage in battle was 
very often bom of a desperate attempt to bring matters to a head.  ^On the subject of battle 
as a means to an end of war, Duby has observed in relation to Bouvines that The battle 
is not war, I would even go as far to say that it is the reverse, the battle is a procedure of 
peace .... battles do matter however, they are decisive events’. Duby’s observations, 
however, may not be relevant to all battle situations as many battles did not have decisive
’ Gillingham, ‘Richard I and the Science o f War in the Middle Ages’, p. 90.
 ^R. C. Smail, Crusading Warfare, (2nd edition with a bibliographical introduction by C. Marshall, 
Cambridge, 1995), p. 12.
3 Verbruggen, The Art o f  Warfare, pp. 280-283.
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outcomes or long lasting effects. During the Albigensian Crusade full scale encounters in 
the field did sometimes prove decisive; at Muret, for example the crusaders’ victory put 
paid to the threat of Aragonese intervention. In other cases the crusaders’ success in 
battle gave them little more than short periods of respite. The importance of field armies 
in this period, however, goes beyond their role in pitched battles. An army in the field 
carried out important activities such as the destruction of the enemy’s property and 
potential sources of supply as well as the gathering of supplies for one’s own army. A 
mobile force capable of carrying out these functions was therefore very important to the 
successful defence of fortified strongholds, as has been observed by Smail amongst 
others.'^
Verbruggen has made a number of valid points on the insufficiencies of 
concentrating on pitched battles as a means of studying the history of war. Although he 
acknowledges that a great deal can be learnt from the study of battles in terms of the 
strengths and weaknesses of a knightly army, he also points to the pitfalls of such an 
approach. First there is the question of taking specific unique incidents in a battle and 
drawing general conclusions from them. Another problem is the concept of battle tactics. 
It is often questionable whether a leader could impose any sort of planned scheme on his 
manoeuvres once a body of men was committed. It is therefore very unlikely that the 
outcome of the battle could be influenced except by the bringing up of reserves. Smail is 
also of this opinion, observing that a commander may make a plan but once an attack was 
launched he had little or no control over them, ‘the result of the battle must be left up to 
morale, individual prowess and good fortune’.^
The uncritical use of sources has often presented a problem in the study of military 
history, particularly in the study of battles. More recent studies have criticised earlier 
military historians for their superficial and uncritical use of source material, seeing the 
need to use these texts with care and critical judgement.^ In the past some authors have 
taken sources quite literally when they depict battles as merely a series of single combats. 
Such assumptions have more recently been challenged. It has been pointed out that 
individuals depicted in a battle presumably led a force of men with them so that individual
 ^Smail, Crusading Warfare, p. 25.
 ^Ibid, p. 12-13.
® See Veitruggen, The A rt o f  Warfare, p. 1-5.
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encounters should more properly be seen as encounters between groups of men under the 
leadership of the individual described/
The question of the use of monastic chronicles and other sources written by 
churchmen has been addressed earlier in this dissertation and should again be emphasised 
in the context of war in the field. Churchmen describing these events were often ignorant 
of military matters and if not eye witness to events could misunderstand the purpose of a 
certain manoeuvre, even imposing their own interpretations of an army’s behaviour or 
movements during battle.
The emphasis placed on the pitched battle and the use of heavy cavalry by many 
military historians is also a reflection on the written sources they used. Monastic 
chronicles and poetic sources are keen to depict the feats of arms performed on the 
battlefield. Churchmen often attribute the victory of one side over another to the 
judgement of God, whilst secular poets are keen to flatter the knightly classes with 
descriptions of their martial prowess in a situation where the knight was dominant, 
perhaps with the result that the role of infantry is rarely stated. Battles involving heavy 
cavalry were exciting and newsworthy and so tend to be recorded by the sources.* Poetic 
works very often concentrate on single combat in order to celebrate an individual’s 
courage and martial prowess. These are therefore sometimes limited in their usefulness in 
trying to gain an overall impression of an encounter.
Some authors such as Delbruck have dismissed completely the usefulness of 
medieval written sources for the study of military history particularly when they are 
uncorroborated. He states that ‘most medieval writers.... had no sense of recounting what 
really happened or what seemed credible to them.... it would perhaps be not worth their
trouble to portray the real events the spirit of the period is whimsical and uncritical’.®
In many cases it is true that several different sources are needed to build up a complete 
picture of a military encounter. The dismissal of all uncorroborated medieval sources in 
such a manner however appears to be rather extreme. The question of the Latin language 
as a medium for describing military events also has some bearing on the usefulness of 
clerical sources and has been dealt with elsewhere in this study. Vernacular works such
’ Verbruggen, The Art o f  Warfare, p. 16.
 ^See Gillingham ‘Richard I and the Science of War in the Middle Ages’, p.89. 
 ^Delbruck, A History o f  the A rt o f  War, p. 285.
’9 See above p. 20.
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as the Chanson or the L 'histoire de Guillaume le Maréchal, however do not suffer from 
the faults that Verbruggen and Delbruck have pointed out with Latin sources.
Older works on military history have been keen to emphasise the lack of 
discipline present within the ranks of knighthood and therefore the limited amount of 
control that would be possible over cavalry manoeuvres on the battlefield, leading to the 
conclusion that little can be learnt regarding military tactics from these 
encounters. More recently it has been argued that discipline could be a decisive factor 
in victory in a battle and this includes the discipline needed to draw up a line of cavalry 
and keep them together. Several authors have referred to the ‘feigned flight’ mentioned in 
contemporary sources describing the battle of Hastings. Some historians have dismissed 
the idea that a force of Norman knights would have the discipline and expertise to 
perform such manoeuvres. Other authors such Bachrach and Brown, however, see a 
cavalry force such as this being perfectly capable of acting as a coherent unit in order to 
perform such an action. Verbruggen points out that both Muret and Bouvines were 
won because the victorious force was more disciplined in its charge. He argues that at 
Bouvines in particular, the troops of the Emperor Otto advanced too quickly and 
unevenly and were therefore more vulnerable to attack and also less able to carry out a 
disciplined charge.
The role of the early tournament in training and in particular as a means of 
practising the shock tactics of the cavalry charge has recently been used to counter 
arguments regarding the undisciplined nature of the heavy cavalry charge. The early 
form of tournament, which featured a general mêlée, developed in northern France but 
seems never to have became popular in the South. The rise of the tournament in the 
North was related to a specific set of political and cultural circumstances, that is the 
banning of private warfare and a relatively peaceful and stable domestic situation which 
prevailed in both Northern France and England in the mid to late twelfth century. This 
served as a vehicle for the dissemination of chivalric ideas, a source of profit and a means
” Delbruck, A History o f  the Art o f  War, p. 288.
See R. A. Brown, ‘The Battle of Hastings’, Proceedings o f  the Battle Conference 1980, ed. R. A. 
Brown (Woodbridge, 1981) and B.S. Bachrach, The Feigned Retreat at Hastings’, Medieval Studies, 33, 
1971,pp. 343 -347.
’3 Verbruggen, The Art o f  Warfare, p. 98.
See M. Parisse, ‘Le tournoi en France, des origines à fin du XIII* siècle’, Das Ritterliche Tumier im 
Mittelalter, ed J. Fleckenstein (Gôttingen, 1985) and J. R. V. Barker, The Tournament in England 1000- 
1400 (Woodbridge, 1986)
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whereby knights could train together in the techniques employed in the heavy cavalry 
charge. Such a situation did not exist in southern France. The absence of the 
tournament in the South should not be taken as evidence that there was not ample 
opportunity for southern knights to practice and perfect the cavalry charge as private 
warfare was endemic in the area at this time.
Another assumption made by older works of military history covering the 
thirteenth century is the low value placed on foot soldiers, and that effective 
co-operation between foot soldiers, light cavalry and heavy cavalry could not have been 
achieved to any great extent. More recently it has been emphasised that foot soldiers 
had an increasingly important role to play on the battle field, particularly as mercenary 
soldiers. Devries has pointed out that in many battles of the twelfl:h and thirteenth 
centuries the victorious side often had the support of infantry and archers as, for 
example at Antioch, Arsuf and Bouvines. In the fourteenth century, victories at Courtrai 
and Arques would prove the importance of infantry on the battlefield.^  ^ In a study of 
battles involving Norman forces in the eleventh and twelfth centuries Bradbury points out 
that knights almost invariably dismounted before battle, demonstrating that knights could 
be used to reinforce infantry when it was required.^* Contamine points out, however, 
that the French appear not to have used such a tactic in this period.^ ®
All of these factors need to be taken into consideration when dealing with the 
subject of warfare in the field during the Albigensian Crusade. By observing the way field 
armies were used it may be possible to draw comparisons between the crusaders and their 
southern adversaries and so gain a deeper understanding of the way field armies were 
used during the thirteenth century.
’ ® See Delbruck, A History o f  the Art o f  War, p. 268 and Oman, A rt o f  War, I, p. 270. 
Verbruggen, The Art o f  Warfare, pp. 111-202.
1 8
K. Devries, Infantry Warfare in the Early Fourteenth Century, ( Woodbridge, 1996), pp. 2-3.
J. Bradbury, ‘Battles in England and Normandy, 1066 -1154’, Anglo Norman Studies, vi, (1983),
pp. 1-12.
Contamine, War in the Middle Ages, p. 231.
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5.1 Muret and war in the field during the Albigensian Crusade.
The reason for the defeat of the southern French during the Albigensian Crusade has often 
been depicted as a consequence of poor leadership and more particularly the disunity of 
the Southern troops, stemming from a disintegrating and decadent society. Typical of 
such opinion is Lot’s assertion that the crusaders’ victory at Muret was a ‘great feat of 
arms by no means a miracle’ considering that Peter of Aragon’s army were ‘less 
homogeneous, and badly commanded’. Belperron typically depicts the crusading army as
‘ the best type of knight in Capetian France animated by faith, formed into a solid
body, coherent, intrepid and under an energetic leader’.^ ® It may very well be the case that 
some contingents which took part in the crusade trained together, perhaps meeting at 
tournaments and may even have campaigned together previously on crusade. Belperron, 
however, does not take into account the many different origins of the crusaders as 
described, for example, in the Chanson?^ If this is the case then the crusaders were surely 
no more homogeneous in their origins than the southerners.
The crusaders success during the early years of the crusade has also been 
attributed to the qualities that Simon de Montfort possessed as leader. His early career 
certainly shows him acquitting himself well at Barletta during the Fourth Crusade and 
written sources depict him as distinguishing himself at the siege of Carcassonne with his 
initiative and courage.^  ^Peter of les Vaux de Cemay, well known for eulogising de 
Montfort in his writings calls him ‘wise in council, fair in judgement, wise in decisions, 
affable and having humility’.T h e  Chanson paints a very different picture and although 
he is depicted as never listening to discouragement he is also very often not keen to take 
advice. Modem historians have depicted Simon de Montfort as being energetic, 
audacious and a decisive leader and he has often been attributed with having the gift of 
knowing when to attack at the most opportunistic moment.^ "^
The rarity of encounters in the field during the Albigensian Crusade between the 
crusaders and their southem enemies shows that the crusade was in many ways typical of 
the warfare of this period. The written sources show many of the common activities
^  Belperron, La croisade contre les Albigeois, p. 450.
" See above p. 28.
^  See Historia, 96
For a foil description of Simon’s qualities according to Peter see Historia, 103 - 105. 
4^ See Y. Dossat, ‘Simon de Montfort’,pp.281-284 and pp. 286-288.
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known to have been undertaken by an invading army in the field, as well as counter­
measures often taken by defenders to deprive the enemy of both food and shelter. The 
inhabitants of Carcassonne tried their best to deprive the besieging crusaders of 
sustenance before the city was besieged in 1209, whilst the inhabitants of Casseneuil are 
described as burning down their own fortifications before fleeing from the crusaders.^  ^
Peter of les Vaux de Cemay frequently describes Simon de Montfort destroying vines 
and crops.^  ^ Raymond of Toulouse’s mercenaries are shown ravaging and plundering the 
country around Castelsarrasin^  ^whilst Peter of Aragon’s reason for intervening in 1213 
against the cmsade is said in the Chanson to have been ‘because it was wasting and 
destroying the whole country.’^ * Surprise raids and sallies are described in the Chanson 
on many occasions. Pierre Roger of Cabaret launched a daring night raid with the aim of 
destroying the cmsaders’ siege engines outside the walls of Carcassonne, following this 
up with an ambush on a group of German cmsaders near Montgey. A force fi'om 
Montauban sallied out to attack a force of cmsaders on the road to Cahors.^ ® At the siege 
of Toulouse in 1217/18 frequent skirmishes between the cmsaders and the southem allies 
took a heavy toll on both sides. All these encounters show the way in which a mobile 
force of cavalry in the field could be used to intimidate and threaten an enemy, destroy 
his property and deprive him of means of sustenance.
Only on two or three occasions is there evidence of what could be described as a 
full scale pitched battle. William of Tudela depicts such an encounter at Montaudran near 
Toulouse as a ‘full battle’ with more than ‘ 180 dead on the two sides’. O n  this occasion 
Raymond of Toulouse’s son Bertrand is reported as ransoming himself for ‘ 1000 shillings’ 
as well as his armour and his horse showing that, in common with much warfare during 
the thirteenth century, the capture of an important prisoner could lead to large profits.^^
On two occasions during the cmsade, it appears to have been a deliberate policy 
of the cmsaders to force battle. In 1211, when Raymond of Toulouse launched a counter 
offensive against Simon de Montfort, the leader of the cmsade is reported in the Chanson
Chanson, v. 14. On the whole, however, the crusaders were able to take over many intact 
fortifications when their inhabitants put up no resistance or fled.
^  See Historia, 144, 147, 245, 327, 423 & 434 for examples.
^ Chanson, v. 127,13-15.
Chanson, v. 131, 11-12.
Chanson v. 122, 7.
9^ Chanson, v. 78, 5.
Chanson, v. 78, 9.
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as seeking advice from his companions regarding what course of action he should take in 
response. Hugh de Lacy’s advice was for him to put his troops in his weakest fortress 
and bring up reinforcements in order to seek batt le .Thus de Montfort’s enemies 
hemmed him in at Castelnaudry and intercepted his supply column. Verbruggen sees this 
as one of the occasions when De Montfort attempted to bring matters to a head by 
seeking battle and believes that de Montfort’s rush to help his men and meet the enemy 
put the fate of the whole crusade in jeopardy, everything depending on the outcome of 
this battle as it did at Muret two years la te r . I t  certainly true that these two engagements 
took place when the crusaders’ fortunes were at a low ebb. Verbruggen concludes that 
‘ Simon’s energetic way of leading the successful crusade was entirely consistent with his 
belief in battle as the best means of conquest’. T h e  question remains, however, whether 
we can regard de Montfort’s decision to seek battle as the mark of an energetic and 
brilliant strategist or the response of a desperate man to a potentially disastrous 
situation. What is certain is that such encounters allowed him to exploit the use of his 
heavy cavalry to its fiillest extent. The crusade, as described in the main written sources, 
was essentially a war of sieges. Warfare in the field, however, allowed Simon de 
Montfort to bring to bear his cavalry, which were recruited to serve 40 days and provided 
many of his reinforcements by this method of recruitment. His cavalry needed to be 
mobile to be of much use to him.^ ^
As a prelude to the encounter at Castelnaudary, the supply train of the crusaders 
which was on its way to that town under the escort of Bouchard de Marly was attacked 
by the Count of Foix and his men. This led to one of the few full scale encounters besides 
Muret during the crusade, the Battle of St. Martin Lalande/Castelnaudary.^^ The 
Chanson tells of the two forces charging towards each other over the plain, lances 
lowered. The southerners’ force, divided into three, comprised heavy cavalry in the 
centre with light cavalry consisting of squires and sergeants on one wing with infantry 
consisting of crossbowmen and Spanish mercenaries on the other.
Chanson v. 91, 8-10.
”  Verbruggen, The Art of Warfare, p. 281-82 
4^ Ibid. p. 282.
Roquebert, L ’Épopée cathare, p. 439.
See Chanson, v. 93-102.
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The French force consisted of 100 knights under Bouchard de Marly, 20 mercenaries 
under Martin Algai and a force of 40 knights sent as relief by Simon de Montfort. On the 
Occitan side the Chanson talks o f400 men. Martin Algai is seen fleeing from this 
encounter, later making the excuse that he was pursuing the mercenaries in the southern 
army, whilst other southern forces quit the battle field once the supplies from the 
crusaders’ wagons had been taken. William of Tudela quotes a friend, a ‘Master 
Nicolas’, as being an eyewitness to this encounter. When Simon de Montfort rides out of 
Castelnaudary to aid the supply train William depicts his desperate plight by saying ‘he 
was aware that defeat would lose him both land and castle, he would be blockaded and 
never leave except in defeat’ .P e t e r  of les Vaux de Cemay remarks that the French 
recovered their strength whilst the southerners appeared to collapse with the arrival of 
these reinforcements.^^ Roquebert believes this is because the majority of the southern 
force was composed of mercenaries who were of more value as a force for ravaging or 
ambush, but were impossible to discipline in a battle situation.'"  ^ Simon de Montfort left 
his infantry behind in the castle to defend it and rode out. His quick response appears to 
have caused panic in the ranks of the southern army who were camped nearby at Pech. 
The Chanson describes this force as being 200,000 strong and outnumbering the 
crusaders 10 :1 A force led by Savary de Maulon rode out of the southerners’ camp 
but returned when they had learnt of the defeat of the Count of Foix.
On the question of why Count Raymond did nothing to aid the count of Foix, 
Roquebert sees this as being due to the faults of individuals but also as being inherent in 
the nature of the southern coalition. De Montfort’s force may have been, small but he 
was a sole commander facing a badly co-ordinated enemy. Roquebert sees the citizen 
militia of Toulouse as psychologically incapable of an attack against a force of heavy 
cavalry whilst Raymond was incapable of leading them. Defending their city was one 
thing, facing a group of heavily armed knights in the field was another.'*  ^Belperron talks 
of the ‘inexplicable inertia’ of Count Raymond in a situation where it is certain that he had 
a great numerical superiority. He sees the conflict at Castlenaudary as reflecting perfectly 
the character of both Simon de Montfort and Count Raymond, Simon decisive and
38 Chanson, v. 1 0 0 ,6 -7 .
Historia, 274.
Roquebert, L 'Épopée cathare, p. 445. 
Chanson, v. 88, 8.
Roquebert, L 'Épopée cathare, p. 446.
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vigorous, Raymond hesitant and lacking in courage. Overall, however, Belperron sees the 
victory purely in terms of the complete superiority of the French over the southerners who 
were too used to hiring mercenaries to fight in their place and therefore liable to panic at 
the first reversal. Peter of les Vaux de Cemay frequently comments on the reluctance 
of the southern forces to engage the crusaders. This could be interpreted as a symptom 
of the southerners’ awareness of the general superiority of the northerners in the field, 
although this is by no means certain."^
The immediate effect of the southerners’ defeat at Castelnaudary was their 
general retreat. The encounter at Castelnaudary provides a number of details worthy of 
note. Firstly the attack on the baggage train indicates the importance the southerners 
placed on the need to deprive the crusaders of supplies, secondly there is the combination 
of troops used by the southerners and the behaviour of the mercenaries once their primary 
objective had been achieved. Thirdly there is the seeming inability of Raymond of 
Toulouse to follow up the attack once it was learnt that the crusaders had ridden out of 
the town to aid the baggage train. Such a collapse of the southern army was once again to 
be witnessed at Muret in 1213 under different circumstances.
In September 1213 Peter of Aragon crossed the Pyrenees and entered southern 
France after his bitter protests to the pope regarding the unjustness of the crusade had 
gone unheeded."*^  At this time Simon de Montfort was under increasing pressure from the 
southerners and had decided to withdraw all his troops west of the Garonne. The 
Aragonese combined forces with the counts of Comminges and Foix as well as a large 
group of militia from Toulouse and converged a few miles south of the city. Several 
authors have emphasised that such foot soldiers do not appear to have been very highly 
regarded.'^ They did, however, bring provisions and siege engines with them in barges 
fi'om Toulouse. Thus the scene was set for the encounter at Muret between this coalition 
of southern French and Aragonese troops and a greatly diminished crusading army.
Muret has been dealt with in a number of general works covering the history of warfare 
during the middle ages, as well as in several more specialised studies.'*  ^It would therefore
Belperron, La croisade contre le Albigeois, p. 234.
Historia, 140, 257, 259-2, 279.
H istoria , 415.
See Sumption, The Albigensian Crusade, p. 164.
See M. Deiulafoy, ‘La bataille de Muret’, Institute de France, Mémoires de l Académie de Inscriptions 
et Belles-Lettres, XXXVI, part, (1901), A. Molinier, ‘La battle de Muret d’apres les chroniques 
contemporaines’. Histoire generate de Languedoc, vol. VII, note XLVIII, p. 254-259 and
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seem opportune to deal with the battle in this present study and ascertain whether the 
battle merits such attention within the general context of the study of the medieval army 
in the field. Many, including Belperron and Delbruck, have dismissed the importance of 
the battle."** Considering the scope and aims of the present study, however, Muret offers 
a rare example of an encounter between the Crusaders and a southern army in the field 
and should therefore not be ignored.
Roquebert has observed that one of the major reasons why Muret has attracted 
such attention and has been the subject of such speculation revolves around the fact that 
the written sources describing the battle are particularly vague and open to various 
interpretations."*  ^Of the three major sources for the battle, none of the authors were 
eyewitnesses to the event. William of Puylaurens wrote his chronicle 60 years after and 
relies on the eyewitness testimonies of Toulousain soldiers present and the memories of 
Raymond VII of Toulouse, a young man of 17 at the time. The Chanson's description of 
the battle contains the least detail of all and is based on descriptions of isolated incidents. 
One possible explanation for this is the anonymous author’s desire to gloss over a 
spectacular defeat for the army of the southern coalition.
Peter of les Vaux de Cemay had returned to northern France after the Council of 
Lavaur and did not return to the Languedoc until May 1214. Although his account gives 
more detail than the other sources, it is incomplete and appears to rely mainly on accounts 
given by churchmen. The narrative certainly concentrates quite heavily on the activities of 
the clergy accompanying the army on and around 13 September. As a churchman Peter 
was less concerned with the details of the battle and his views are particularly partisan. 
None of the sources provide an overall view of the action and none of the accounts 
provide a clear idea of the topography of the battlefield or the position of the troops upon 
it. Gaps in our knowledge regarding the sequence of events during the battle and the 
position of the various contingents on the field have led to many studies speculating on 
these matters, and imposing their own interpretations on vague and potentially misleading 
references in the written sources. Different interpretations have been put forward 
regarding fundamental points such as the position of the allied camp and the point of
H. Delpech, La bataille de Muret et la tactique de la cavalerie a u X llf  (Paris, 1878)
See Belperron, Le croisade contre le Albigeois, p. 281., Delbruck, A History o f  the A rt o f  War, II, 
p. 414.
Roquebert, L ’Épopée cathare, II, p. 196.
125
egress of the crusading army from the town. (Figures 15 & 16).^ ® A selection of different 
authors’ opinions on the events and outcome of the battle should be sufficient to illustrate 
the difficulties presented to the historian by the secondary literature on Muret.
Oman has called the victory of the crusaders at Muret ‘the most remarkable 
triumph ever of a force entirely consisting of cavalry over an enemy using both horse and 
foot.’ He sees the outcome of the battle as going against ‘general military teaching and 
experience’ and explains the defeat of the coalition of Aragonese and southern French 
troops in terms of the exceptional ability of Simon de Montfort as a battlefield leader, the 
surprise of the southerners before they were in proper battle array and failure on the part 
of the southerners to combine the horse and foot elements of their army effectively. He 
characterises Muret not as a pitched battle but a sudden rout which would never have 
been fought but for the quick eye of Simon de Montfort in moving at an opportunistic 
moment. He also sees weakness in the army of Peter of Aragon as being due to a lack of 
enthusiasm for the campaign on the part of his Catalonian subjects. One fundamental 
problem with Oman’s interpretation is that the infantry of the southern army had very 
little role to play in the battle and so can hardly be considered part of a combination of 
horse and foot on the battlefield. Another flaw in Oman’s study of the battle concerns his 
use of the written sources. He criticises other authors for getting the topography of the 
battlefield wrong and yet is prepared to base his own observations on the assumption that 
William of Puylaurens has substituted ‘west for east and right for left, by a slip of the 
pen’.^ ^
Lot sees the battle’s main distinction as being the disproportion in the number of 
troops present at the battle, the crusaders being considerably less in number than their 
opponents. Speculation on the numbers present at Muret has played a large role in the 
study of the battle. Lot estimates the number of Aragonese cavalry at Muret to have been 
2,400.^  ^The mounted contingents under the Counts of Foix, Comminges and Toulouse he 
judges to have been 900, whilst the whole force the allies could muster was 3,900. He 
considers the figure of 1000 knights attributed to Peter of Aragon to be a fantasy, this 
assertion being based on the fact that Philip Augustus could only muster a force of around
See Roquebert, L 'Épopée cathare, II, pp. 191-193 & pp. 206-208. 
Oman, Art o f  War, I, pp. 453-44.
Ibid. p. 465.
Lot, L A rt militaire, p. 214.
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the same number at Bouvines in the same year. Contemporary sources give a number of 
between 760 and 1000 cavalry on the side of the crusaders. Peter of les Vaux de Cemay 
gives a number of 800 knights and sergeants/"* William of Puylaurens quotes 1000 
cavalry/^ whilst William the Breton says 260 knights and 500 sergeants. Sumption 
makes a valid point when he observes that northern chroniclers who reported on the 
battle were no doubt keen to depict God’s work in the defeat of the southerners and 
therefore could have overestimated the numbers in the southern army. He estimates the 
Spanish cavalry to be 800 strong (with another 200 expected) whilst the contingent from 
Languedoc is estimated at 600 h o r s e . A  consensus seems to be therefore that the 
southern cavalry out numbered that of the crusaders 2:1.
Sumption observes that the infantry were prevented from playing an active role in 
the battle ‘through snobbery and military incompetence’.^ * Whether this was the case or 
not, it was certainly true that despite their numbers they played little role in the fighting. 
Lot considers Muret to have been purely a cavalry battle.The disproportion between the 
crusaders and southerners was greater with the infantry than the cavalry, all the 
chroniclers putting the number at 15- 20,000. Lot considers this number to be absurd 
considering that Toulouse and Mountauban put together had a population of only 
120,000."*®
De Montfort appears to have marched on Muret with the idea of holding the town 
and waiting for reinforcements from the North. The unexpected intervention of Peter of 
Aragon caught the crusaders off guard as much of the crusading army had already 
returned to France after a season of campaigning. The Chanson reports Peter of Aragon 
as being oveijoyed when he heard that Simon de Montfort was heading for Muret. 
According to the Chanson Peter planned to allow the crusaders to enter into the town 
and then surround it. He therefore ordered the Toulousain troops attacking Muret to 
withdraw and the town was evacuated on the evening of 11 September.^* It is possible 
that this is merely an excuse made by the partisan anonymous continuator of the Chanson
Historia, 460.
Chronicle, XX, p. 83.
William the Breton, Gesta, 177.
Sumption, The Albigensian Crusade, p. 164. 
^®Ibidp.l64.
Lot, L A rt militaire, p. 215 
Ibid, p. 216.
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and that the the Toulousain foot soldiers in fact fled from the town in panic thus allowing 
the crusaders to cross into the town with no resistance, a lack of adequate chain of 
command preventing the southerners from taking the opportunity to engage the 
crusaders.^  ^De Montfort’s decision to seek battle may have stemmed from the fact that 
there were only enough supplies in the town of Muret to last for another day, although 
this fact was unknown to the southerners.
During the night the crusaders had been reinforced by men of the viscount of 
Corbeil. The Aragonese king and the count of Toulouse had probably made camp on the 
left bank of the Garonne to the north west of the town and planned to besiege the town 
from the area where the Garonne and the smaller tributary river of the Longe met. 
According to the Chanson Raymond of Toulouse opposed Peter of Aragon’s plan to fight 
the crusaders. His plan to fortify the camp and wait for the crusaders to attack was 
dismissed as un-knightly by Peter, the poet seeming anxious to contrast the glory seeking 
Peter with the more cautious Raymond.^  ^Not only is Peter depicted as keen to go into 
battle, he also refuses to wait for reinforcements in the form of knights under the 
command of his captains Nuno Sanche and Guillaume of Montcade.®  ^ Judging him on 
these actions, Oman considers Peter of Aragon as ‘no fit leader against de Montfort’, and 
a ‘mere knight errant’.
The count of Foix led a force of men closer to the town in order to attack via the 
Toulouse gate. De Montfort is said to have divided his forces into three parts, the same 
action taken by Philip Augustus at Bouvines.^® One part of the crusader army attacked at 
the Porte au Sales, a second at the East gate of the town, the third part removed 
themselves to the Fanjeaux road, crossed the Longe and arrived within sight of the enemy. 
According to Lot, whilst the count of Foix attacked,Peter of Aragon had ranged his 
forces across the favourable ground dominating the plain. He failed, however, to give 
them adequate instructions as to how they were to proceed. Some historians have 
accepted a version of events which has the crusaders making a surprise attack whilst the 
southerners sat down to eat. The story however does not appear in any of the three main
Sumption, The Albigensian Crusade, p. 165.
Chanson, v. 139
This force is mentioned by Peter at Chanson, v. 137, 28. 
Oman, Art o f  War, p. 453.
^  See Historia,A62.
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sources/^ One group of crusaders now rode towards the banner of the King of Aragon 
where they were joined by a second force of crusaders in successfully opening a breach 
in the line of the Aragonese troops. Simon de Montfort, seeing the confusion, is said to 
have now charged with his force, Lot sees this as the decisive move which won the 
battle.^*
Peter of Aragon is said to have insisted on being in the front line of battle. This 
choice, however, was to prove costly. Sumption calls his act ‘pointless vanity’, although 
Peter had chosen favourable ground at the top of a gentle rise on which to site his army. 
Sumption describes his army ‘a confused mass of cavalry without infantry, without
orders the result was a rout, not a battle’.^ ® It lasted scarcely twenty minutes and
when the battle was over the crusaders’ small force of infantry swarmed across the plain 
to finish off the wounded and plunder the corpses of the dead. The turning point of the 
battle had been the death of Peter of Aragon which led to the collapse of his army. The 
risk in battle was great and the threat to Peter was certainly not unique in an age where 
kings led their troops into battle in person. During the battle of Bouvines, both Philip 
Augustus and the Emperor Otto had very narrow escapes when the enemy broke 
through their line.^ ® They were saved only by the quick action of their men in fighting off 
an attack. One only needs to look to the example of Hastings to realise the exceptional 
personal risk both Harold Godwinson and William of Normandy faced on that day. On 
such occasions the fate of a single man could decide the outcome of the battle and the 
death of Peter certainly appears to have had a great effect on his troops.
The southern counts now fled towards Toulouse. Not knowing of the defeat of 
the cavalry, the militia of Toulouse proceeded to attack the town, ‘without listening to 
either count or king’’* These words from the Chanson could be used to illustrate to 
undisciplined nature of the southern army. Dieulafoy judges the crusaders’ success to 
have been mainly on account of Simon de Montfort’s decisive generalship and, whether 
his move was audacious or prudent, his instinctive knowledge of when to chose the right 
moment to move. He also sees de Montfort as being unhke his contemporaries or 
successors in that he did not approach the combat in a ‘scientific manner’. The crusaders
See Roquebert, L ’ Épopée cathare, p. 196. 
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won solely because of the death of Peter of Aragon and the united charge of the crusaders 
which was violent and rapid.
The southern defeat at Muret has been open to various interpretations. The 
counts of Toulouse and Comminges appear to have been totally inactive on the battlefield 
but this is mainly due to the impression given in the sources and it is impossible to know 
their position or activities for certain. Their inactivity could be interpreted as being due 
to a lack of enthusiasm for the battle, as illustrated by Raymond’s attitude at the stormy 
council meeting of the southern coalition leaders on the morning of the battle. Peter took 
an enormous risk by commanding the first echelon of southern troops, the second echelon 
being too weak to the follow up the first.’  ^The dissent amongst the southern allies, the 
imprudence of Peter and the unevenness of the distribution of the southern troops may all 
have counteracted their numerical superiority. Belperron points to the internal divisions 
in the southern camp whilst emphasising the effective leadership of Simon de Montfort as 
supreme commander of the crusaders, concluding that discipline was the key to the 
victory.
The overall significance of the victory of the crusaders has certainly been over 
emphasised.’"* The crusaders certainly suffered some significant reversals after Muret.
As can be seen, the action at Muret on 12 September 1213 has been debated and analysed 
by many military historians. The Battle of Bouvines was fought less than a year later on 
the 27 July 1214. Given that these two battles were fought within such a relatively short 
period of time it therefore may be instructive to compare these two actions in order to 
determine whether any significant differences can be ascertained between methods 
employed between southern and northern armies in this period.’^
5.2 The battle of Bouvines
Although the only eyewitness account of the battle is that of William the Breton, 
Bouvines was better reported than the majority of medieval battles as can be seen from
Roquebert, L 'Épopée cathare, II, p. 232.
'"Ibid, p.231.
For example see Belperron, Le croisade contre les Albigeios, p. 282.
For a detailed commentary on the battle see, Verbruggen, The Art o f  Warfare, pp. 239-260.
William the Breton, Gesta, 184 - 97.
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the widespread mention it receives in contemporary chronicles.”  William gives no 
estimate of the number of French troops present and only states that the enemy were three 
times as strong as the French. Piecing together evidence from various other sources 
French forces can be estimated at around 1,200 knights, 150 light cavalry and 4 -5,000 
foot. The probable number of allied troops were 1,500 knights and 7,500 foot.’* As has 
been discussed in Chapter 2 Philip Augustus relied upon a variety methods for raising and 
maintaining troops. Bradbury has recently pointed out the troops available to Philip at 
Bouvines were only a part of what was available to him and the heart of his army would 
have consisted of troops from the lands of the royal demesne. It is likely that the hasty 
march of the emperor Otto’s troops from Mortagne probably contributed to their defeat. 
Otto positioned his troops on high ground facing west. The French were divided into 
three with a group of light cavalry from Soissons to the right with 180 knights from 
Champagne. In the centre Philip Augustus took up position with his knights, whilst the 
left wing consisted of various lords with their knights (Figure 17). The commander in 
chief of the French army was Bishop Guerin who was careful not to let the enemy 
outflank him. He ordered his knights to present a broad front by spreading out so that 
they could all fight in one line.’®
The French right wing were faced by Count Ferdinand of Portugal with a force of 
knights from Hainault and Flanders. The emperor took the centre with a force of knights 
and foot, with the knights probably in front. On the right wing of the emperor’s allies 
was the earl of Salisbury and Renaud de Dammartin. Renaud had a force of mercenaries 
on foot which are said to have been formed up into a crown so that some of the cavalry 
could withdraw into the cover of their pikes. An early attack by the light cavalry from 
Soissons was fought off by the Flemish knights. The count of Champagne and his knights 
now attacked and succeeded in putting some of the Flemish to flight as well as taking 
prisoners. The Flemings, however, made a counter-charge and broke through the French 
line. After three hours, foot soldiers from the French communes arrived and drew 
themselves up in front of the king’s knights in the centre. They were, however, not 
prepared for Otto’s attack when it came and were thrown back when Otto’s knights
" See Duby, The Legend o f  Bouvines. p. 144. 
For numbers at Bouvines see above p. 19-20.
As can be seen above one of the fimdemental mistakes made by Peter of Aragon at Muret was his 
failure to draw up such a line.
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broke through the line, followed by his foot soldiers. The French now charged the 
emperor’s knights and the Emperor was forced to withdraw. The French right wing, 
however, continued to fight, the last contingent of the allied troops to hold out being the 
pike-men in their circular formation which was only broken when surrounded by foot 
soldiers.
Verbruggen sees Bouvines as being an excellent example of knightly battle in the 
thirteenth century. It certainly illustrates many of the strengths of the heavy cavalry used 
during this period as well as the way infantry could be used in combination with cavalry, 
though on the whole the struggle between the two elements proved to be unequal on this 
occasion. The actions described during the Albigensian Crusade and at Bouvines certainly 
illustrate the dominance of heavy cavalry on the battle field on these occasions. The 
importance of the well drawn up line, the solid charge, the elements of speed, decisiveness 
and discipline can all be seen. On the whole, however, it is very difficult to make any solid 
judgements regarding the significance of these battles in terms of wider practice. It must 
be noted however that the battles of the twelfth century involving northern French armies 
showed a marked tendency to be characterised by the use of heavy cavalry in a dominant 
role. This compares with earlier trends in the eleventh and twelfth century for the use of 
dismounted knights by Anglo-Norman leaders or the growing use of successful infantry 
tactics in the thirteenth century illustrated by the victories at Bannockburn and Courtrai.
The lack of illustrative material allows very few judgements to be made regarding 
the overall superiority of northern French versus southern French troops on the 
battlefield. The available secondary literature appears to make far too many assumptions 
regarding the supposed characteristics of each army and their leaders based on evidence 
which can be biased, incomplete and misleading.
The action at Bouvines shows that cavalry and infantry were being used together with 
some degree of success in the early thirteenth century. The failure of the southerners to 
capitalise on their numerical superiority in infantry at Muret and elsewhere appears to 
have stemmed mostly from a lack of discipline and leadership, rather than any inherent 
weakness in the use of this type of troops. Infantry did have an important role to play in 
the warfare of the Albigensian Crusade as a whole and to dismiss its impact would be a 
mistake. Approaching the warfare of the Albigensian in terms of merely studying battles 
appears to illustrate the insufficiencies of this approach to military history as a whole.
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Conclusion
The warfare of the Albigensian Crusade followed a pattern closely resembling many 
other conflicts of the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries. It also had many unique 
characteristics. Ostensibly a religious war initiated at the behest of the papacy, the 
Albigensian Crusade was also an instrument of political ambition and an offensive war 
of occupation. It should, however, be considered in the wider context of the crusading 
movement in the thirteenth century and earlier, alongside, for example the campaigns in 
the Holy Land, the Baltic and those of the Spanish Reconquista, as many of the 
challenges encountered on these campaigns and the Albigensian Crusade proved to be 
similar.*
As with any military campaign, the way each side recruited and maintained its 
army is essential to understanding the nature of the warfare. Regarding this matter, and 
the question of comparison between the crusading army and their southern counterparts, 
the problems presented by the evidence available needs to be taken into account. 
Surviving evidence from French royal records, for example, points to the existence of 
what amounted to a standing army at the command of the French king in this period. 
Such evidence is useful in being able to show how a successfiil military leader might go 
about recruiting and maintaining an army and is therefore relevant to questions regarding 
the composition of the crusading army. What must be taken into consideration, 
however, is that more written documentary evidence exists regarding the recruitment of 
paid troops as opposed to the use of the feudal levy. This may, at times, distort our view 
of the kind of army the king of France was able to put in the field. In general, however 
the trend towards the use of stipendary troops is clear.
The information available to us regarding feudal military service is limited and 
can often be misleading. Many of the problems which arise in assessing its use in the 
royal French army may also hold true for the crusading army. It appears that the leaders 
of the crusading army were only able to call upon troops for the customary 40 days
’ For crusading warfare in the thirteenth century see E. Christiansen, The Northern Crusades (London, 
1997), D. Lomax, The Reconquest o f  Spain (London, 1978), J. Powell, Anatomy o f  a Crusade 1213-1221 
(Philadelphia, 1986).
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expected of those undertaking feudal service. Further service would be undertaken 
voluntarily or would need to be paid for. There is very little evidence to tell us if the 
great lords who took part in the Albigensian Crusade used similar methods of recruiting 
soldiers for their expedition to that of the king. This is particularly true of the use of 
infantry. What is clear, however, is that both in the armies of Philip Augustus and the 
crusading army, the use of mercenaries was by no means unusual. Sources relating to 
such matters, particularly those written by northern French authors of the time, very 
often obscure how essential professional soldiers were in the medieval army. Mercenary 
and stipendary troops had played increasingly important part in the king’s army for 
many years, and there is no reason to suggest that this was not the case for the majority 
of his wealthier vassals.
There are many problems involved in trying to ascertain the size of the 
crusading army and the mechanisms whereby it was recruited. The initial enthusiasm for 
the expedition began to recede, for a variety of reasons, after the first two seasons of 
very successful campaigning. Just as in the East, the Crusade very often suffered fi'om 
the essential problem of lack of manpower, which was only resolved when the king of 
France lent his support to the war in the Languedoc. The crusader kingdoms of the 
East had similar problems in that they could only make military advances with the 
backing of a crusading army with the resources of a monarch such as the king of France 
behind it. What is more, the crusaders of the Languedoc could not rely on the services 
of the Military Orders who provided a continuity and stability to the military effort in 
the east.
After the initial wave of crusading fervour the personal political ambitions of men 
such as Simon de Montfort began to come to the fore and papal support began to be 
channeled into other projects. What emerges from an examination of the evidence is the 
short term nature of service expected, the varied origins of the crusaders and the use of 
paid troops by the crusaders from a very early stage. The written sources can give a 
good impression of the variety of types of soldiers in the army of the crusaders and their 
southern counterparts, showing that although the knight dominated, many other 
combatants made essential contributions to the warfare of the Albigensian Crusade.
The type of warfare which was undertaken included lengthy sieges, for example 
at Toulouse, Minerve and Beaucaire. The need to reduce and man fortifications
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effectively did not contribute to the success of an offensive war where only limited 
numbers of troops were available. The strategy of the crusaders was, out of necessity, 
one of maintaining small isolated garrisons in the face of a hostile population, as can be 
seen most acutely at Beaucaire and Toulouse. The need for mercenary troops and men 
with specialist skills was becoming more acute for the commanders of this period. The 
warfare typical of the campaigns of the Albigensian Crusade proves this to be the case . 
This type of offensive warfare could only be carried out with any degree of success if a 
commander had the financial means to provide monetary reward to a force of men 
capable of reducing fortresses effectively. The crusaders found immense difficulty in 
reducing fortresses quickly, manning effective garrisons and maintaining political control 
because of a lack of reliable manpower. Although the increasing need for professional 
soldiers and skilled engineers emerges as a recurring theme throughout this study, what 
is also clear is the need to focus on how the conflict involved a wide variety of 
participants from all parts of the social spectrum as combatants and non-combatants.
Previous examinations of the military aspects of the Albigensian Crusade have 
often been coloured by authors seeing the defeat of the southerners as somehow 
inevitable due to the nature of the society which had developed in south western France. 
This approach precludes study of the conflict in terms of the military capabilities of the 
combatants, as it has often been assumed that the southern army was inherently weaker. 
Comparison between the army of the crusaders and their southern French adversaries is 
problematic because of the nature of the evidence available. It is clear that both the 
nature of southern French society and political authority in the south differed in many 
ways to the North. The apparent lack of feudal ties and absence of land held in return 
for military service, however, does not necessarily mean that the cohesion of the 
southern army was weaker. What must be taken into account is the political situation at 
the time of the launch of the crusade.
The authority of the house of St. Gilles had not always been so weak and it is by 
no means the case that the type of internal struggles which had affected the region did 
not take place in northern France. It is very difficult to assess how feudal loyalty or lack 
of it really affected the way southern lords were able to respond to the threat of the 
crusade. Lack of vassallic ties could indicate that monetary reward was seen as a more 
important bond in southern society than land holding and homage. Material reward.
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however, had always been a strong incentive to knights in the north, in addition to the 
compulsion to serve as part of a knight’s feudal duty.
The passion of the anonymous continuator of the Chanson appears to indicate 
that the dispossession of the southern lords provided a strong cohesive force for those 
fighting against the crusaders. The evidence regarding this matter, however, is 
ambiguous. It is clear that some southern lords fought on the side of the crusaders at 
various stages of the crusade, and that loyalties fluctuated throughout the conflict. In 
many ways the difficulties Simon de Montfort faced were the same as those of 
Raymond of Toulouse, as he sought to maintain political control over his newly acquired 
and troublesome vassals. Although evidence exists to suggest that de Montfort 
attempted to impose northern feudal practices on both northern in-comers and his 
southern vassals, the effects of such legislation are unclear. If one takes into 
consideration the activities of many of the vassals of Raymond of Toulouse prior to the 
start of the crusade, the idea of the solidarity of the southern faiditz portrayed by the 
anonymous continuator of the Chattson does not always ring true. These fiercely 
independent vassals of the Languedoc did not accept the yoke of authority easily from 
any lord.
The more frequent use of mercenaries in the south is a moot point. It may be the 
case that mercenaries were more widely used in the south, in so far as a wider spectrum 
of people could afford to employ them, perhaps as a result of the greater development of 
a monetary economy. For example, towns and cities could employ them as garrison 
soldiers, as can be seen at Moissac, while lords other than great magnates used them to 
assert their independence, for example Raymond of Termes. If they appear in southern 
literature more often than in that of the north, it may be as a result of the different 
attitudes and perspectives of southern authors. Lack of written evidence in the form of 
financial records makes detirmining just how much southern magnates spent on 
mercenaries very difficult. What is clear however, is that knights who fought for a wage 
were distinguished from the bands of routiers in both North and South.
Another important fact which emerges is that infantry, archers, mounted 
sergeants and other combatants are also clearly visible fighting on both sides, in the main 
southern source for the crusade, the Chanson. Their important role in the warfare of the 
thirteenth century is clear and this is an area which merits future investigation. The
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knight continues to take centre stage, however, because of the nature of written sources 
available to us.
If the knight emerges from the written sources as the central figure in warfare at 
this time, then it is the castle that is the central structure, the essential military device, 
centre of a lord’s power as well as his chief residence. It is clear from modem 
scholarship that the study of castellology has moved away from examining the castle 
merely as a military structure. It has been essential for this study, however, to consider 
the castle mainly in its defensive role as well as that of lordly residence and 
administrative centre.
It should be pointed out that conclusions regarding castle architecture which 
hold good for northern France and England are not necessarily relevant to southern 
France owing to differing political and social structures. The sheer number and variety of 
defensive structures in southern France means that a great deal more research is needed 
into this area. The structures and locations of some of the castles of the Languedoc 
appear to indicate that their principal function was defensive. That is not to say, 
however, that many of them did not combine the functions of residence and 
administrative centres. There is evidence to suggest that from the late eleventh century 
onwards changes were occurring in the location and function of castles in southern 
France. The evidence, though, is ambiguous as it is clear that mountain fortresses such 
as Termes, Minerve and Monsegur continued to have some importance in terms of 
defensive capability.
It is clear that even the most well defended fortress would eventually yield in the 
face of an effective blockade and besiegers who had enough resources at their disposal, 
or be taken by storm. The sieges of the Albigensian Crusade show that the strength of a 
castle’s fortifications was only one factor in its successful defence. It is also important to 
remember that many castles, even strongly defended ones, were surrendered to crusaders 
with little struggle.
Even if castle architecture does not appear to be as elaborate and advanced in the 
South prior to the coming of the crusade as it was in the North, the castle still served as 
a symbol of power and prestige. Large-scale urban fortifications in southern France 
perhaps served just as much as symbols of power and influence as privately owned 
castles did in both northern and southern France. Such fortifications were not, of
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course, unique to southern France, though they may perhaps represent a different 
concept of communal defence.
The royal takeover of the south saw many changes in its administration and rule. 
Some of the mountain fortresses, so much associated with the independence of the 
southern aristocracy, were abandoned, others became royal fortresses. Larger castles in 
more populous areas were turned into the centres of royal administration, for example, 
that of Beaucaire. The kings of France, as well as improving existing castles, also built 
new ones. The improvements made to Carcassonne by the French king and the building 
of Aigues-Mortes, begun in 1241, both point to an attempt by the monarch to stamp his 
mark of authority on the South. Castle architecture in the South appears to have changed 
with the coming of the royal takeover in terms of improvements and elaboration of castle 
structures. It is possible this change was bought about by a number of factors including 
the monetary expenditure the king could afford to devote to such projects,the use of 
northern architects and changing fashions in architecture. It is certainly a mistake to 
think of such changes purely in terms of military technology, as many changes such as 
the addition of private chapels or the improvement of living space are clearly not related 
to such considerations.
The castles of the south are inextricably linked to the warfare that took place 
during the Albigensian Crusade, particularly siege warfare and the technology involved.
It is clear that expeditions such as that of Philip Augustus to the Holy Land involved the 
coming together of men with many different talents and capabilities in the field of siege 
warfare. This may have led to technological improvements resulting fi'om their 
collaboration. Men such as Philip Augustus and Richard I could afford to command the 
talents of skilled men, as well as maintain an army of sufficient numbers to successfully 
reduce fortifications of considerable size.
The Albigensian Crusade also involved large numbers of men of diverse origins. 
The assembly of such an army combined with the challenges presented by the defenses of 
the Languedoc may have led to innovation in the field of siege warfare as has been 
suggested was the case in the Third Crusade. The written sources available to us limit 
the amount of knowledge we have regarding the technology involved, as vocabulary and 
lack of technical description are barriers to a full understanding of such things as the type 
of projectile machines that were being used. There is little evidence to suggest, however.
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that one side had any technological superiority over the other. It is clear that many of the 
siege techniques used, for example, by Philip Augustus were being employed in southern 
France during the Albigensian Crusade. The factors that were of major importance to 
success were the resources available to those besieging a fortification and to those being 
besieged.
It has become clear during the course of this study that although the importance 
of siege warfare is apparent, this must be linked to the army in the field. The interaction 
of the two was vitally important. As has been discussed, large scale battles were rare, 
owing to the fact that they were known to be costly and the risks often outweighed the 
advantages to those who decided to engage in such conflicts. The evidence which exists 
points to the fact that small mobile groups of men were essential to carrying small scale 
raids and expeditions. Although it is clear that on at least two occasions the crusaders 
were victorious against a southern army in the field during the Albigensian Crusade, 
there is little real evidence to suggest that this is because the crusaders were inherently 
superior as soldiers. Decisive leadership may have contributed, together with a more 
cohesive compact force stemming fi’om time spent together fighting and training in the 
field . Arguments suggesting that the use of mercenaries led to a less disciplined and 
committed force are very difficult to prove, as to a certain extent material reward was 
very often a motivating factor for the medieval warrior. It is clear that some of the same 
fighting techniques were being used by both sides with varying degrees of success. It is 
also clear that the southerners were just as adept as the crusaders in the practice of small 
scale raids and skirmishes. There is no firm evidence to suggest that the crusaders 
adapted their fighting techniques and strategy according to such factors as the 
topography of the area or the political situation. As with any military campaign though 
the circumstances under which it was fought were unique and it is highly probable that 
the both the crusaders and their southern enemies learnt more about each others 
strengths and weaknesses as the war progressed.
Written evidence such as the Chanson appears to suggest that the people of the 
south could act as a cohesive force to defend themselves against the crusaders, 
particularly when defending their towns and cities. As the crusade progressed, however, 
such cohesion was seen to be illusory and short lived. The southern nobility would 
eventually be forced to submit to the will of the French king through a process of
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political assimilation as well as military defeat. The nature of the southern French 
aristocracy would also change as the result of the confiscation of land, the stricter 
imposition of a more feudal organisation and ascendancy of the Catholic Church.
The material gathered together in the present study has suggested many further 
avenues for future investigation. The nature of the fortifications of the Languedoc merit 
close examination owing to the sheer variety and number which existed. Their 
relationship not only to the fortifications of northern France but also to those of Spain 
and Italy merit further study. As it has been often emphasized that the Languedoc 
belonged very much in the ‘Mediterranean’ sphere of influence another area which 
requires further investigation is the whole area of military practice in southern France in 
comparison to its near neighbors, particularly the areas of Aragon and Catalonia. This 
study has attempted to provide an objective analysis of a conflict that provoked heated, 
biased and emotional reactions from its original chroniclers. It is hoped it has some 
contribution to make to a reappraisal of the warfare of the Albigensian Cruade and the 
study of warfare as a whole in the thirteenth century.
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Table 1. Daily wages paid to stipendary troops in the army of Philip Augustus in Normandy 1202/3
Type of Soldier Daily Wage Percentage of total expenditure
Knight 72 deniers 34%
Mounted Sergeant 36 deniers 14%
Mounted Crossbowman 48 or 54 deniers 8%
Crossbowman on foot 12 or 18 deniers 6%
Foot Soldier 8 deniers 37%
Table 2. Siege engines used in the Albigensian Crusade as depicted in the Chanson
Siege Date Verse Engines used by Crusaders Engines used by 
Southerners
Carcassonne July-Aug
1209
23/33 peireiras, calabres (v25,4) 
_______ gatas (ref)_______
Minerve June-July
1210
48/50 calabres (v48,6) 
Mala Vezina (v48.6)
Termes July-Nov
1210
53/57 peirieras (v 5 3 ,15) 
engeins(v 56, 14)
Lavaur March-May
1211
67/68 genhs, calabres (v67, 5)
Montferrand May
1211
73/75 peireiras (v74, 5)
Toulouse June
1211
79/84 ‘grandes targas bulhidas de 
 cuir’(v80, 3)_______
Carcassonne July
1211
88 trabuquet (v 88,12)
Castelnaudiy Sept
1211
101/106 trabuquet (vl06, 7)
Penne
d'Agenais
Sept
1212
114/115 manganels, peireiras i trazon, 
bosson
_________(v ll4 , 27)_________
Moissac Aug-Sept
1212
119/124 gatas, engens (v 119, 7) 
gata, bosson, peireiras (v l2 1 ,2-3)
Pujol July
1213
132/134 peireiras, engines cargatz 
(vl33,13)
Muret Sept
1213
135/137 peirers (vl37, 8)
Beaucaire Apr-July
1216
155/167 castel, gata (vl62, 91) 
calabre (vl62 line 94) 
mostela (vl67 line 11)
bofo (v 158, 36) 
manganels, gousas, 
engents a doblers (vl59,13) 
cadolph (v l6 4 ,10)
Toulouse Sept
1216
171/205 gata (v 200 line 81) trabuquetz (v l9 8 ,6)
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Figure 1: Dourdon, Yèvre le Chatel and Montlhéi^, three castles of Philip 
Augustus
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Figure 4: Carcassonne in 1254 (Viollet-le-Duc)
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Figure 12: Minerve in 1209
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Figure 13: Termes
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Figure 14: Relief carving in St Nazaire (VioIIet -le-Duc)
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Figure 15: The Battle of Muret
BATTLE OF
MURET.
Sept.|2.l2l3
Jof(h»T
Camp of Kin^  Péter
Terrain
TAragon aabotj
oftbeTouiousah
X X X
Confne% 
de % , Perrmmcn^»
M URET
AfonCfortÿ Army 
A Bovchert/tfeMmriÿ 
B. WitÜWHOtneontre 
C f*W Simon _ 
A tU vt Arm y 
D Count ntToix 
C Hmg Ptter
vaK ]K
Scale of Kilometers
Figure 16:The battle of Muret (Oman)
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Figure 17: The battle of Bouvines
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Plate 1: Falaise
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Plate 2: RomanA^isigothic Tower at Carcassonne
163
/Mht
Plate 3: Aerial View of Carcassonne
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Plate 4: Castle at Carcassonne
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Plate 5: Castle of Beaucaire as seen from the town
Plate 6: Puylaurens
166
Plate 7: Peyrepertuse
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Plate 8; Montségur
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Plate 9: Minerve
169
1
Plate 10: Termes
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